연방 준비 은행의 금리 인하: 경제적 영향 분석

### 연방준비제도의 금리 인하: 잘못된 결정
* 📉 최근 연방준비제도이사회는 금리를 **50bp 인하**했는데, 필자는 특히 과거 금리 인상 및 인하 주기를 고려할 때 이는 **중대한 실수**라고 생각합니다.
* 📊 저자는 **1995년까지의 데이터를 분석**하면서 금리 인하는 일반적으로 금리 인상 이후에 이루어진다는 점을 강조하고, 현재의 경제력이 금리 인하를 정당화한다는 이야기에 의문을 제기합니다.
* 🔍 수익률 곡선이 **2년째 역전**되어 잠재적인 경제 문제를 시사하고 있으며, 과거 역전은 경제가 안정적이었던 1990년대 중반의 현재 상황과 달리 **경기 침체보다 선행**하는 경우가 많았습니다.
* 📈 실업률을 기준으로 경기 침체 가능성을 나타내는 **솜 법칙도 발동**되어 경제가 생각보다 경기 침체에 가까워졌을 수 있음을 시사하고 있습니다.
* 💡 저자는 인플레이션에 대한 우려에도 불구하고 과거 데이터에 따르면 경기 침체는 낮은 실업률에서 시작되는 경우가 많기 때문에 **75 베이시스 포인트 인하가 더 적절했을 것**이라고 주장합니다.
* 📉 현재 헤드라인 CPI는 **2.5%로 과거 경기침체 이전의 인플레이션율보다 상당히 낮은 수준**이며, 이는 연준의 현재 기준금리가 지나치게 낮지 않다는 것을 나타냅니다.
* 📉 2년 만기 국채 수익률은 역사적으로 연준의 행동을 주도하고 있으며, 현재 스프레드는 **연준이 곡선 뒤에서 움직이고 있음을 나타낸다**고 저자는 주류 언론의 이야기에만 의존하지 말라고 경고합니다.
* 💰 궁극적으로 저자는 경제 지표가 견고한 회복보다는 잠재적인 경기 침체를 가리키고 있기 때문에 **연준의 금리 인하 결정이 더 공격적이었어야 한다**고 주장합니다.

연방준비제도의 50bp 금리 인하는 경제 불안정을 초래할 수 있으므로 더 큰 폭의 금리 인하의 필요성을 시사합니다.

the Federal Reserve just dropped interest rates by a whopping 50 basis points, and I think this was a huge mistake. I'm going to explain why in three simple fast steps. Step number one, let's go over past cycles. We start by looking at a chart going all the way back to 1995 to today's date. This is fed funds, as you guys probably figured out, on the left we go from 0% up to 7%. Now what I want to focus on initially are these red arrows. See, these are the times in the recent past when the FED has hiked rates. We'll call it a rate-hiking cycle, and as you would imagine, the rate hikes are usually followed by rate cuts, which is what we saw yesterday when many market participants were only expecting a 25 basis point cut, and we actually got a 50 basis point cut. So what we have to do first and foremost is ask ourselves in the past, when have these rate-cutting time frames been nice, slow, and steady? Because right now, if you listen to the

mainstream Media or a lot of quote unquote experts or the Federal Reserve themselves. They'll sit there and tell you, Yeah, we did this 50 basis point hike, but, uh, you know, nothing to see here. We'll just sweep that one under the rug. Pay no attention to this 50 basis point. And why did we do 50 instead of 25? Well, it's because the economy is really, really strong, and we just want it to stay strong. So, in the future, what's going to happen over the next year or so? We are going to cut rates, but it's going to be slow. It's going to be gradual. So, if you extend this out until the next year, it's not going to look like Wet n Wild, like these water park slides, like these others. Oh, no, no, no. It's going to be nice and gradual. So, it's going to be maybe right around here, and we're just going to take our time. It's going to look a lot like the rate hiking cycle that we

saw in the mid-1990s. This is the narrative they are trying to get you to believe. But now, let's add a few more layers of data. So, we go back and look at this chart, all the ups and all the downs, and we have to ask ourselves, Okay, at what point in time was the yield curve inverted? You guys know well from watching my videos that the yield curve has been massively inverted for the past two years. That's when short-term interest rates are much higher than long-term interest rates. As you would imagine, this is very unusual, this is atypical, it's unnatural, and it tells us there's a problem with the underlying economy. In other words, when you look at the surface, everything seems fine and dandy, but once you get into the details, once you look underneath the hood, you see that there are a lot of economic storm clouds brewing. So, the yield curve definitely inverted here. We know that for sure. Did it invert prior to the surveys of sickness? That would be a yes. Did it

invert prior to the GFC. Oh yeah, did it invert prior to the dot-com bust? You better believe it did. Did it invert during the mid-90s when we didn't have a recession that followed these interest rate hikes? That would be no, we did not have an inversion of the yield curve. But now, let's ask another very important question. What about the unemployment rate? You guys know from watching my videos the Som rule recently has been triggered, and all this is is a 3-month moving average of the unemployment rate relative to the lowest unemployment rate over the past 12 months. And every single time going back to the 1950s when you have seen the P rule go above 50 basis points, we have either been in a recession or very close to a recession. So, this is extremely powerful, especially when you combine it with the inversion of the curve. So, as we know, the psle rule has also been triggered. In fact, it's not at 50 basis points, it's at 57 basis points right now. So, we have to go

through the exact same process we went through right here. Was the Som rule triggered during the seresa sickness recession? Yes, it was. GFC Bingo, com bust, you guessed it. How about the 1995 increase in interest rates? Nope, the P rule was not triggered. So, back here when we had this Fed rate hiking cycle that did not result in a recession, it's hard to use this as an example of what the FED is doing now or what we should expect moving into the future because the punchline here is we didn't have an inverted curve, we didn't have the unemployment rate R spiking. And when you look at these two key metrics, we see this time is likely again, no certainties, only probabilities, but the probabilities are extremely high that this cycle is going to play out more similar to this cycle, this cycle, and this cycle than what we saw in the mid-1990s, meaning we're not going to have slow and steady like the mainstream media and the fed and the experts are trying to get you to believe. We're going

to have Wet n Wild, and I think the huge mistake is not the fact that they dropped 50 basis points instead of 25 basis points. I think the huge mistake is that they didn't drop 75 basis points or more. Step number two. Now, I know a lot of you right about now are saying, George, have you completely lost your mind? 75 basis points? Are you crazy? Don't you understand that the unemployment rate? Yeah, sure, we've triggered the Som rule, but it's still low. It's still at 4.2%. And remember, we've got CPI. We've had inflation problems. Hello. And if the Fed cuts by 75 basis points or more, we're gonna have this reacceleration in inflation because they've cut too much, and the economy will overheat for heaven's sakes. And I get it. I get it. I get it. That's a fair argument. I know a lot of people get passionate about this stuff, but let's look at the data just like we did in Step number one. First and foremost, let's

start with the argument that, Yeah, George, we've seen unemployment spike, but historically, it's very, very low, which would indicate the economy is doing great. We've got nothing to worry about, for heaven's sakes, especially not enough to worry about that would warrant a 75 basis point cut. Alright, let's look at a chart of the unemployment rate, and let's remember that right now we are at 4.2%. So, let's just try to figure out where we were prior to the surge of sickness, and that would be 3.6%. But let's go back to the GFC, and there you go, you see the beginning of the recession right here when the Fed was really dropping rates. We're at 4.7%, not at 4.2%. George, hello? Okay, fair enough. Now, let's go back to the dot bust, and you see that right when we started the recession, we were at 4.2%, exactly where we are today. But let's not stop there, let's also go back to 1969. We see at the start of that

recession unemployment rate at 3.5%. Let's go back to 1957, 4.2%. In fact, part of the 1953 recession, we were at 2.6%. And then we go back even further to 1948, and we were at 3.7. In other words, there's probably just as many recessions, if not more, where the unemployment rate actually started near or less than where it is today. But now, let's go ahead and look at headline CPI because the argument there is that the Fed has dropped way too much, so we're going to ignite the inflation, and we're going to go right back to the 1970s. We should never, ever, ever be cutting rates by 50 basis points, heaven forbid 75, when we've got the headline CPI at 2.5%. Well, let's just start by going back to the GFC and prior to the global financial crisis, which definitely resulted in a recession. In fact, the largest recession we have seen since the 1930s. When in 2009, we actually had

deflation, deflation with a d, where prices actually went down, not to mention the massive asset deflation, where the housing market and the stock market over time, the span, went down by 50%. And we see going into this catastrophe, the inflation rate was 5.6% headline inflation. Now, I know that it understates the level of inflation, but we're using the same metrics, the same formula today pretty much that we used in 2007-2008. So again, back then, the CPI 5.6%, today 2.5%. But now, let's go back to the com bust, and we see inflation rate back then 3.6%. But wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute, how on Earth could there be a high probability that we are going into a recession, or we're in one now, or we'll be in one within the next, let's say, six months, if we have positive GDP? I mean, if you look at the last number, I did not see negative GDP. And wouldn't this be a

prerequisite. Therefore, if we don't have a contraction in economic growth, how on Earth can you argue the FED should be cutting 75 basis points? In fact, how can you even argue that they should be cutting interest rates at all, for heaven's sakes? Well, let's go back to 2008, and we see in Q2 GDP was almost 2% positive, not 2% negative. So, my point here is that there's very little in the macroeconomic data, especially when you look at this through the lens of history, that would lead you to believe the FED, even at 4.75, has interest rates too low. If anything, they've got interest rates much too high. Step number three, whatever you do, don't listen to me. Don't listen to George Gammon. You've got to listen to the marketplace. More specifically, you've got to listen to the 2-year treasury yield. And as Jeff Gunlock always points out correctly, the FED historically just follows the 2-year treasury. Let me show what I'm referring

to going to look at a chart going all the way back to 1995 to today's date. On the left, we go from 0% being the middle, then we go up to 2%, down to a negative 2%. This represents the spread between the 2-year Treasury and the FED funds. Now, it's important to not just look at the Delta; we're going to do that in a moment, but we also have to notice, editor, go ahead and throw up the chart that what Jeff Gunlock was saying as far as the FED following the two-year, meaning the two-year moves first, is spot on. Editor, go ahead and highlight the Cycles we referenced in step number one to give the viewer a visual as to how this always happens. The 2-year goes first, and then the FED catches up. So now, let's get back to the spread more specifically, and we can see that we are at an all-time, almost at an all-time extreme right now as we speak. In fact, we're pretty much at the exact same

level as we were when the FED started cutting rates prior to the GFC, and if we also look at the com bust, we see we were at a 1% spread. In other words, the two-year treasury was 1% (100 basis points) lower than fed funds, but it's not even close to where we are today. Now, another thing I want to highlight is when the FED drops rates and catches up to the 2-year treasury, it's not like the 2-year treasury just flattens out, goes sideways, and then starts to go up. Absolutely not. The 2-year treasury usually goes down even further, and in fact, it usually goes down a lot further. So, we have to ask the question: where is the 2-year treasury yield trading right now? And we can see that it's right around 3.6%. While the FED just dropped, but they dropped to 4.75%. That means the Delta is still over 100 basis points. And if history is a teacher, it reveals that even if the FED

starts dropping a lot faster than they would currently admit. The two-year treasury will just go down at the exact same pace. In other words, the FED is way off sides according to the market, even though they've dropped 50 basis points from 5.25 down to 4.75. And I know right about now I'm probably getting a lot of pushback from the viewers. In fact, I was probably getting it starting in step number one, and they're saying, Oh my gosh, George, how could you be so ignorant? The elephant in the room is obviously the 1970s. In fact, the gold price lately has been ripping higher, telling us that the FED is dropping rates too soon, not that the FED hasn't dropped rates enough. All right, well, first, let's go back, and I want to compare two charts. I want to compare a chart of the gold price over the last, let's say, year and a half, two years, and look at the gold price prior to the GFC. And you can see that these charts line up almost exactly. So the

fact that gold is ripping higher isn't exactly proof in and of itself that the FED dropped rates too early. And now let's go ahead and look at the 1970s because the argument there is, well, we had these inflationary recessions, and the mistake Arthur Burns made, or the Federal Reserve at the time, was they dropped rates too soon. And this led to a re-acceleration of consumer prices, and it took Paul Volcker coming in and jacking rates all the way up to 18% to actually break the back of inflation. Okay, that's a fair argument, but I'd like to point out that during the 1970s, we had periods of disinflation, meaning consumer prices were going up at a much slower rate. So let's compare this to the S rule. So we see that in the 1970s when the S rule was triggered, and we're just using this as a proxy for the unemployment rate or the labor market softening, and we can see this was followed every single time.

by the inflation rate going down, not going up, meaning we didn't have a reacceleration of inflation unless the unemployment rate was going down or at the very least flat. And now we have the opposite where the unemployment rate is going up. Now, I'm not saying the Phillips curve, the inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation, is correct because we see the 1970s disproves this. But what you have to look at is the trend, not just the inflation rate or not just the unemployment rate throughout history. Do we see examples of the inflation rate, consumer prices skyrocketing, while at the same time unemployment is spiking straight up as well? I can't find any, at least not in the 1970s. But George, George, George, what about the money printing? You're forgetting the fact that M2 money supply went up by 25% between 2020 and 2021. My gosh, the Fed's balance sheet is at 7 trillion for heaven's sakes, and all that money is still slashing around the

system okay fine, but let's go back to the 1970s, and we see that it is true every single time we saw a massive increase in M2 money supply. It was followed by an increase in consumer prices, but it was just followed by one wave of consumer prices. It wasn't followed by multiple waves of consumer prices. So, my point here is that once you have that money supply work its way through the system, prices adjust, but they don't keep going up and up and up and up unless you're adding more and more and more money supply, which is what we saw in the 1970s. And we've seen the exact opposite over the past two years, that once we got that spike, it didn't even flatten out. M2 money supply and M1 went down. Therefore, I would argue it's extremely difficult unless you get velocity to really, really crank up, and that's going to be unlikely if we are headed toward a recession. But it's extremely unlikely to see a re-acceleration in consumer prices.

regardless of what the FED does, assuming the amount of currency units chasing goods and services doesn't spike once again. To be clear, there are no certainties; there are only probabilities. So, I'm just sharing with you my thought process behind why I think the probabilities are high. When we look back on this time frame, let's say a year in advance, we'll see the FED should have cut not by 50 basis points, but a hell of a lot more. For more content that'll help you build wealth and thrive in a world of out-of-control central banks and big governments, check out this playlist right here, and I will see you on the next video.

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연방 준비 은행의 50 베이시스 포인트 금리 인하: 실수인가?

최근 연방준비제도이사회는 금리를 50bp 인하했는데, 저자는 이를 중대한 오류로 보고 있습니다.

이번 금리 인하는 금리 인상 패턴을 따르고 있으며 경제 호조로 정당화되고 있지만 저자는 이 이야기에 의문을 제기합니다.

또한 지난 2년 동안 수익률 곡선이 역전되어 겉으로는 안정된 것처럼 보이지만 근본적인 경제 문제가 있음을 나타냅니다.

수익률 곡선 역전과 실업률이 경기 침체 예측에 미치는 영향

수익률 곡선은 GFC와 닷컴 붕괴 등 주요 경기 침체기 이전에도 역전된 적이 있지만, 금리가 인상된 90년대 중반에는 역전되지 않았습니다.

실업률의 3개월 이동 평균인 솜 법칙은 실업률이 50bp 이상 상승할 때 경기 침체가 임박했음을 지속적으로 알려 왔습니다.

현재 솜 규칙은 57 베이시스 포인트로, 특히 수익률 곡선 역전과 함께 경기 침체 가능성이 높음을 시사합니다.

실업률 및 경기 침체 예측 분석

실업률은 역사적으로 낮은 수준을 유지해 왔으며, 현재 실업률은 4.

2%로 이전 경기 침체기와 비슷한 수준입니다.

과거 경기 침체도 낮은 실업률에서 시작되었다는 사실로 인해 금리 인하에 대한 주장은 약화되고 있습니다.

5%로 이전의 주요 경기 침체기의 물가 상승률보다 훨씬 낮기 때문에 GDP 성장률이 플러스인 경기 침체 가능성에 대한 의문이 제기되고 있습니다.

미 연준의 금리 결정과 2년 만기 국채 수익률

거시경제 데이터는 플러스 성장세를 보이고 있고 과거 추세를 보면 연준의 금리가 너무 높다는 것을 알 수 있기 때문에 금리 인하 주장은 약합니다.

2년 만기 국채 수익률은 역사적으로 FED의 행동을 주도해 왔으며, 현재 이 두 수익률의 스프레드는 이전 금리 인하 이전 수준과 비슷한 극단적인 수준입니다.

2년 만기 국채 수익률은 현재 3.

6%로 FED 금리보다 100bp 이상 낮아 추가 금리 인하가 필요할 수 있음을 시사합니다.

연방준비제도의 금리 인하와 시장의 반응

시장에서는 연준의 금리 인하가 너무 느리다고 보고 있으며, 2년물 국채 금리가 크게 하락할 것으로 예상하고 있습니다.

금값 상승은 연준이 금리를 너무 빨리 내리고 있다는 신호로 해석되고 있지만, 과거 차트를 보면 이에 대한 명확한 증거는 없습니다.

1970년대 인플레이션 불황과 실업률과 인플레이션의 관계는 금리 인하가 소비자 물가의 재가속화로 이어질 것이라는 생각에 도전하는 복잡한 그림을 제시합니다.

M2 통화 공급이 소비자 물가에 미치는 영향

역사적으로 M2 통화 공급이 크게 증가하면 소비자 물가가 여러 차례에 걸쳐 상승하기보다는 한 차례에 걸쳐 상승했습니다.

반면, 지난 2년 동안 M2와 M1 통화 공급이 감소하면서 소비자물가 상승이 다시 가속화될 가능성은 낮아졌습니다.

발표자는 통화 공급이 다시 크게 급증하지 않는 한 연준의 조치와 관계없이 소비자 물가 상승률이 다시 가속화될 가능성은 낮다고 주장합니다.