대만의 토종 전투기 개발 여정

### 대만 전투기 개발의 진화: 의존에서 독립으로: 대만 전투기 개발의 진화
* ✈ 1989년 5월 28일, 대만은 **토종 초음속 전투기인 칭궈의 첫 비행**으로 중요한 이정표를 세우며 항공 역사에 자부심을 드러냈습니다.
* 🇺🇸 대만의 항공 산업은 초기 노력에도 불구하고, 특히 **1971년 탁구 선수권 대회 이후 미국이 중국으로 초점을 옮긴 후 외국 기술에 대한 의존**으로 인해 뒤처졌습니다.
* 🛩 F-14와 F-5의 노후화된 함대로 인해 대만의 최신 전투기 도입이 시급한 상황이었으며, 미국의 정책 변화로 인해 **F-16과 노스롭 F-20을 도입하려던 초기 계획이 좌절**되었습니다.
* 🔧 그 결과 대만은 **1982년 5월에 IDF 개발 프로젝트**를 시작하여 **1972년 항공우주산업개발공사(AIDC)를 설립**하고 **최초의 훈련기인 쯔청**을 생산하게 되었습니다.
* 💡 미국의 지원에도 불구하고 대만은 **군용 엔진과 작전 범위의 제한**과 같은 한계에 직면하여 **국내 생산 미사일을 개발**하고 기존 기술을 수정하게 되었습니다.
* 📉 1990년 징궈가 거의 완성될 무렵 미국은 대만에 F-16 수출을 허용했고, 그 결과 **징궈의 계획 생산량은 260대에서 130대로 크게 줄었습니다.**
* 🛠 이러한 생산량 감소와 **10% 미만의 국산화율**로 인해 대만 전투기 능력의 효율성과 자급자족에 대한 우려가 제기되었습니다.
* 🔍 궁극적으로 대만과 한국의 대조적인 전투기 개발 과정은 **진정한 국방 자립을 달성하기 위한 자체 개발 역량과 효율적인 기술 조달**의 중요성을 강조합니다.

대만의 전투기 독립을 위한 투쟁은 자립형 방위 역량의 중요성을 강조합니다.

On May 28, 1989, in Tainan, Taiwan, a sleek-looking fighter jet took to the skies for the first time. This was a historic moment as Taiwan successfully completed the first flight of the indigenous supersonic fighter jet, the Ching-kuo. It was a moment filled with emotion. Considering that our first domestically produced fighter jet, the T-38, was essentially just an assembly of the Northrop F-5, Taiwan was quite far behind in the aviation sector at that time. So, why does Taiwan now look at Korea with envy? What happened in the meantime? 

Originally, Taiwan had a strong alliance with the United States. However, the issue arose with that little ping pong ball. The relationship between the U.S. and China improved rapidly following the 1971 Table Tennis Championship held in Japan, leading to the deployment of J-7 fighter jets with enhanced engine performance in the region, which put Taiwan in a precarious position.

They were threatened, but the state of the Taiwanese Air Force was such that it was almost despairing. More than 70 aging F-14s, which had long surpassed their recommended service life, along with outdated F-5s, were a significant concern. In particular, the aging F-5s that were operational in Taiwan made it urgent to replace them with new fighter jets. Initially, the F-16 and Northrop F-20 were strong candidates for Taiwan's new fighter jet. The F-20 was especially significant as it was an upgraded version of the F-5 that Northrop was keen to push for Taiwan. However, due to changes in U.S.-China relations, the U.S. government did not permit this, rendering all these plans futile. At this time, Northrop turned its attention to South Korea instead of the blocked Taiwanese market, but the crash of the F-20 during a flight in Suwon meant that the promising prospect of introducing the F-20 in South Korea also fell through. In any case, as it became clear that acquiring new fighter jets would be difficult in the future, Taiwan decided to pursue independent development of a fighter jet.

In May 1982, the IDF development project was launched, marking the beginning of serious research and development. Taiwan's independent aircraft development efforts surprisingly began quite early, with attempts to develop aircraft dating back to the time of President Chiang Ching-kuo's Kuomintang administration. The result of these efforts was the establishment of Taiwan's aircraft development agency, AIDC, or the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation. After several reorganizations, AIDC became active in the 1970s and successfully launched its first product in 1972, which was Taiwan's first domestically produced trainer aircraft, the Tzu Chung. Although it was developed based on American trainer aircraft, it served as an important stepping stone for independent aircraft development. To put it in perspective, we can compare it to the KT-1, which had its first flight in 1991, indicating how advanced Taiwan was at that time. Under the support of President Chiang Ching-kuo's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, AIDC made various attempts at independent aircraft development. Among these efforts,

One of the developments was the evidence of the fourth-generation fighter jet. The name was also derived from the name of the leader, which was part of the development process. So, did Taiwan have the capability to independently develop fighter jets at that time? Of course, it did not. It was thanks to various American defense companies that entered Taiwan's fighter jet development project behind the scenes. The Reagan administration, due to its relationship with China, officially prohibited major arms sales to Taiwan, but it was not about to abandon Taiwan, which was crucial in preventing China's expansion into the Pacific. The support for this fighter jet system technology came from General Dynamics, BA Systems, Northrop Grumman, and others. However, as development progressed with American assistance, some issues arose. First, the United States did not allow Taiwan to use the latest military engines. As a result, Taiwan had to modify the F124 engine, which was not specialized in military aircraft engines, from the American company Honeywell.

I created an F125 engine with an afterburner, which has made it quite a usable engine. However, due to its weak thrust when used as a single-engine, it had to be a twin-engine even for a lightweight fighter. This significantly affects the weight. Moreover, the United States has limited the operational range of Taiwan's fighter jets to just enough to defend Taiwan without provoking China. In fact, initially, there were attempts to limit the engine output through software. Since the U.S. did not allow the export of AMRAAM missiles to Taiwan, Taiwan had to develop its own missiles. Due to technological support factors, the appearance of the F-16 and FA-18 can be seen simultaneously. The basic armament includes a cannon, with short-range air-to-air missiles being the domestically produced Tien Kung 1, medium-range air-to-air missiles being Tien Kung 2, and a 200 km range air-to-ground missile, the Wan Gong. Although it has not been tested in actual combat, it has been significantly enhanced by being equipped with domestically developed systems.

The head of the power was made possible. The radar was equipped with the latest model, the F20, boasting a detection range of 150 to 160 km, which was excellent. Although it was difficult to say it was completely self-developed and there were many performance limitations, Taiwan was painting a hopeful picture. However, in 1990, when the development of the Jinguo was completed and it was being deployed for practical use, the U.S. government allowed the export of F-16 fighter jets. Although it was the initial version, Taiwan prioritized the introduction of the F-16. Around the same time, France proposed the Mirage 2000 to Taiwan, and Taiwan, thirsty for high-performance fighters, quickly accepted the Mirage as well. As a result, the number of Jinguo units introduced fell to half of the original plan, at 130 units. It was truly like pouring cold water on a fire that was being stoked. In fact, although it was a self-developed project, the limited timeframe led to an urgent process, resulting in a very low domestic production rate of components.

The domestic production rate was less than 10%. A low localization rate is not only a problem for military support but also puts us at a disadvantage in production costs. Especially since we reduced the required number of units by half, the impact was significant. While we expected limited performance, the overall effectiveness of the airframe, such as fuel efficiency and operational availability, did not meet the standards of the Taiwanese Air Force. Some criticize the low localization of parts, questioning how it can be called a domestic fighter jet, but this perspective ignores the advantages of developing our own platform and system capabilities. In fact, Taiwan developed the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) with the consideration of it being a nuclear delivery system. Thus, even with a low localization rate and reliance on foreign technology, there are sufficient reasons for needing an independently developed fighter jet. The introduction of the F-16, which Taiwan desperately wanted, was also allowed after the development of the IDF, indicating that there is indeed a causal relationship.

It seems that for this reason, during the development of TOC in our country, we received advice on various technological experiences from Taiwanese aircraft developers, separate from Lockheed Martin's technology. On the other hand, after the production quantity of evidence halved, we only made performance improvements around 2009 and did not consider additional production. However, recently, evidence has resurfaced. In 2019, we introduced the AT5 Yongying, a high-level trainer. Although a new model was presented, its foundation is clearly based on the FA-50, which was developed for conversion to combat use. There are also reports that Taiwan's next-generation fighter development project is based on this. If we look at the fighter development history of Taiwan and our country together, we can see clues as to why we have different outcomes today. First, the independently developed fighter, or more precisely, the core components of the independently developed platform...

If there is no capability for in-house development or sourcing, even a reader platform cannot fully function. The localization of parts does not necessarily mean that all components must be developed in-house. Unlike Taiwan, we have relatively free sourcing of technology and components, so it is more efficient in terms of time and cost to source from abroad. However, experts believe that we need to steadily secure the development capability for key aircraft components under government leadership. This is likely the last piece of the puzzle for true self-reliant defense. The case of Taiwan's Jingguo illustrates this point. What are your thoughts?

앞서가다 존재감 사라진 대만 전투기 근황 : F-CK-1 징궈(경국호) 이야기

All about enjoying 'flying'!
‘아는 만큼 보인다!’ 비행을 즐기기 위한 모든 것!  

비행기로 여행할 때  / TV나 영화를 볼 때  / 항공 전문지를 읽을 때  / 항공 레저를 즐길 때 / 항공 분야에 종사하면서 
항공기, 하늘 그리고 엔지니어링에 대해 갖게 되는 궁금증들을 취재하여 소개합니다.



더스카이맥 theSKYmag

1989년 5월 28일, 대만 최초의 토종 초음속 전투기인 칭쿠오가 첫 비행을 하면서 대만 항공 산업에 중요한 이정표를 세웠습니다.

1970년대 미중 관계의 개선, 특히 탁구 선수권 대회 이후 대만의 위상이 불안정해지면서 노후화된 전투기를 교체해야 할 필요성이 절실해졌습니다.

초기에는 F-16과 F-20 같은 신형 전투기를 도입할 계획이었지만, 미국 정부의 제한과 이후 한국에서 발생한 추락 사고로 인해 이러한 계획이 무산되었고, 대만은 독자적인 전투기 개발을 추진하게 되었습니다.

대만의 항공기 개발 노력은 장칭궈(蔣慶國) 총통 시절부터 시작되어 1970년대에 AIDC가 설립되었습니다.

1972년 AIDC의 첫 번째 제품인 대만의 국산 훈련기 츠청(Tzu Chung)이 출시되면서 대만은 독자적인 항공기 개발의 중요한 발걸음을 내디뎠습니다.

대만의 야망에도 불구하고 대만의 전투기 개발은 최신 군용 엔진 사용 금지와 같은 어려움에 직면하면서 미국 방산업체들의 지원을 많이 받았습니다.

대만의 F125 엔진 및 전투기 개발

애프터버너가 장착된 F125 엔진은 추력이 약하기 때문에 경량 전투기에는 트윈 엔진 설정이 필요합니다.

미국은 대만 전투기의 작전 범위를 제한했고, 대만은 국산 미사일을 개발하게 되었습니다.

F-16과 미라지 2000의 도입은 대만의 전투기 프로그램과 맞물려 징궈의 계획 대수를 크게 줄였습니다.

전투기 국내 생산률은 10% 미만으로 군 지원과 생산 비용에서 불리한 점이 있었습니다.

낮은 국산화율에도 불구하고 대만의 토착 방위 전투기(IDF)는 핵전투기라는 의도로 개발되었습니다.

대만의 F-16 도입은 IDF 개발 이후에 허용된 것으로 보아 둘 사이에 인과관계가 있음을 알 수 있습니다.

국방 분야에서 개발 역량의 중요성

리더 플랫폼의 완전한 기능을 위해서는 자체 개발 또는 소싱이 중요합니다.

부품의 현지화도 중요하지만 해외에서 기술과 부품을 조달하는 것이 더 효율적일 수 있습니다.

진정한 자주국방을 달성하기 위해서는 정부 주도하에 주요 항공기 부품의 개발 역량을 확보하는 것이 필수적입니다.