미국 외교 정책: 힘의 역학 관계와 글로벌 시사점

### 딥 스테이트와 미국의 외교 정책: 비판적 고찰
* 🌍 이 토론은 외교 정책의 영향력 있는 사상가, 특히 **존 마이머 교수와 제프리 삭스 교수**를 중심으로 최근의 정치적 지지와 미국 통치에서 **'딥 스테이트' 개념의 함의**를 분석합니다.
* 🔍 삭스는 두 주요 정당의 인사들로 구성된 단일한 '딥 스테이트 정당'이 존재한다고 가정하고, 이들의 공통된 이해관계가 **수십 년 동안 일관된 외교 정책 의제**를 이끌어 왔다고 주장합니다.
* 🧐 미머는 공화당과 민주당을 '트위들 D와 트위들 덤'에 비유하며 **특히 트럼프 대통령 재임 기간 동안 외교 정책 접근 방식의 차이가 거의 없었다**고 강조합니다.
* 💼 '딥 스테이트'라는 용어는 **19세기 후반부터 성장한 확고한 행정 국가**를 의미하며, 현재 기득권을 가진 관료들의 네트워크를 통해 **미국 외교 정책에 영향을 미치고 있습니다.**
* ⚔ 두 학자는 **미국의 외교 정책이 주로 세계 권력을 극대화하는 것**을 목표로 해왔으며, 종종 민주주의와 안정을 증진한다는 명분으로 정당화된 개입으로 이어져 역효과를 낼 수 있다는 데 동의합니다.
* 📉 삭스는 미국이 진정으로 해외 민주주의를 증진하고자 한다는 개념을 비판하며, **리비아와 이라크의 혼란스러운 결과**가 보여주는 것처럼 개입이 다른 국가의 복지보다는 미국의 이익에 부합하는 경우가 많다고 주장합니다.
* 🌐 대화는 미중 관계로 옮겨가 **미머는 중국 봉쇄의 필요성**을 강조하고 **삭스는 갈등과 경제적 타격을 피하기 위해 보다 협력적인 접근**이 필요하다고 주장합니다.
* 🤝 궁극적으로 이 대담은 미국 외교 정책의 복잡성을 강조하며 **다극화된 세계에서 민주주의의 이상과 실용적인 국익 추구 사이의 긴장**을 드러냅니다.

### 글로벌 긴장 탐색하기: 미국, 중국, 그리고 핵 분쟁의 위험성
* 🌍 미국은 중국과 경제적, 군사적으로 경쟁하면서 **지구상에서 유일한 지역 패권국**으로 남아야 할 필요성을 강조하는 중대한 도전에 직면해 있습니다.
* 🤔 일부 전문가들은 **중국을 봉쇄하는 것이 현명한 전략**이라고 주장하는 반면, 다른 전문가들은 특히 대만과 관련하여 긴장이 고조되는 것을 경계하는 등 권력 추구 행위의 효과에 대해 논쟁을 벌이고 있습니다.
* 🔒 존 미어샤이머는 **"지역 패권국들은 서로를 위협하지 않는다"**고 강조하며 미국이 불필요한 분쟁을 막기 위해 **러시아 인근에 군사 주둔을 피해야 한다**고 제안합니다.
* ⚠ 핵전쟁에 대한 우려가 만연하고 있으며, 특히 우크라이나 분쟁의 맥락에서 **현재의 미국 정책이 재앙적인 결과**를 초래할 수 있다고 경고하는 지도자들이 있습니다.
* 🇮🇳 또한, 전문가들은 서로 다른 이해관계에도 불구하고 **인도의 실용적인 접근 방식**과 **중국에 대한 동맹국으로서의 잠재력**에 주목하면서 신흥 강국으로서 인도의 역할에 대한 논의가 이어집니다.
* 🌊 남중국해와 인도양은 향후 분쟁의 주요 발화점이 될 수 있는 지역으로, **분쟁이 확대되는 것을 방지하기 위해 신중한 항해**가 필요합니다.
* 📚 대담은 이스라엘-팔레스타인 분쟁에 초점을 맞춰 **두 국가 해법의 필요성**과 지역 불안정을 피하기 위한 평화를 달성하기 위한 **미국의 영향력 역할**을 강조하며 마무리됩니다.
* 🔗 궁극적으로 패널들은 점점 더 복잡해지는 글로벌 환경에서 권력의 역학 관계와 신중함의 중요성을 이해하면 **핵 재앙을 피하는 데 도움이 될 수 있다**고 강조합니다.

딥 스테이트는 종종 진정한 민주주의 가치를 무시하고 글로벌 긴장을 고조시키는 권력 중심의 외교 정책을 영속화합니다.

one of the most influential and controversial thinkers in the world. He is known as one of the world's leading experts on economic development, one of the most famous political scientists in history. We're talking about moral and political principles here. I would suggest that all four wars could be ended quickly. Great power politics is now back on the table. If we are anything as a world community, we have to implement what we've [Music] [Applause] said. I'm excited for this panel. We're going to talk about foreign policy. We have, I think, two of the most interesting, eminent, renowned thinkers about foreign policy, Professor John Mimer from the University of Chicago and Professor Jeffrey Sachs from Columbia. So great to have you guys here today. It's a big world, and there's a lot of things happening, so let's just jump into it. The big news over the past week was that Dick Cheney endorsed Kamala Harris for president. I think for people who see the world in partisan political terms, this might have

been surprising, but I don't think that you guys were that surprised by that. Do you see an underlying logic to this? Um, Jeff, why don't I start with you? I think it's obvious there's basically one deep state party, and that is the party of Cheney, Harris, Biden, Victoria Nuland, my colleague at Columbia University now, and Nuland is kind of the face of all of this because she has been in every administration for the last 30 years. She was in the Clinton administration wrecking our policies towards Russia in the 1990s. She was in the Bush administration, Jor, with Cheney, wrecking our policies towards NATO enlargement. She was in then the Obama administration as Hillary's spokesperson first and then making a coup in Ukraine in February 2014. Not a great move, started a war. Then she was Biden's undersecretary of state. Now that's both parties. It's a colossal mess, and she's been Cheney's

uh adviser. She's been Biden's advisor. She, she, uh, and, uh, makes perfect sense. This is the reality, uh. We're trying to find out if there's another party. That's the big question. And John, what's your thought on that? Do you see any difference between, uh, Republicans and Democrats? No, I like to refer to the Republicans and the Democrats as Tweedle D and Tweedle Dum. There's hardly any difference. I actually think the one exception is that, uh, former president Trump, when he became president in 2017, was bent on beating back the Deep State and becoming a different kind of leader on the foreign policy front. But he basically failed, and he has vowed that if he gets elected this time, uh, it will be different, and he will beat back the Deep State. He will pursue a foreign policy that's fundamentally different, uh, than Republicans and Democrats have pursued up to now. And the big question on the table is whether or not you think Trump can beat the Deep State and these two established parties, uh, and I'd bet against Trump, John, um, and

Jeff, but let's start with John. Can you actually define for us, for me, I don't understand when people say Deep State, what it is. I almost viewed the term comically. We have one of our friends in our group chat who we called Deep State. Who is he? He's deep State. He's really in the Deep State. But we say it as a joke. But for maybe the uninitiated, what does it actually mean? What are their incentives? Who are they? Jeff, maybe you want to start, or John, you want to start? Yeah, I'll say a few words about it. When we talk about the Deep State, we're talking really about the administrative State. It's very important to understand that starting in the late 19th, early 20th century, given developments in the American economy, it was imperative that we develop—and this was true of all Western countries—a very powerful Central State that could run the country. And over time, that state has grown in power, and since World War II, the United States, as you all know, has been involved in every nook

and cranny of the world fighting wars here, there, and everywhere. And to do that, you need a very powerful administrative state that can help manage foreign policy. But in the process, what happens is you get all of these high-level bureaucrats, middle-level, and low-level bureaucrats who become established in positions in the Pentagon, the State Department, the intelligence community, you name it. And they end up having a vested interest in pursuing a particular foreign policy. And the particular foreign policy that they like to pursue is the one that the Democrats and the Republicans are pushing. And that's why we talk about Tweedle D and Tweedle Dum with regard to the two parties. You could throw in the Deep State as being on the same page as those other two institutions. Yeah, there's a very interesting interview of Putin in Figuro in 2017. And he says, I've dealt with three presidents now. They come into office with some ideas even, but then the men in the dark suits and the blue

ties, and then he said, I wear red ties, but they wear blue ties. They come in and explain the way the world really is, and there go the ideas. And I think that's Putin's experience, that's our experience, that's my experience, which is that there's a deeply entrained foreign policy. It has been in place, in my interpretation, for many decades, but arguably a variant of it has been in place since 1992. I got to watch some of it early on because I was an adviser to Gorbachev, and I was an adviser to Yeltsin, and so I saw early makings of this, though I didn't fully understand it except in retrospect. But that policy has been mostly in place pretty consistently for 30 years, and it didn't really matter whether it was Bush senior, whether it was Clinton, whether it was Bush Jr., whether it was Obama, whether it was Trump. After all, who did Trump hire? He hired John Bolton. Well, the pretty deep state, that was the end of... They told you know, he explained this is

the way it is, and by the way, Bolton explained also in his Memoirs when Trump didn't agree. We figured out ways to trick him basically so well. And what are their incentives? Is it war? Is it self-enrichment? Is it power? Is it all three? Is it some? Or is it, yeah, is it just, is there a philosophical entrenchment? Or is it just this inertial issue that like once a policy begins, it's hard to change, and the system's just working with 10,000 people working towards it? You know, if I were lucky to sit next to the world's greatest political philosopher, which I am, he'd give you a good answer, which is that the right answer, which is if you want to interpret American foreign policy, it is to maximize power. And he gives a John, gives an explanation of that. We have some differences, but I think it's a very good description of American foreign policy, which is that it's trying to maximize global power.

essentially to be Global hegemon. I think it could get us all killed. This is because it's a little bit delusional in my mind, but not his interpretation of their idea, but the fact that they hold that idea is a little weird to me. But in any event, that's the idea, and every time a decision comes inside that I've seen, I'm an economist, so I don't see security decisions the same way, but every decision that I've seen always leans in the same direction for the last 30 years, which is power as the central objective. So Clinton faced an internal cabinet debate: should NATO be enlarged? This is a post-Cold War phenomenon. I'll let John take that. Just two very quick points. First of all, I do believe that the people who are in favor of this foreign policy do believe in it. It's not cynical; they really believe that we're doing the right thing. I've

met them, yeah, no, yeah. The second point I would make to you, and this sort of adds on to what Jeff said. Jeff said power has a lot to do with this and is a good realist. I, of course, believe that, but it's also very important to understand that the United States is a fundamentally liberal country, and we believe that we have a right, we have a responsibility, and we have the power to run around the world and remake the world in America's image. Most people in the foreign policy establishment, the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, they believe that, and that is what has motivated our foreign policy in large part since the Cold War ended. Because remember, when the Cold War ends, we have no rival great power left. So what are we going to do with all this power that we have? What we decide to do is go out and remake the world in our own image. So that's a values point of view, though, right? That there are values that they hold dear, that many do hold.

dear that liberalism democracy does ultimately, I believe, I've heard this reduce conflict worldwide. That there's an importance that we've never seen two democratic nations since World War II go to war, and that there's a reason why we want to see liberalism kind of breed throughout the world, and it's our responsibility for world, for Global Peace, to make that a mandate. Let me step in for one moment, okay? Sure, very quickly, and by the way, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, uh, what do you call it where you pull the spirits of the voice of others, but I'm just trying to channeling, channeling, that's the word I want to be very clear. I am forever thankful that I was born in a liberal democracy, and I love liberalism, but the question here is, do you think that we can run around the world imposing liberal democracy on other countries and some cases shoving it down their throat, doing it at the end of a rifle barrel?

and my argument is that's almost impossible to do. It almost always backfires. Think Iraq, Afghanistan, so forth and so on. And secondly, you begin to erode liberalism in the United States because you build a deep state, right? And you want to understand that a lot of the complaints here about cracking down on freedom of speech and so forth and so on are related to the fact that we have this ambitious foreign policy. Those two things go together in very important ways. What an... Let me disagree just a bit, uh, because we agree actually on the behavior, and I've learned, I'd say, most of that from you, that it's power-seeking, truly, John. In my work 40 years, uh, overseas, I don't think the US government gives a damn about these other places. I, I don't think they really care if it's a liberal democracy, if it's a dictatorship. They want the right of ways, they want the military bases, they want, uh, the state to be in support of the United States, they want NATO enlargement. I don't, I know You' you've

written, and there are some who believe in state-building God. If they do, they are so incompetent, it's unbelievable. But Professor s know I. I'll give you an example. If I put just one example, I'm a friend with one of the only PhD Afghani economists, senior person in the US academia over the last 30 years. You would think that the State Department, if they were interested in state-building, would ask him one day, one moment, something about Afghanistan. Never happened. Never happened. Not even one question. Never happened. He asked me, Can you get me a meeting with the department? They were completely uninterested. This is about power. You're too idealistic, John. They don't care about the other places. They may feel we should be whatever we want, free and so forth, but freedom. I've been, I've seen my own eyes, the coups, the overthrows, the presidents, democratic presidents led away. They don't care at all. This is Washington. Be a realist. Come on, Professor mimer.

I when we talk about power um there are other people in the world who are trying to accumulate power. We live in a multi-polar world right now and they have in some cases very nefarious or bad intent um and they do not have democracy. So it's one thing to you know tell uh people in Afghanistan you need to evolve you know to be a perfect democracy like the one we have here. I think we all agree that's unrealistic and insane um and not practical. But what about the free countries of the world uniting together to stop dictators from invading other free countries. Is that Noble. Is that a good use of power and a good framework for America to evolve too. No I don't think so uh. I think that what the United States should do is worry about its own National interest uh. In some cases that's going to involve aligning ourselves with a dictator uh. If we're fighting World War II all over again it's December 8th 1941. You surely would be in favor of

allying with Adolf Hitler, with Joseph Stalin, and the Soviet Union against Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. Sometimes you have to make those kinds of compromises. As I said before, I love liberal democracy. I have no problem aligning with liberal democracy, but when you begin to think in the terms that you're thinking, you end up with an impulse to do social engineering around the world, and that gets you in all sorts of problems. Well, what I'm proposing is when dictatorships invade other countries, then we take action. It depends, maybe defend them, so it depends, yeah, of course. I mean, when Russia invades Ukraine, basically what you're saying is you want to go to war on behalf of Ukraine against Russia. Are you in favor of that? No, I would say diplomacy would obviously be what we'd want to exhaust, but if they do roll into other free countries, I think there's an argument for the free countries of the world to get together and say to dictators, We're not going to allow

this could I come in here could I clarify a few things look uh first of all um almost all the time that we intervene it's because uh we view this as a power situation for the us so whether it's Ukraine or Syria or Libya or other places even if we Define it as defending something believe me it's not about defending something it's about a perception of us power and US interest and it's in objectives of us Global hegemony and if we analyze the Ukraine conflict uh just even a little bit below the surface this is not a a conflict about Putin invading Ukraine this is something a lot different that has to do with American power projection into the former Soviet Union so it's completely different second if we decide were the police which we do you can't imagine how cynical  we use to justify our actions we used the cynical B that we're defending the people of Benghazi to bomb the hell out of Libya to kill moamar Gaddafi why did we do that well I'm kind of an expert on that region and

I can tell you maybe because Sarosi didn't like Gaddafi. There's no much deeper reason except Hillary liked every bombing she could get her hands on, and Obama was kind of convinced my secretary of state says go with it, so why don't we go with the NATO Expedition. It had nothing to do with Libya. It unleashed 15 years of chaos, cheated the UN Security Council because like everything else we've done, it was on false pretenses. We did the same with trying to overthrow Syria. We did the same with conspiring to overthrow Victor Yanukovich in Ukraine in February 2014. So the problem with this argument is we're not nice guys. We're not trying to save the world. We're not trying to make democracies. We had a committee, by the way, of all the luminaries you could mention, but they're the neocon crazies, but they're luminaries, the committee for the people of Cheta. Are you kidding? Do you think they even knew where Cheta is or cared about

Chia, but it was an opportunity to get at Russia, to weaken Russia, to support a jihadist movement inside Russia. To do this is a game, but it's the game that John has described better than anyone in the world. It's a game of power. It's not that we're defending real things. If you want to defend real things, go to the UN Security Council and convince others because the other countries are not crazy, and they don't want mayhem in the world. But we play a game, so they say that's a game. Iraq, which was obviously a game before we went in, was obviously Co and Powell could not move his lips without lying that day, obviously. And so they said no, but if we're real about our interests, then you go to the UN Security Council, and then it's not just on us. It's actually then a collective security issue. Professor M, if we were to take Jeffrey's position here, that we are exerting power for the sake of our reputation and

In fact, to weaken dictatorships, if I'm summarizing correctly here, um, is that not a good strategy to weaken dictators around the world who might like to invade other countries? Is there a frame Fring in which you could see that being um for, you know, a world where democracy and people living freely has gone down in our lifetimes? Is that not knowable? Is there not a justification somebody could make for, I'm not saying I have that, but I'm just trying to steal me on the other side of this. Is weakening dictators and despots a good strategy? It depends. Uh, well, let's talk about the two that we have, you know, uh, Xi Jinping. I think you wanted to get to eventually, and then Ukraine and Putin. Are these people worth trying to, you know, uh, contain or even weaken? Well, in terms of China, I'm fully in favor of containing China. Okay, so containment check. It's containment. I'm not interested in regime change. I'm not interested in trying to turn China into

a democracy not going to happen. Yeah, not going to happen. We tried it, actually, and I thought it was foolish to even pursue a policy of engagement toward China. With regard to Russia, I don't think Russia is a serious threat to the United States, and indeed, I think the United States should have good relations with Putin. It's a remarkably foolish policy to push him into the arms of the Chinese. There are three great powers in the system: the United States, China, and Russia. China is a peer competitor to the United States; it's the most serious threat to the United States. Russia is the weakest of those three great powers, and it's not a serious threat to us. If you are playing balance and power politics and you're interested, as the United States, in containing China, you want Russia on your side of the ledger. But what we have done, in effect, is we have pushed Russia into the arms of the Chinese. This is a remarkably foolish policy. And furthermore, by getting bogged down in Ukraine and now bogged down in the

Middle East. It's become very difficult for us to pivot to Asia to deal with China, which is the principal threat that we face. [Applause] Can I think, David, could I just say, uh, 2/3 right, perfect. So you gave him a B or B plus, A minus. I always give him an A minus inflation. I just wanted to add a footnote, which is that China's also not a threat. It's just not a threat. I mean, we're going to get to it, ch-ch-China. China's a market. It's got great food, great culture, wonderful people, a civilization 10 times older than ours. It's not a threat. Well, as an economist, can you talk about the impact of a cold or hot conflict with China from an economic perspective, given the trade relationship? Yeah, it would wreck California for one thing. It would destroy the economy that you guys are making completely. This economy has been the biggest beneficiary of China's rise, probably in the whole world. So it's crazy. Maybe if you're worried, if you're

really worried about whether a worker in Ohio has a particular job on a particular assembly line. Then, you can be anti-China if you're worried about the tech industry, about California, about peace and the future. You should be pro-China. That's all. So, why has it become so universal to assume that we are already in a state of conflict with China on not just party lines but like almost any spectrum you could kind of like consider? Said it exact right, and he predicted it better than anyone in the whole world. In 2001, he said, When China becomes large, we're going to have conflict. Because that's John's theory, and it's right as a description of American foreign policy that we are for power. They are big, therefore they're an enemy. They're an enemy of our aspiration to global city, tra city. Let John jump in here. Do you want me to? Is it okay if I talk about this? Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think, um, I think that, um, what's interesting, I mean, you and

Jeff, I think, arrived at similar conclusions about Ukraine, but different ones on China, right? Because Jeff is an economist and I think sees the world in fundamentally positive some ways based on the potential for trade economics basically, whereas you see the world as more of a zero-sum game based on the balance of power. Why don't you just explain that difference? I okay, uh, it is very important to emphasize David was saying that Jeff and I agree on all sorts of issues, including Ukraine and Israel-Palestine, but we disagree fundamentally, as he just made clear, on China. And let me explain to you why I think that's the case, and then Jeff can tell you why he thinks I'm wrong. Uh, it has to do with security, whether you privilege security or survival, or whether you privilege prosperity. And economists, and I would imagine most of you in the audience, really care greatly about maximizing prosperity. For someone like me who's a realist, what I care about is maximizing the state's prospects of survival. And when you live in an Antarctic system and in IR speak

that means there's no higher authority. There's no night watchmen that can come down and rescue you if you get into trouble. And this is the international system. There's no higher authority in that anarchic world. The best way to survive is to be really powerful. As we used to say when I was a kid on New York City playgrounds, you want to be the biggest and baddest dude on the block. And that's simply because it's the best way to survive. If you're really powerful, nobody fools around with you. The United States is a regional hegemon. It's the only regional hegemon on the planet. We dominate the Western Hemisphere. And what China has begun to do as it's got increasingly powerful economically is translate that economic might into military might. And it is trying to dominate Asia. It wants to push us out beyond the first island chain. It wants to push us out beyond the second island chain. It wants to be like we are in the Western Hemisphere. And I don't blame the

Chinese one bit. If I was the National Security advisor in Beijing, that's what I'd be telling Xi Ping. We should be trying to do, but of course, from an American point of view, this is unacceptable, and we do not tolerate peer competitors. We do not want another regional hegemon on the planet. In the 20th century, there were four countries that threatened to become regional hegemons like us: Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. The United States played a key role in putting all four of those countries on the scrap heap of history. We want to remain the only regional hegemon in the world. We are a ruthless great power, never want to lose sight of that fact. And the end result of this is you get an intense security competition between China and the United States, and it revolves around the concept of security, not prosperity. What you just very quickly see beginning to happen is that it's in all domains where the competition takes place, especially high-tech. We do not want them defeating

this defeating us in the high-tech war. We are competing with them economically. We are competing with them militarily. And this is because the best way to survive is for us, the United States of America, to be the only regional hegemon on the planet. So, Jeff, let me set it up for Jeff here. So, Jeff, you and John, I think, agree that the game on the board is power-seeking. I think what John is saying is there are smart ways and dumb ways to pursue power. That containing China is a smart way. What we're doing in Ukraine is a dumb way. Whereas it seems like you're saying that all power-seeking behavior is bad. That's not the game we should be playing. We should somehow opt out of that. Is that kind of where you're going? It's not a bad way to say it, but I would put it in another way. I read a very good book, John's, and John described, I'm going to quote him, but he can quote

himself. Afterwards, he said that the regional hegemons don't threaten each other. Actually, why? Because we have a big ocean in between. I deeply believe that China is not a threat to the United States, and I deeply believe the only threat to the United States, period, in the world, given the oceans, given our size, and given the military, is nuclear war. I deeply believe we're close to nuclear war because we have a mindset that leads us in that direction. We have a mindset that everything is a challenge for survival and that escalation is therefore always the right approach. My view is a little bit of prudence could save the whole planet. So, why I don't like Ukraine is that I don't see any reason in the world that NATO has to be on Russia's border with Ukraine. I was, as I said, Gorbachev's adviser and Yeltsin's adviser, and they wanted peace, and they wanted cooperation. But whatever they wanted, they did not want the US military on their border. So

if we continued to push as we did, we would get to war. John explained that better than anybody. We're now at war, and even this morning, there is further escalation. Blinken has said, Well, if the Iranians give these missiles, then we will give missiles to hit deep into Russia. This is a recipe. And then we had Bill Burns, the CIA director, say last week an absurdity that he knows, but CIA directors never tell the truth. If they do, they lose their job. But he said, Don't worry about nuclear war. Don't worry about saber rattling. My advice to you is worry a lot about nuclear war. And so be prudent. You don't have to put the US military on Russia's border. Okay? And my advice to Russia and to Mexico when I'm going to Mexico tomorrow, I'll give them a piece of advice. Don't let China or Russia build a military base on the r Grant. Not a good idea for Mexico. Not a good idea for Ukraine. Not a good idea for Russia. Not a good idea for

China is not a good idea for the United States. We need to stay a little bit away from each other so that we don't have a nuclear war. By the way, I do recommend another good book, and that is Annie Jacobson's Nuclear War: A Scenario. It takes two hours to read. The world ends in two hours in the book, and it's a very persuasive guide that one nuke can ruin your whole day, as they say. Jeffrey can, um, uh, my strong advice on this, therefore, is to recognize China, first of all, is not a threat to the United States security. Big oceans, big nuclear deterrent, and so forth. Second, we don't have to be in China's face. What do I mean by that? We don't have to provoke World War III over Taiwan. That's a long, complicated issue, but this would be the stupidest thing for my grandchildren to die for imaginable, and I resent it every day when we play that game. We have three agreements with China that say we're going to stay out of that, and we should.

and then China would have no reason for war either. China and then on the economic side let me just reiterate because I was asked yesterday and there was some surprise. Was it good to let China into the WTO? I said of course. It enriched all of you by the way. It enriched me. It enriched this country. It enriched the world including enriching China. That's normal. Economics is not a zero-sum game. We all agree on that. I believe that security doesn't have to be a zero-sum game either. We can stay a little bit away from each other and China does not spend its time beyond America being a Western Hemisphere hegemon. They don't. That's not their greatest interest to bring down American power in the Western Hemisphere. Jee, what about the energy? Hold on. Let's let John respond to this just very quickly. Most of you have probably never asked yourself the question, Why is the United States roaming all over the planet interfering in every country's business? It's in part because it's so powerful, but it's also

because it's a hegemon, which means we have no threats in the Western Hemisphere, so we are free to roam the great danger, Jeff. If China becomes a regional hegemon and doesn't have to worry about security concerns, then they behave like us, yeah, then they behave like us, exact. But my point to you, Jeff, is let's prevent that from happening by preventing them from becoming a regional hegemon. We don't want them to have freedom to roam. You were talking about them putting military bases in Mexico. That's our great fear. It's not my great fear. They have no interest in doing so because they don't want to get blown up either. So they do seem to have a big interest, Jeff, in Africa, India, Russia, and they are. China has major military bases there. Oh, well, they're building nuclear power plants in trade, and they're building deference in favor of that. Let's go compete that way. I'm all in favor of that. But, Jeff, that's 'cause they're not a regional hegemon.

yet yeah if you try to prevent them from being a regional hegemon, we're going to end up in World War I because, as you say yourself, that this can absolutely spill over into war. I don't want it to spill over into war on the theory that maybe someday they behave differently. That's not a good theory for me. So, so, so that part. So, John, can we contain China, prevent them from becoming a regional hegemon without directly defending Taiwan? I mean, isn't that where the rubber meets the road? No, it's not just Taiwan. I mean, one could argue there's sort of three flashpoints in East Asia that you folks should keep your eye on. One is obviously Taiwan, two is the South China Sea, and three is the East China Sea. And I think, David, that the place where a conflict is most likely today is not over Taiwan. I could explain why I think Taiwan is not a serious problem at the moment or for the foreseeable future. The South China Sea is a very dangerous place. We could end up in a war for sure.

Even if we did not defend Taiwan, uh, so Taiwan, you don't want to overemphasize. I agree with Jeff that we definitely don't want a war, and we certainly don't want a nuclear war. And he is absolutely correct that there's a risk of a nuclear war if a war breaks out of any sort between China and the United States. Many of us in the audience remember the Cold War, and this was an ever-present danger in the Cold War. But my argument is that this is inevitable because in a world where you don't have a higher authority and you care about your survival, you have a deep-seated interest as any state in the system to be as powerful as possible. And that means dominating your world. Um, there is one player on this chessboard that hasn't come up yet, and then maybe we could skate to where the puck is going. You know, when you talk about the South China Sea, okay, sure, South Korea, Japan, Australia, all those major players there, they're just a

couple hundred million people, but then China is in population decline. She apparently is self-destructing in terms of trade. Seems like, uh, containment is working pretty well there because of all the self-inflicted wounds. But the fastest-growing country, fastest-growing economy, the quickest to develop is India, and they seem to have a very pragmatic approach. Hey, they'll buy cheap oil from Putin, and they are their own sovereign country with their own point of view. Would we not be really well advised over the next 10 to 20 years to make that our priority and India's role in this? How do you look at them? Well, we definitely view India as an ally, right? It's part of the Quad, which is this, uh, this Rube Goldberg-type alliance structure that we put together in East Asia that includes Australia, Japan, the United States, and India. And India is smartly maintaining its good relations with Russia. The Indians understand, like Jeff and I do, that the Russians are no great threat, but from India's point of view, the real

threat is China, right? And there are two places where India cares about China. One is on the India-China border up in the Himalayas, where they've actually had conflicts, right? And there's a real danger of war breaking out. The second place, which is maybe even more dangerous, not at the moment, but will be over time, is the Indian Ocean. Because the Chinese are imitating the United States. They not only want to be a regional hegemon, they want to develop power projection capability. So the Chinese are building a blue-water navy that can come out of East Asia, through the Straits of Malacca, through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. And once you start talking about going through the Indian Ocean, the Indians get spooked. And that's when the Americans and the Indians come together. Okay, let's think of this from an engineering point of view. If we could, um, why are the Chinese developing the navy? Because for 40 years, I've read essays on all of the choke points in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Indian

Ocean against China, that's our policy. Choke points, look at the Malacca Straits, look what we can do here. First island chain, this is American strategy. Can we keep the Chinese submarine out of the Pacific Ocean? First China, first island chain, and so forth. So, of course, they react. They're rich. They're going to build a Navy so that they can get their oil on which their economy runs. Can we be a little bit sensible with them and decide how we're not going to have choke points, and then we don't have to have a nuclear war, which is really going to ruin our day? That's the point. We can think a little bit. We can understand it from their perspective. We can understand it from our perspective. Deconfliction, by the way, I don't believe India is an ally. India is a superpower. India is going to have its own very distinctive interests. Thank you. It's not going to be an ally of the United States. I happen to like India enormously and admire their policies.

but the idea that India is going to ally with the United States against China is somebody's dream in Washington because it's another delusion in Washington. Because they should get a passport and go see the world and understand something. But Jeffrey, if they, these are my students in Washington right now because they didn't listen to their Professor Jeffrey. We're making our iPhones in India now. Is that not significantly important? Say again. We're moving iPhone production. Maybe Cooper, you're into economics here. And that impact, you got Apple moving out of China. You've got Japan funding people leaving China to Vietnam and to India. Is that not the solution here as we decouple from China? It seems like they come back to the table. We had Xi Jinping kick all the venture capitalists, all investment out of China. He got rid of all the education startups. And then whatever, two or three years later, he's in San Francisco asking all of us to invest more money and saying, Where'd you go? Okay, first of all, uh

invite me back 10 years and we'll see how smart all these decisions are because uh Shing it's incred no I'm talking about yes we've moved to India that's our great Ally and then then we're going to have other other issues okay you I think you said that XI jinping's trade policy is uh implo self-imploding or something it seems like there's a lot of self-inflicted wounds when you it's not let me explain what the wounds are okay the wounds are the United States deliberate policy to stop you from selling things to China and to stop China buying things from you that's not self-inflicted this a clear wait minute just to say let me say please because it's very important for the economy of the people in this room this is a decision that was taken around 2014 to contain China and it's been systematically applied since then and it's not a surprise that Biden kept all the things that Trump did and added more and now Trump says I'm going

to do all the things that Biden has kept in place, and I'm going to do more. This is not a self-inflicted wound. The United States has closed the market to China. Okay, is that smart? No, it's not smart. Is it leading to, uh, is it, by the way, recuperating American manufacturing jobs? Zero. It may shift them a bit. It may make things less efficient. It may make all of you lose a bit more money or not make as much money, but is it going to solve any single economic problem in the United States? No way. Let me, John, let John spicy. I just want to ask Jeff a question on this. My argument is that this is the way the world works. Yes, I know, and it is, and it is. But if I'm describing how the world really works, how do you beat me? The reason is you've described a world. You've described, I think, better than any person I ever read or know how American foreign policy works. I think it's likely to get us all blown up. You

you not and you title not not because of John but because he made an accurate description of a profoundly misguided approach, which is power-seeking. Even if you're safe as a regional hegemon, you're never safe if another regional hegemon does what you do. No, you can't allow that to happen, so you have to meddle in every single place in the world. This now, all I'm saying, wait, let me just finish because it's important that it is important to say, try this in the nuclear age. You don't get a second chance. So, this to me is the most definitive fact of our lives, which is we are now in a war, direct war, direct war, not proxy war, direct war with Russia, which has 6,000 nuclear warheads. I can't think of anything more imbecilic than that, aside from the fact that I know step by step because I saw it with my own eyes how we got into that mess because we thought we had to meddle, up to including putting NATO into Georgia in the Caucuses of all

places and Ukraine. So, we made that because we have to medal, because we couldn't let good enough stand. If we do the same with China, there will be a war. But it's not like reading about the Crimean War or World War One or World War II. That's my difference. This is a fine theory that explains a lot of things, but damn if you can make chat GPT, or you can make Optimus, or you can make all the rest. We can avoid nuclear war, so just do a little bit better than saying it's inevitable. All right, so we only have a minute left, so I want to give it to John. I just want to ask. He had a question, I know, but we only have a minute left, and it's, we got to add five minutes. This is the best panel I've ever been on in my life. Can we just add 10 minutes? Minutes, we got to add 5 or 10 minutes. The best panel, is this the best panel ever? I feel like calling a respond wa wa before. Okay, we got 5 minutes, so

before we leave this topic. John, your book is called The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. You clearly understand the tragic aspect of how great power rivalry, great power competition can lead to disaster. What Jeff is saying is we're now in the nuclear age, and it's going to lead to nuclear war. So do we have to be on this path, or is there a way off of it? Two points: in my heart, I'm with Jeff; in my head, I'm not with Jeff. I wish he were right, but I don't believe he's right. To answer your question head-on, I believe that there is no way out. We are in an iron cage. This is just the way international politics works, and it's because you're in an anarchic system where you can never be sure that a really powerful state in the system won't come after you and inflict a century of national humiliation on you. So you go to great lengths to avoid that by trying to gain power at the expense of another power, and that leads to all sorts of trouble. Can war be avoided? I

like to distinguish between security competition, which I think is inevitable, and war, which is where security competition evolves into war. I think war can be avoided, and we were thankfully successful in that regard during the Cold War, and hopefully that will be the case, uh, in the US-China competition moving forward. Can I guarantee that no, uh, does this disturb me greatly? Yes, but again, this is just a tragic aspect of the world. Let me just ask one because we're a little bit, I know we were going to try and talk about the Middle East for a good chunk of this, so I just want a scenario, uh, uh, propose or kind of give you guys a scenario, get your reaction, because it is kind of what feels to be the most imminent, uh, theater of conflict, uh, the West Bank. Um, the, the Israelis are buttressing the settlements. There's a lot of checkpoints. Things are getting very tense. They're running raids, and it's becoming a very difficult place to live for Palestinians, and there's a real concern that the West Bank collapses, and Israelis, and Israelis, but there's a real

risk that the West Bank collapses and turns into a real conflict zone. If that happens, the Jordanians are sitting right there, and they're not going to let Palestinians get slaughtered. They're going to have to do something, and they're such a strong ally of the United States. Does that trigger a theater of response where what is Saudi going to do? Are others going to be drawn to the region? Does the collapse of the West Bank or the conflict that seems to be brewing in the West Bank become this kind of tinderbox for everyone showing up and getting involved and create some sort of regional issue that we get drawn into in a bigger way? Can I start and have John have the last word? You know, I work each day at the UN and discuss this issue with ambassadors from all over the world. There is, over the last 50 years, an agreement on what would make for peace, and the agreement is two states, maybe with a big wall between them on

the 4th of June 1967 borders with a state of Palestine being the 194th UN member state and its capital in East Jerusalem and control over the Islamic holy sites and that is international law. The International Court of Justice just reaffirmed that the Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal. The International Criminal Court is likely to find that Israel is in violation of the 1948 Genocide Convention, which I very much believe it to be in violation. So my own solution to this is to implement international law, two states, build the wall as high as you need to build, but you give Palestinian rights, you establish a state of Palestine, you stop the Israeli slaughter of Palestinians, you stop the Israeli apartheid state, and you have two states living side by side. Israel is dead set against that. The entire Israeli political governance now is dead set against that. Hundreds of thousands of illegal settlers in the West Bank are dead set against that.

smotrich, benir, Galant, Netanyahu are dead set against that. So, my view is it has nothing to do with what Israel wants; it has to do with enforcement of international law. So, I want to see this imposed, not because Israel agrees to it, but because it is imposed. And there is one country that stands in the way of imposing this: not Iran, not the Saudis, not Egypt, not Russia, not China, not any country in the European Union. One country and one country alone, and that is because of the United States of America and the Israel Lobby. Somebody wrote a very good book about that too that I know, the best book ever written about it by John. And that's what stops the solution that could bring peace. And I believe we should bring peace because not only would that bring peace to the Palestinians and peace to the Israelis, but it would avoid potentially another flashpoint that could easily end up in World War III. Let me answer your question about escalation potential: the Jordanians coming in. Israel faces three big

problems aside from problems with centrifugal forces inside the society. One is the Palestinian problem, which is both in Gaza and in the West Bank. It's one. Two is Hezbollah, and three is Iran. I think there is virtually no chance of what you described happening, which is if the Israelis were to go on a rampage in the West Bank, similar to what they've done in Gaza, that the Jordanians would come in, or the Egyptians, or the Saudis. They simply don't have the military capability. This is a scenario where the Israelis completely dominate. So, in terms of escalation with regard to the Israel-Palestine problem, I don't think there's much potential. Hezbollah is a different issue, but mainly because it's linked with Iran, right? And Iran is the really dangerous flashpoint because, as you know, the Russians are now closely allied with the Iranians, the Chinese are moving in that direction as well, and if Israel gets involved in a war with Iran, we're going to come in, in all likelihood. Remember when the Israelis attacked the Iranian Embassy in

Damascus on April 1st. On April 14th, the Iranians retaliated, reciprocal response. Yeah, but we were involved. We were forewarned, weren't we? Yes, we were forewarned, but the point is that we were involved in the fighting, right? We were involved with the Israelis, with the French, the British, the Jordanians, and the Saudis. We were all involved in the fighting, so this gets at the escalation problem. Now, to counter the Iranian escalation scenario, the fact is Iran does not want a war with the United States, and the United States does not want a war with Iran. And it's the Israelis, especially Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been trying to sort of suck us into a war because he wants us, the United States, to really whack Iran, weaken it militarily, and especially to go after its nuclear capabilities. Because, as you well know, they are close to the point where they can develop nuclear weapons. So, the Israelis are the ones who want us to get involved in a big war with Iran. That's the escalation.

Flasho and the $64,000 question is whether you think the United States and Iran kind of loting can work together to prevent the Israelis from getting us that that question will be answered based on the next who who who leads the next Administration. Well, if you believe that it matters who leads the next Administration, that's true. Take it out. Thank you. Let me just say, Jeffrey and John, now I know why saxs will not stop talking about you too. This was the most amazing panel of the event so far. Give it up for Jeffrey Sachs and John Mirshimer. All right, wow.

John Mearsheimer and Jeffrey Sachs | All-In Summit 2024

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All-In Podcast

이 토론은 미국 외교 정책에서 딥 스테이트의 영향력을 중심으로 진행되며, 빅토리아 눌랜드와 같은 주요 인물이 여러 행정부에서 중요한 역할을 담당하고 있습니다.

존 마이머 교수와 제프리 삭스 교수는 공화당과 민주당을 "트위들 디와 트위들 덤"이라고 부르며 두 정당 사이에 차이가 거의 없다고 주장합니다.

요직에 있는 기존 관료들로 구성된 딥 스테이트는 수십 년 동안 거의 변하지 않은 일관된 외교 정책을 유지하는 데 기득권을 가지고 있습니다.

미국의 외교 정책은 글로벌 파워를 극대화하고 미국을 헤게모니로 자리매김하려는 열망에 의해 추진됩니다.

여야를 막론하고 외교 정책 수립자들은 특히 냉전 이후 미국의 이미지에 맞게 세계를 재편해야 할 책임이 있다고 믿습니다.

그러나 다른 나라에 자유 민주주의를 강요하는 접근 방식은 종종 역효과를 낳았고 국내적으로 자유주의와 자유의 침식에 기여했습니다.

현재 세계는 다극화되어 있으며 일부 국가는 사악한 의도를 가지고 있고 민주주의가 결여되어 있습니다.

미국은 때때로 독재자들과 협력하는 것을 의미하더라도 자국의 국익을 우선시해야 합니다.

미국의 개입은 종종 미국의 권력 투영에 의해 주도되며, 리비아나 우크라이나 같은 국가에서 취한 조치의 정당성은 냉소적이고 이기적이라는 비판을 받아왔습니다.

연사는 중국에 민주주의가 실현될 가능성은 낮다고 주장하며 미국의 대중국 관여 정책을 비판합니다.

러시아를 3대 강대국 중 가장 약한 국가로 보고 중국의 영향력을 상쇄하기 위해 미국이 푸틴과 좋은 관계를 맺어야 한다고 제안합니다.

연사는 국제 관계에서 힘의 역학 관계의 중요성을 강조하고 미국이 유일한 지역 패권국으로 남아 중국과 치열한 안보 경쟁을 벌여야 한다고 주장합니다.

미중 관계와 글로벌 힘의 역학에 대한 논쟁

미국은 유일한 지역 패권국이 되기 위해 중국과 경제적, 군사적으로 경쟁하고 있습니다.

연사는 중국이 미국에 위협이 되지 않는다고 생각하며 핵전쟁을 피하기 위해 보다 신중한 접근을 해야 한다고 주장합니다.

이들은 나토가 러시아 국경에 주둔하는 것에 반대하며 미국과 중국 모두 분쟁을 방지하기 위해 거리를 유지해야 한다고 주장합니다.

중국이 지역 패권국이 되는 것을 막으려는 노력은 대만, 남중국해, 동중국해를 주요 발화점으로 삼아 갈등으로 이어질 수 있습니다.

인도의 영향력이 커지고 러시아 및 중국과의 관계에서 실용적인 접근 방식을 취하고 있는 인도는 이 지역에서 미국의 소중한 동맹국이 될 수 있습니다.

중국 해군의 인도양 진출은 인도에 잠재적인 위협이 되고 있으며, 미국과 인도는 공동의 우려를 해결하기 위해 긴밀히 협력하고 있습니다.

미중 관계와 글로벌 파워 역학 관계의 영향

미국은 2014년부터 중국을 봉쇄하기 위해 의도적인 정책을 시행해 왔으며, 이는 양국 간 시장 폐쇄로 이어졌습니다.

이러한 접근 방식은 미국의 제조업 일자리를 성공적으로 회복하거나 경제 문제를 해결하지 못했습니다.

이 토론은 특히 미-중 경쟁과 서안지구의 긴장 상황에서 강대국 간 안보 경쟁의 불가피성과 분쟁의 잠재력을 강조합니다.

서안지구의 잠재적 붕괴와 지역적 영향

웨스트뱅크가 붕괴될 위험에 처해 있으며, 이는 요르단과 미국의 다른 동맹국들과 관련된 지역 분쟁을 촉발할 수 있습니다.

평화를 위한 오랜 합의는 2국가 해법에 기초하고 있지만 이스라엘의 현재 통치 방식과 불법 정착촌이 그 이행을 방해하고 있습니다.

미국은 국제법 집행과 평화적 해결을 방해하는 핵심 주체로 지목되고 있으며, 이란과의 긴장 고조는 지역 안정에 심각한 위협이 되고 있습니다.