토니 로빈스가 말하는 사모펀드: 위험과 수익 설명

### 사모펀드의 현실: 토니 로빈스의 주장에 대한 비판적 분석
* 📈 토니 로빈스는 최근 일반 투자자를 위한 고수익 저위험 투자로 사모펀드를 옹호하며, **현재 수수료를 지불하는 부유층과 달리 곧 수수료 없이 이러한 기회를 이용할 수 있게 될 것**이라고 말했습니다.
* 🤔 그러나 이러한 주장은 **기존의 금융 이론과 모순**되고 시장 변동에 영향을 받는 개인 투자에 내재된 위험을 간과한다는 점에서 회의적인 시각을 불러일으킵니다.
* 📊 사모펀드는 증권거래소에 상장되지 않은 기업에 투자하는 것으로 정의되며 **벤처 캐피탈, 성장 자본, 차입매수(LBO)**를 포함하며, 그 역사적 맥락은 **100년 이상 거슬러 올라갑니다.**
* 💼 상당한 부채를 활용하여 기업을 인수하는 LBO 모델은 **1901년 JP Morgan의 카네기 스틸 인수**와 같은 주목할 만한 거래가 이 분야의 초기 이정표가 되면서 시작 이래로 발전해 왔습니다.
* 📉 사모펀드는 투자자가 실제 경험하는 현금 수익을 반영하지 않는 내부수익률(IRR)을 보고하는 경우가 많기 때문에 **공모주보다 50퍼센트 높은 수익률**이라는 로빈스의 주장은 오해의 소지가 있습니다.
* 🔍 연구에 따르면 최근 몇 년간 사모펀드가 **S&P 500 지수보다 성과가 저조**했다는 보고가 나오는 등 사모펀드의 상장 시장 대비 성과가 크게 감소한 것으로 나타났습니다.
* 💸 또한, 사모펀드 투자는 적절한 보상 없이 유동성 위험을 수반하기 때문에 **상장 주식에 비해 실제 위험 대비 수익률에 대한 우려**가 제기됩니다.
* 📉 전반적으로 사모펀드는 소형주에 대한 가치 있는 노출을 제공할 수 있지만, 특히 **전통적인 공개시장 투자를 통해 비슷한 수익**을 얻을 수 있는 상황에서 개인 투자자가 이 분야에 참여해야 한다는 논거는 약합니다.

토니 로빈스는 사모펀드가 종종 공개 시장보다 실적이 저조하다는 증거가 있음에도 불구하고 사모펀드를 저위험 고수익으로 잘못 표현하고 있습니다.

A friend of mine sent me a link last week to a CNBC interview with the giant motivational speaker Tony Robbins, where he extolled the virtues of investing in private equity. Robbins argued that private equity provided high returns with low risk to rich investors, and that these great returns would soon become available to ordinary investors, and surprisingly, with no fees. In fact, I was confused as he seemed to be saying that you would receive fees as an investor. All of these rich idiots are paying fees, but somehow regular people won't have to. I haven't watched CNBC in quite some time, but the whole thing came off as being like a commercial for decades. You know, private institutions, big institutions, pension funds, ultra-wealthy people have had access, but the general public has not had access, and most of them don't even understand the impact. For example, in the S&P 500 for the last 35 years, we know we've compounded at 99.2%. It's pretty darn good. You're doubling your money about every eight years, but you've

got 14.2% not with these guys with average private equity. So imagine getting 50% more per year compounded for decades. So you don't have to fight to get into these funds anymore. You can actually purchase the fund, the companies themselves. You can become a general partner. As you know, you're a limited partner when you're an investor in one of these funds, but you alert the CEO, the CFO, and they make 2% whether they make you money or not, and they make 20% of the upside. And people give that because of the amazing returns. Well, now you get the 2 and 20. It's pretty extraordinary. So I own 65 different firms, some of the biggest in the world now that I'm a partner in that area. And anyone can start to do this now. I know very little about Tony Robbins, but as you can probably guess, I was instantly skeptical. These claims fly in the face of all financial theory. To start with, it's not obvious why investing in private

companies would provide much higher returns than investing in publicly listed companies. Private companies are still just businesses and subject to the business cycle like all investments, and many of the private companies were even taken private by investors paying a premium to the public shareholders. It's really not obvious why a privately held business would be less risky than a listed business or that an investor should expect to get higher returns with lower risk. Now, I did some Googling, and I have to tell you I'm actually quite impressed by Tony Robbins. He's made some big promises in the past and at least in one case appears to have lived up to them. More than 30 years ago, Tony Robbins wrote a book called Awaken the Giant Within, and straight away I thought, Well, who can do that? And the answer is Tony Robbins, it seems to. He's 6'7 tall, an actual giant. There's no one better qualified to write a book like that. In fact, I'll have to go out and buy one. I realized that I probably shouldn't have.

been so skeptical. Anyone with a basic knowledge of um history knows that giants like Tony Robbins probably have a goose that lays golden eggs, and so maybe we should buy some of his magic beans. It has to work out, right? So, first up, what is private equity? Are the returns really as high as Tony Robbins says, and is the risk as low? On top of that, when people say that private equity firms are evading taxes and ruining the economy, are they right? Well, private equity is quite simply investing in companies that are not listed on a stock exchange. Private equity funds can be broken down into venture capital, which involves investing in startups, which are high risk, high return; growth capital, which involves taking a minority stake in a mature company that either needs this capital to grow or needs it to commercialize a new product line; and finally, leveraged buyouts, where the fund uses a large amount of debt to purchase an entire company. In an LBO, the buyer usually uses the company's assets as collateral for the debt and plans to pay

it off with the company's future cash flow. We'll be focusing mostly on LBOs today, as that's what most people mean when they talk about private equity. And there's a long history of transactions like this, as people have been borrowing money to buy out businesses as long as businesses have existed. JP Morgan's acquisition of Carnegie Steel in 1901 for $480 million is considered the first true major buyout, and the first leveraged buyout was the purchase of Pan Atlantic Steamship Company and Waterman Steamship by McLean Industries in 1955, where the buyer borrowed $42 million for the transaction and was able to pay off $20 million of that debt as soon as the transaction closed, using the cash and assets of the acquired companies. Up until the 1980s, the LBO remained an obscure financing technique, as since the Great Depression, companies had kept their debt loads low. Robin Wigglesworth described in the FT how K's 1978 purchase of Hudde Industries using only $1 million in equity for the $380

million purchase was Private equity's Genesis moment. The deal was structured such that the target firm itself was responsible for repaying the massive debt. This deal showed just how ambitious even a small investment company could be and became a blueprint for the industry. Wigglesworth describes how the deal documents became widely read on Wall Street by people like Steven Schwarzman, then a partner at Lehman Brothers. Schwarzman wrote in his book King of Capital that he had read the deal prospectus, looked at the capital structure, and realized the returns that could be achieved. He described it as a Rosetta Stone for how to do leverage buyouts. Over the next decade, the LBO became the biggest business on Wall Street. Before we go any further, let me tell you about this week's video sponsor, Flexispot. A few of you might have noticed my new desk, the Flexispot E7 L Pro L-shaped standing desk. If you haven't already heard of Flexispot, they make these really solid adjustable height desks along with other

office furniture like office chairs and under-desk treadmills that can change the way you interact with your workspace. It's hard to describe how solid the desk frame is, but it's rated to lift 330 lb, which is 150 kg. Flexispot sent me their Space Walk E3, a great under-desk walking treadmill, which you can use with the desk in standing mode. At 6'2, I'm a bit taller than average, and considering how much time I spend in the office, I like that I can set a custom desk height so that I'm not hunched over my keyboard, and I can adjust it for different tasks. I chose one of the more basic desktops, but they're available in different colors, different woods, with all sorts of storage drawers and monitor stands available. You can also just buy the frame and use your own custom desktop. There's built-in cable management too, which keeps things tidy, and the cables don't tangle when you raise and lower the desk. Use my code for an extra $30 off on E7, E7 Pro, and E7 L. Trust me, it's

a rare treat. Don't miss out on designing your dream setup with Flexi spot. From the early 1960s through until the late 1970s, American Executives participated in a wave of Acquisitions where they built massive Diversified conglomerates. The ranks of middle management at these firms grew and profitability began to decline as the businesses became too unwieldy to manage. Many of these businesses were trading at a discount to net asset value and the early lbos involved buying these businesses up on the cheap and breaking them up by selling off the pieces for something closer to fair value. This breakup approach led to a media backlash against the greed of these so-called corporate Raiders. The character Gordon gecko in the 1987 film Wall Street was based on a number of high-profile corporate Raiders of the day and was supposed to be the villain of the film. The Writers were shocked when the public saw gecko as a hero rather than as a villain for his line greed is good.

how did these deals work well? While every deal is unique, the one common element is financial leverage or borrowed money to complete the transaction. Some portion of the debt incurred in the LBO is secured by the assets of the acquired business, and its cash flows are used to service the buyer's debt. With an LBO, the acquired company helps pay for itself, and for this reason, the deals were sometimes called bootstrap acquisitions. The high level of debt helps the private equity company to achieve acceptable returns for their investors, and maybe more importantly, provided tax savings due to the tax deductibility of interest expense. Private equity companies often encourage top company management to invest alongside them in the deal, better aligning management's incentives with investors. It's argued that the large interest in principal expenses incurred puts management under pressure to improve operating efficiency and that the discipline of debt can force management to cut costs, divest non-core businesses, and invest in technological upgrades to improve efficiency. While private equity firms will be flexible in terms of what

they invest in. The leverage nature of their business means that strong cash flow generation and a strong asset base will matter a lot as you can't really borrow without these attractive valuations along with relatively little existing debt will matter too. One of the key drivers of returns to early leverage buyouts was that not only did expensing the interest payment on debt reduce the tax burden on the acquired company but what was known as the general utilities Doctrine meant that a buyer who bought at least 80% of the stock of a corporation could treat the transaction for tax purposes as liquidation of the corporation and purchase of its assets. Corporations liquidate their assets were not subject to capital gains tax on the appreciation in value on their assets and what this meant was that the value of assets could be written up and red depreciated reducing the taxes owed by the company. These newly leveraged firms would have to pay little if any corporate income tax for the life of the buyout. This meant that no business turnaround was even

needed the same stream of corporate income now shielded from tax. It could be used to service the massive debt taken on in the transaction with the belief that the taxpayer was subsidizing leverage buyouts. Ronald Reagan's tax reform Act of 1986 repealed the general utilities Doctrine, reducing the profitability of these deals. We're reducing tax rates by simplifying the complex system of special Provisions that favor some at the expense of others. Restoring confidence in our tax system means restoring and respecting the principle of fairness for all. Okay, so who invests in private Equity? Tony Robbins told the CNBC audience that regular people don't get a look in. It's just the ultra-wealthy. Well, when we look at the biggest investors in private Equity, it's a mix of Pension funds and Sovereign wealth funds, which is basically the money of ordinary people. Just over half of the money in private Equity comes from public Pension funds. A quarter comes from Sovereign wealth funds. Then we've got insurance companies, foundations, private Pension funds, Banks, and so on.

CPP, the Canadian pension plan, is a huge allocator to private equity, as is Calpers, the Californian public pension plan. Broken down by country, the US, Canada, and Singapore are the biggest allocators. So when Tony asks why do the richest people in the world get the great assets, it's maybe a bit misleading. If you invest in private equity, you're getting to invest like a teacher or a firefighter, not Jeff Bezos. If you want to invest like Jeff Bezos, you have to put almost all of your money in Amazon, a publicly listed stock. So what do the investment returns look like then? Tony said the returns are 50% higher than public equities, but that's not really accurate. Firstly, private equity funds don't actually report total returns like other fund managers do; they report the fund's IRR or internal rate of return. When an investor commits to invest in a private equity fund, their money doesn't go in right away. The first four to five years of a private equity fund's life are known as the investment period in

this period, the fund usually draws down committed capital to make investments into portfolio companies. Although they usually call in most of the committed capital during the first 5 years, it can sometimes take them longer to invest at all, such as if they feel there are no good investment opportunities. Warren Buffett explained the problem with this at a shareholder meeting in 2019, saying, When you commit the money to private equity firms, they don't take the money, but you pay a fee on the money that you've committed. You really have to have that money ready to come up with at any time, and of course, it makes their returns look better if you sit there for a long time in treasury bills, which you have to hold because they can call you up and demand the money, and they don't count that in their IR calculations. There are other tricks too. The Wall Street Journal described in 2018 how the funds often don't call the cash as soon as an investment is identified. Instead, borrowing money to make the investment in what's called a bridge loan, tapping investors for cash.

later according to the journal. This was originally done to make Capital calls more predictable for investors, but while the practice doesn't boost a fund's cash profits, it does decrease the time during which investors' cash is held in the fund, delaying the moment when the clock starts ticking from an IRR calculation standpoint, which can result in a significant boost in the internal rate of return. So, as impressive as reported IRRs often look, that's not the actual return that an investor gets. Internal rate of return is quite a problematic metric. It's a bit like yield to maturity on a bond, where there's a built-in reinvestment assumption which may not play out in real life as the amount of capital invested changes over time. It's not very easy to know average private equity returns as the funds themselves don't report returns to a central database, and the series of returns that people analyze contain survivorship bias. When people claim that private equity outperforms public equities by 3% a year, a big problem with that number is that most of that outperformance happened 20

or more years ago when the industry was much smaller, and there was more low-hanging fruit. Over the last 20 years, the outperformance has been closer to 1% a year after fees, which, while not as impressive, is still good and should compound out into significantly greater wealth for investors over time. Sadly, using PitchBook data, it would appear that private equity stopped outperforming the S&P 500 15 years ago and, over the last year, significantly underperformed the stock market. A 2014 paper from Oxford University made the argument that investors had been using the wrong benchmark, the MSCI All Country World Index, to judge private equity returns, as that index has a weighting of about 50% for US stocks, and private equity funds invest about 80% of their money in the United States, which has outperformed international stocks over that period. Additionally, private equity typically invests in smaller companies than are in the big US indices, and most importantly, public equities use considerably less leverage than the companies in a leveraged buyout fund.

paper argued that you could not judge private equity returns without taking these factors into account. The author concluded that if the benchmark is changed to small and value indices and is levered up, the average buyout fund underperforms by 3.1% per annum. And that's not what we're trying to do at all. How are we going to awake and the giant within if we're growing 3.1% less than our benchmark? Building on this research, a paper in the Financial Analyst Journal dug even deeper. The authors used a more complete database of returns and conducted a thorough bottom-up analysis of the risk characteristics of the underlying companies in buyout funds. This paper found that the underlying companies that buyout funds invest in have, on average, smaller market caps than their public counterparts. Their sector composition is materially different to big US indices, for example, significantly overweight consumer discretionary stocks and underweight the financial sector. And their leverage is much higher than that of public companies in the same sector. When they adjusted for size sector

composition and leverage of portfolio companies in buyout funds. The outperformance was reduced by more than half. Finally, when they adjusted for the vintage of the funds, they found no evidence of private equity outperformance. That then leads us to Tony Robin's argument that private equity is low risk if the returns are the same as the returns of a leveraged investment in small-cap stocks. Because the funds make levered investments in small-cap stocks, then an investment in private equity should be riskier than the average portfolio. One risk that you're taking when investing in private equity is that your investment is illiquid, meaning that you can't necessarily get your money back quickly if you want it. Now, normally, when an investor takes an incremental risk like this, they expect to get an incremental return in compensation. It doesn't appear that with private equity, investors are being compensated for the illiquidity risk that they're taking. This leads us to Cliff Asness's argument that private equity investors and fund managers are playing a dangerous game of what he

calls volatility laundering. Asus argues that the illiquidity of private equity and the fact that the assets are held at prices that in no way relate to real-world asset values was historically acknowledged in the industry as a bug, but today this bug is being sold to investors as a feature. He points out that investors usually get paid to accept a bug but are expected to pay up to receive a feature. In market sell-offs, private equity funds are very slow to write down the value of their investments, but equally in market rises, they're slow to mark them up. Now, it shouldn't be hard to adjust the value of a portfolio of private assets in line with the overall stock market. As if you're levered long small-cap equities and the stock market falls by 25%, your portfolio most likely fell by that amount or more. When people see the stock market fall and private equity funds claim that their investments are just fine, they might get the feeling that they have a low-risk investment, but best of luck selling it at anything.

close to the price it's marked to what you have instead is Schrödinger's investment returns. A 2002 paper by Mark Anson looked at the effect of stale pricing in the risk and return analysis of private equity investments. Managers reporting unnecessarily stale pricing, as described by Cliff Asness, can result in investors underestimating the risk of an investment and overestimating the manager's skill. Anson's paper demonstrated that there was a significant lagged beta effect for leveraged buyouts, venture capital, and mezzanine debt investments, and that the lagged market betas are statistically significant for up to four prior quarters of public stock market returns. Since betas are linearly additive, the sum of the lagged betas provides an estimate of the total systematic risk embedded within private equity portfolios. Anson found that the systematic risk in private equity was approximately double what it first appeared to be. Now, I'm not trying to beat up on Tony Robbins here, but it would appear that his assessment of investment risk is almost as skewed as

his assessment of the risk of walking over hot coals, and I'm basing that on a New York Times article which reports ordered that 30 people had to be treated for burns after walking over hot coals at one of his seminars. His website says walking over those hot coals is a symbolic experience that proves if you can make it through the fire, you can make it through anything. And I guess that's an interesting way of working out which of your seminar attendees can't make it through anything. All right, look, let's just cut through the old crap cake here, huh? Okay, the biggest problem in Tony's statement on CNBC is that even if he was right that returns had been higher and risk had been lower than public markets in the past, there's no reason to believe that an investor today will get the same returns. When you invest in a strategy, you get its future returns, not its past returns. If we follow Tony's approach to investing, we would put everything in Altria Group, which used to be known as Philip Morris.

it's a tobacco company and was the highest returning stock of the last 100 years. A dollar invested 100 years ago would be worth $2.65 million today. Most of the returns of investing in private equity came when the private equity business was a lot smaller than it is today and under very different tax rules. Today we have dozens of massive buyout funds all chasing the same deals, meaning that they are significantly less likely to find underpriced assets than they found years ago. The deal landscape today is nothing like it was in 1978 when KKR put up a million dollars to buy a $380 million company. Today private equity firms are sitting on $2.6 trillion of cash reserves looking for deals to do. So how did that 1978 deal work out anyhow? Well once levered up HUD day had to manage more for cash flows than for profits as they had those steep debt repayments to meet. A severe recession came in 1981 to 1982 right as competition in making machine tools

appeared from Japan. Firm management petitioned the government for protection from Japanese imports, but the request was denied. The company underwent a restructuring plan, spinning off a number of divisions to reduce debt. A year later, it underwent another LBO, or what might be more accurately called a recapitalization. The equity investors who paid $252 per share for their stock in 1979 received $11 per share seven years later. The recapitalization piled debt upon debt at the high-interest rates of the time, and the firm was eventually broken up and sold off in pieces. One of the arguments in favor of investing in private equity is that the number of public companies available to invest in today has reached a new low, as startups have been staying private for much longer than in the past, and equity issuance net of stock buybacks is today at its lowest level in 25 years. It can be argued that these trends are working together to limit investment opportunities for public market investors. Private equity can serve a

valuable role in an institutional investor's portfolio as it provides small-cap equity exposure, which is worthwhile having, and the additional leverage might appeal to institutional investors with a long investment time horizon. It's not obvious that retail investors should be stepping in when the research shows that they can get similar returns from a small-cap equity index fund. Retail investors don't need to deploy the same amount of capital as sovereign wealth funds and pension funds do either. The FT recently wrote that if the mosaic of assets managed by KKR were folded into one entity and listed on the stock market, its market cap would be comparable to industrial giants like GE, Lockheed Martin, or 3M. KKR now resembles the sprawling diversified conglomerates it broke up. According to PitchBook data, private equity's annual internal rate of return fell below 10% in the year to March 2024, and over the same period, an investment in the S&P 500 returned 30%. A big reason for this underperformance is

that private equity is a levered investment in small-cap stocks with sufficient cash flows to pay down their debts. While recent stock market performance has been driven by mega-cap tech firms, which private equity has no exposure to, according to a presentation by Awat De Modin at NYU, private equity firms typically buy companies that have suffered declining profits in the two years leading up to the acquisition, and profitability typically improves in the two years after acquisition. This improvement, he finds, is most pronounced when leverage is higher. The companies bought up have often underinvested relative to their peers before the acquisition, and there is a decline in investment after the acquisition. Deod finds that private equity-owned firms don't default more frequently than similarly levered publicly listed firms. He finds that while private equity is often blamed for job losses, there's little evidence to support this claim. Research shows that while layoffs often do come after an acquisition, new jobs are also frequently created in new businesses that these firms enter while people.

criticize private equity for exploiting the tax code. The tax shield associated with higher debt is available to every company, and if they're under-taxed, the blame lies with the politicians who write the tax code, not the companies governed by it. If insufficient taxes are being collected, the government is able to change the tax code as they did in the 1980s. I don't invest in private equity, and I don't intend to do so either, as I believe similar returns are available in public markets with better legal protections in place. I don't worry about missing the boat on this front either, as right now it would appear that there might be too much money chasing too few deals, and I don't expect to see huge returns out of these funds in the coming years. I don't have any objection to the industry either. I think that it's a net benefit to the economy to have people out there making changes at inefficiently run firms, and it strikes me that an economy made up of stagnant

badly managed companies wouldn't provide more jobs or higher tax revenues. But feel free to disagree with me in the comment section. If you enjoyed this video, you should watch my video on Blackstone's Frozen real estate fund next. Don't forget to check out our sponsor, Flexy Spot, using the link in the video description. See you in the next video. Bye. [Music] t

Is Tony Robbins Right About Private Equity?

Patrick Boyle is a hedge fund manager, a university professor and a former investment banker. 

This channel is all about quantitative finance. By subscribing you will see videos explaining what is happening in markets right now, you will learn about financial derivatives, corporate finance and how traders use quantitative tools like statistics. You will see interviews with some of the most interesting people in the financial industry.  In addition, you will see some longer form documentaries on the history of financial markets.

To contact Patrick go to the website http://onfinance.org

DISCLAIMER:
This channel is not affiliated with any financial institution. The videos on this channel are for entertainment purposes only and do not constitute financial advice. Those seeking investment advice should seek out a registered professional. Patrick is not responsible for investment actions taken by viewers and his content should not be used as a basis for investment.

Patrick Boyle

토니 로빈스의 사모펀드에 대한 생각

토니 로빈스는 사모펀드가 낮은 위험으로 높은 수익을 제공하며, 이러한 기회가 곧 일반 투자자들도 수수료 없이 이용할 수 있게 될 것이라고 주장합니다.

그는 비상장 기업이 상장 기업보다 더 높은 수익을 제공할 수 있으며, 이제 투자자가 직접 회사를 인수하거나 일반 파트너가 될 수 있다고 주장합니다.

사모펀드 모델에는 벤처 캐피탈, 성장 자본, 레버리지 바이아웃이 있으며, 후자는 부채를 이용해 기업 전체를 인수하는 방식입니다.

1901년 JP Morgan이 카네기 스틸을 인수하고 1955년 맥린 인더스트리가 팬 애틀랜틱 증기선 회사를 인수한 것이 중요한 이정표로 기록될 만큼 LBO는 오랜 역사를 지니고 있습니다.

1978년 K가 단 100만 달러의 자기자본으로 허드 인더스트리를 인수한 사건은 레버리지 바이아웃의 잠재적 수익을 보여준 사모펀드의 창세기적 순간으로 꼽힙니다.

이후 1980년대에 기업 침입자들에 의해 주도된 LBO의 물결은 언론의 반발과 함께 고든 게코 같은 인물이 대중문화에서 논란의 여지가 있는 영웅으로 묘사되는 결과를 가져왔습니다.

레버리지 바이아웃(LBO)의 메커니즘

LBO는 인수한 회사의 자산과 현금흐름을 담보로 한 부채를 통해 재무 레버리지를 활용하여 거래를 완료합니다.

이러한 높은 수준의 부채는 사모펀드가 투자자를 위한 수익을 달성하는 데 도움이 되며 이자 비용 공제를 통한 절세 효과를 제공합니다.

사모펀드의 일반적인 투자자로는 공적 연기금과 국부펀드가 있으며, 이들은 궁극적으로 일반인의 돈을 관리합니다.

사모펀드 수익률에 대한 오해의 소지가 있는 이야기

사모펀드는 자산 배분에서 중요한 역할을 담당하고 있으며, CPP와 Calpers와 같은 주요 투자자들이 이를 활용하고 있습니다.

사모펀드가 초부유층과 비슷한 수익을 제공한다는 일반적인 인식은 투자 과정과 보고 방식이 다르기 때문에 오해의 소지가 있습니다.

사모펀드에서 사용하는 내부수익률(IRR)은 문제가 있는 지표로, 평균 수익률을 정확하게 평가하기 어렵고 분석에서 생존 편향이 발생하는 경우가 많습니다.

사모펀드의 수익률은 지난 20년 동안 수수료를 제외하면 연간 1%로 감소했으며 지난 15년 동안 S&P 500을 밑돌았습니다.

2014년 옥스퍼드 대학의 한 논문에서는 사모펀드 수익률을 판단하는 데 잘못된 벤치마크가 사용되었으며, 기업 규모, 섹터 구성, 레버리지와 같은 요소를 조정하면 성과가 절반 이상 감소한다고 주장했습니다.

사모펀드 투자의 비유동성은 투자자들이 추가 위험에 대해 적절한 보상을 받고 있는지에 대한 의문을 제기합니다.

Asus는 사모펀드의 유동성과 낡은 가격 책정을 비판하며, 이러한 요소들이 현재 투자자들에게 기능으로 마케팅되고 있다고 주장합니다.

시장 변동에 따른 사모펀드 투자 가치의 느린 조정은 저위험 투자에 대한 잘못된 인식을 불러일으킵니다.

2002년 마크 앤슨의 논문은 사모펀드의 상당한 후행 베타 효과를 강조하며 시스템 리스크가 실제보다 약 2배 더 크다는 사실을 밝혀냈습니다.

담배 회사는 지난 100년 동안 가장 높은 수익률을 기록한 주식으로, 1달러 투자로 오늘날 265만 달러로 성장했습니다.

사모펀드 업계는 크게 변화하여 이제 대규모 펀드가 동일한 거래를 쫓고 있으며 2조 6천억 달러의 현금을 보유하고 있습니다.

2024년 3월 기준 연간 내부 수익률이 10% 미만인 사모펀드의 저조한 성과는 같은 기간 S&P 500의 30% 수익률과 대조를 이룹니다.

사모펀드는 안정적인 현금 흐름을 가진 소형주에 대한 레버리지 투자를 포함하며, 일반적으로 인수 전 수익이 감소하는 기업을 대상으로 합니다.

동종 업계에 비해 과소 투자하는 경우가 많으며, 인수 후 정리해고를 유발할 수도 있지만 다른 벤처기업에 새로운 일자리를 창출하기도 합니다.

부채 증가에 따른 세금 혜택은 모든 기업이 받을 수 있으며, 과소 과세에 대한 책임은 세법을 만든 정치인에게 있습니다.