you would have to fly every day for more than a 100,000 years to be in a plane crash where someone dies. But that's not because nothing ever goes wrong. I often get asked, Have you ever been scared in an airplane? And the answer is, of course. This is Captain John Cox. He's worked about 25 crash investigations and flown over 14,000 hours during his 25 years as a commercial pilot. I've had cracked windshields, I've had engine problems, had hydraulic problems, and he says that when problems arise, pilots first maintain control of the plane, then run checklists in this book, The Quick Reference Handbook, or QRH. There are different versions for every plane, but the gist is the same. They all outline operational steps for the crew to take when just about any issue comes up. These days it's also electronic, but there are a lot of other decisions captains have to make at their own discretion. What's that? So what do pilots do when the worst-case scenarios become reality? A 2023 study found that six of

the 20 deadliest accidents since 1974 were caused by communication errors. But one accident fundamentally changed how pilots and their crew communicate on United Airlines flight 173. A pilot with more than 27,000 hours of flight time, Captain Malburn MC Brom, made a critical mistake. The problem arose as they began their descent. The right main landing gear didn't go down normally. It sounded very odd, and it appeared that it was only partially down. They went through the checklist in the QR, and it said that if the visual indicators show the gear is down, then it's up to the pilot to decide what to do. The captain was worried that if they tried to land, the gear would collapse under the weight of the plane. So, preparing the cabin and crew for an emergency evacuation upon landing became Captain McBroom's main focus. To see how everything unfolded at that point, look at the Black Box transcripts. At 5:46 p.m., the co-pilot asks the flight engineer, How much fuel we got, Frosty? The answer, £5,000, enough for

roughly 20 minutes, they're in a fuel-critical situation, and it's getting worse by the minute because the plane was ready to land flaps up and landing gear down. They were burning through fuel fast. The co-pilot and flight engineer, both below the captain and crew hierarchy, bring up the fuel levels four more times. The captain doesn't acknowledge it. Then at 606, the co-pilot says, We're going to lose an engine, and the captain says, Why, which indicates he has not yet understood the criticality of their fuel state. Soon after, the captain decided to turn towards the airport. Within the next 7 minutes, they lost the last three engines. When they finally did turn to the airport, they were some 18 miles from it. At 613, the pilot realizes they won't make it. He would be looking for any open place to put the jet away from a community. So if you saw a large collection of lights, that's houses and buildings and people, you want to go away from there. You want an open field, a roadway, anything like

that where you can potentially put the Jet, and let it start to slow down as it comes apart because it's going to come apart a minute after declaring Mayday. The plane went down in some wooded suburbs of Portland, killing 10 people. The accident investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board found two main probable causes. First, the failure of the captain to monitor properly the aircraft's fuel state, and second, the failure of the other two flight crew members either to fully comprehend the criticality of the fuel state or to successfully communicate their concern to the captain, turning an abnormal event into an emergency into a tragedy. This wasn't a skill-based problem, this wasn't an experience-based problem, this was a communication problem. After Flight 173, United instituted a new management system that went on to be called Crew Resource Management, or CRM. It trained crews to reduce pilot error by using the human resources on the flight deck. One of the biggest changes CRM made was to cockpit hierarchy. Before CRM, the captain was the deao authority.

on a flight, which often led to other crew members' observations and suggestions being ignored, as happened on flight 173. CRM reduced the authority gradient between the captain and other crew members, creating a more collaborative environment. Less than a decade after United implemented CRM, pilot Al Haynes credited it with saving 184 people on United flight 232. United flight 232's emergency condition was worse than a pilot in his worst nightmare could come up with. Captain Haynes was flying from Denver to Chicago. About an hour into the flight, the tail-mounted engine came apart. When they ran through the engine shutdown checklist in the QRH, they noticed another issue: the hydraulic systems gauge was showing zero pressure, so they couldn't fully control the plane. The chance of losing all hydraulic systems was so remote that there wasn't even a checklist for this scenario. The loss of this engine was something that the airplane was designed to be able to tolerate. The thought that you could have the simultaneous loss of all three hydraulic systems was considered to be

less than one in a billion. To make matters worse, they noticed the plane kept pulling to the right. I have serious doubts about making airport, and without a checklist for this situation, the crew had only their existing knowledge and each other to work with. United had a training captain that was flying as a passenger, and he asked, Is there anything he can do to help? He recognizes the airplanes having control problems. Captain Haynes immediately invites him up front. We'll take all the input we can get, was his approach. Now you have four Pilots that are effectively putting ideas on the table, discussing them, the pros and cons of each of those to help come up with a team solution to this extremely complex problem. The crew was also in constant contact with air traffic control to figure out where to land. They had such limited control that they needed basically Compass headings to fly and to not try to do navigation themselves. They had enough to worry about. As we get control of this airplane, we're going to put it down wherever it

happens to be they discussed landing on water known as ditching, and landing on a four-lane Interstate if you can't make the airport, sir. There is an interstate that runs uh north to south. Over the course of 44 minutes, the crew tried everything they could think of to regain control. They came up with a way to use the thrust on the wing-mounted engines to counter the fact that the airplane wanted to roll to one side and to dampen out some of the aerodynamic pitch up and down that the airplane was doing. Eventually, they managed to gain just enough control of the plane to line up with a Runway at Sue Gateway airport. But without Hydraulics, the crew struggled to control the speed or the rate of descent at Final Approach. They were going almost 250 mph, about 80 mph too fast. 19 he's coming down real fast down the south end on fire. Of the 296 people on board, 112 people died, but 184 survived. Under a condition as severe as what United flight 232 experienced, there should have

been no survivors. Captain Haynes, while he maintained control of the situation, he was dependent on the other three Pilots to get a successful outcome after flight 232. The FAA made CRM mandatory for every Airline. Looking at the number of fatal accidents compared to how many millions more flights there are each year, it's clear that flying has become significantly safer. If you go back to 1904, the Wright Flyer was virtually destroyed after its fourth flight. Expectation of safety circa 1904: one major accident every four flights. If you come forward to the mid-1930s, the Airline Pilots Association was founded by 24 Pilots, of which 12 were killed in aviation accidents. Course corrections to the industry have streamlined Pilots' actions and Communications, and now when Pilots do face emergencies, they're more equipped to handle them. Just look at how Captain Chesley Sullenberger handled losing both engines in a bird strike at about 3,000 ft in the air. He only had a few minutes to figure out where to put

the plane down what that work to our right anything in New Jersey maybe teero you want to try to go to teero yes C 1529 turn right 280 land Runway one at T we can't do it okay which Runway would you like at T we're going be there were 155 people on board everyone survived and that is the work of a large number of people over a very long time to make better airplanes better Air Traffic Control Systems better pilot training all of these things work in concert to come up with this extraordinarily safe transportation system

Captain Breaks Down Flights That Changed How Pilots Handle Disaster | WSJ Booked

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Captain Breaks Down Flights That Changed How Pilots Handle Disaster | WSJ Booked

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