FRAGMENTS
1. From Arrian, the pupil of Epictetus. To the man who was bothering himself about
the problem of being: What do I care, says Epictetus, whether all
existing things are composed of atoms, or of indivisibles, or of fire and earth? Is it not enough to learn the true nature
of the good and the evil, and the limits of the desires and aversions, and also of the
choices and refusals, and, by employing these as rules, to order the affairs of our life,
and dismiss the things that are beyond us? It may very well be that these latter are
not to be comprehended by the human mind, and even if one assume that they are perfectly
comprehensible, well, what profit comes from comprehending them? And ought we not to say that those men trouble
themselves in vain who assign all this as necessary to the philosopher's system of thought? Is, therefore, also the precept at Delphi
superfluous, Know thyself?

—That, indeed, no, the man answers.
—What, then, does it mean? If one bade a singer in a chorus to know
himself, would he not heed the order by paying attention both to his fellows in the chorus
and to singing in harmony with them? —Yes.
—And so in the case of a sailor? or a soldier? Does it seem to you, then, that man has been
made a creature to live all alone by himself, or for society? —For society.
—By whom? —By Nature.
—What Nature is, and how she administers
the universe, and whether she really exists or not, these are questions about which there
is no need to go on to bother ourselves. 2
From Arrian the pupil of Epictetus: He who is dissatisfied with what he has and
what has been given him by fortune is a layman in the art of living, but the man who bears
all this in a noble spirit and makes a reasonable

use of all that comes from it deserves to
be considered a good man.

From the same, All things obey and serve the Cosmos: both
earth, and sea, and sun, and the other stars, and the plants and animals of earth; obedient
to it also is our body, both in sickness and in health, when the Cosmos wishes, both in
youth and in old age, and when passing through all the other changes. Therefore, it is reasonable also that the one
thing which is under our control, that is, the decision of our will, should not be the
only thing to stand out against it. For the Cosmos is mighty and superior to us,
and has taken better counsel for us than we can, by uniting us together with the universe
under its governance. Besides, to act against it is to side with
unreason, and while accomplishing nothing but a vain struggle, it involves us in pains
and sorrows.

Rufus.

From the remarks of Epictetus on friendship:
Of things that are, God has put some under our control, and others not under our control. Under our control, He put the finest and most
important matter, that, indeed, by virtue of which He Himself is happy: the power to
make use of external impressions. For when this power has its perfect work,
it is freedom, serenity, cheerfulness, steadfastness; it is also justice, and law, and self-control,
and the sum and substance of virtue. But all other things He has not put under
our control. Therefore, we also ought to become of one mind
with God, and, dividing matters in this way, lay hold in every way we can upon the things
that are under our control, but what is not under our control we ought to leave to the
Cosmos, and gladly resign to it whatever it needs, be that our children, our country,
our body, or anything whatsoever.

5
Rufus. From Epictetus on friendship.
What man among us does not admire the saying of Lycurgus, the Lacedaemonian? For when he had been blinded in one eye by one of his fellow-citizens, and the people had turned over the young man to him to take whatever vengeance upon the culprit he might desire, this he refrained from doing, but brought him up and made a good man of him, and presented him in the theatre. And when the Lacedaemonians expressed their surprise, he said, This man when I received him at your hands was insolent and violent; I am returning him to you a reasonable and public-spirited person.
6
Rufus. From Epictetus on friendship.
But above all else, this is the function of nature, to bind together and to harmonize our choice with the conception of what is fitting and helpful.
7
The same.

To fancy that we shall be contemptible in the sight of other men, if we do not employ every means to hurt the first enemies we meet, is characteristic of extremely ignoble and thoughtless men. For it is a common saying among us that the contemptible man is recognized among other things by his incapacity to do harm; but he is much better recognized by his incapacity to extend help. Rufus. From the remarks of Epictetus on friendship. Such was, and is, and will be, the nature of the universe, and it is not possible for the things that come into being to come into being otherwise than they now do. And not only has mankind participated in this process of change and transformation, and all the other living beings upon earth, but also those which are divine, and, by Zeus, even the four elements, which are changed and transformed upwards and downwards, as earth becomes water, and water air, and air again is transformed into ether; and there

is the same kind of transformation also downwards. If a man endeavours to incline his mind to
these things, and to persuade himself to accept of his own accord what needs must befall him,
he will have a very reasonable and harmonious life. 9
A philosopher who is well known in the Stoic school . . . brought out of his handbag the
fifth book of the Discourses of the philosopher Epictetus, which had been arranged by Arrian,
and agree, no doubt, with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus. Originally there were eight, of which only
four survive, together with these fragments. In that book, written of course in Greek,
we find a passage to this purport: Things seen by the mind (which the philosophers call
φαντασίας), whereby the intellect of man is struck at the very first sight of
anything, which penetrates to the mind, are not subject to his will, nor to his control,
but by virtue of a certain force of their

own thrust themselves upon the attention of
men; but the assents (which they call synkatathéseis), whereby these same things seen by the mind,
are recognized, are subject to man's will, and fall under his control. Therefore, when some terrifying sound comes
from the sky, or from the collapse of a building, or sudden word comes of some peril or other,
or something else of the same sort happens, the mind of even the wise man cannot help
but be disturbed, and shrink, and grow pale for a moment, not from any anticipation of
some evil, but because of certain swift and unconsidered motions which forestall the action
of the intellect and the reason. Soon, however, our wise man does not give his
assent, but rejects and repudiates them, and sees in them nothing to cause him fear. And this, they say, is the difference between
the mind of the fool and the mind of the wise.

man, that the fool thinks the cruel and harsh
things seen by his mind, when it is first struck by them, actually to be what they appear,
and likewise afterwards, just as though they really were formidable, he confirms them by
his own approval also, καὶ προσεπιδοξάζει (the word the Stoics use when they discuss
this matter); whereas the wise man, when his colour and expression have changed for a brief
instant, οὑ συγκατατίθεται, but keeps the even tenor and strength of the
opinion which he has always had about mental impressions of this kind, as things that do
not deserve to be feared at all, but terrify only with a false face and a vain fear. This is the sentiment and expression of the
philosopher Epictetus, derived from the doctrines of the Stoics, that we have read in the book
of which I spoke above.

I have heard Favorinus say that he had heard the philosopher Epictetus say that most of those who gave the appearance of philosophizing were philosophers of this kind: apart from deeds, as far as words. There is a still more vigorous expression which he was accustomed to use that Arrian has recorded in the books which he wrote about his discourses. For Arrian says that when Epictetus had noticed a man lost to shame, of misdirected energy, and evil habits, bold, impudent in speech, and concerned with everything else but his soul, when he saw a man of that kind, continues Arrian, handling also the studies and pursuits of philosophy, and taking up physics, and studying dialectics, and taking up and investigating many a theoretical principle of this sort, he would call upon gods and men, and frequently, in the midst of that appeal, he would denounce the man in these words: Ἄνθρωπε, ποῦ

βάλλεις; σκέψαι εἰ κεκάθαρται
τὸ ἀγγεῖον. ἂν γὰρ εἰς τὴν οἴησιν
βάλλῃς, ἀπώλετο. ἢν σαπῇ, ἢ οὖρον ἢ ὂξος
γένοιτ᾽ ἂν, ἢ τι τούτων χεῖρον. Surely, there is nothing weightier, nothing
truer than these words, in which the greatest of philosophers declared that the writings
and teachings of philosophy, when poured into a false and low-lived person, as though into
a dirty and defiled vessel, turn, change.

are spoiled, and become urine, or something,
it may be, dirtier than urine. (as he himself says κυνικώτερον). The same Epictetus, moreover, as we have heard
from Favorinus, was in the habit of saying that there were two vices which are far more
severe and atrocious than all others: want of endurance and want of self-control, when
we do not endure or bear the wrongs which we have to bear, or do not abstain from, or
forbear, those matters and pleasures which we ought to forbear. And so, he says, if a man should take to
heart these two words and observe them in controlling and keeping watch over himself,
he will, for the most part, be free from wrongdoing, and will live a highly peaceful life. These two words, he used to say, were Ἀνέχου
and Ἀπέχου.

10a
When the salvation of our souls and regard for our true selves are at stake, something
has to be done, even without stopping to think about it, a saying of Epictetus which Arrian
quotes with approval. 

11
From the homilies of Arrian, exhorting to virtue. Now when Archelaus sent for Socrates with the intention of making him rich, the latter
bade the messenger take back the following answer: At Athens four quarts of barley-meal
can be bought for an obol, and there are running springs of water. For, look you, if what I have is not sufficient
for me, still, I am sufficient for it, and so it too is sufficient for me. Or do you not see that Polus was not accustomed
to act Oedipus the King with any finer voice or more pleasure to his audience than Oedipus
at Colonus, the outcast and beggar?

And then shall the man of noble nature make a poorer showing than Polus, and not play well any role to which the Deity assigns him? And will he not follow the example of Odysseus, who was no less pre-eminent in his rags than in his rich and purple cloak? 12
From Arrian There are certain persons who exhibit their high spirit rather gently, and in a sort of passionless manner do everything that even those who are swept away by their anger do. We must be on our guard, therefore, against the error of these persons, as something much worse than violent anger. For those who give way to violent anger are soon sated with their revenge, but the others prolong it like men who have a light fever. 13
From the Memorabilia of Epictetus But, says someone I see the good and excellent perishing from hunger and cold.—And do you not see those who are not good and excellent perishing from luxury, and bombast, and vulgarity?—Yes.

but it is disgraceful to be supported by another. And who, O miserable fellow, is supported by himself alone, except the Cosmos? Whoever accuses Providence, therefore, because the wicked are not punished, and because they are strong and rich, is acting just as though, when the wicked had lost their eyes, he said they were not being punished because their finger-nails were in good condition. Now, as for me, I assert that there is much more difference between virtue and property than there is between eyes and finger-nails. From the Memorabilia of Epictetus . . . bring forward the ill-natured philosophers, who think that pleasure is not something natural, but a sequel of things that are natural, as justice, self-control, and freedom. Why indeed, then, does the soul take delight in the lesser goods of the body, and enjoy calm therein, as Epicurus says, and yet not find pleasure in its own goods, which are

very great? Verily, nature has also given me a sense of
shame, and frequently I blush when I feel that I am saying something disgraceful. It is this emotion which does not allow me
to lay down pleasure as the good and end of life. 
From the Memorabilia of Epictetus: At Rome, the women have in their hands Plato's
Republic, because he insists on community of women. For they pay attention only to the words,
and not to the meaning of the man. The fact is, he does not bid people marry and live
together, one man with one woman, and then go on to advocate the community of women,
but he first abolishes that kind of marriage altogether, and introduces another kind in
its place. And in general, people delight in finding excuses
for their own faults. For, indeed, philosophy says we ought not to stretch out even our
finger at random! 
From the Memorabilia of Epictetus.

One ought to know that it is not easy for a man to acquire a fixed judgement, unless he should day by day state and hear the same principles, and at the same time apply them to his life. From Epictetus. Now when we have been invited to a banquet, we take what is set before us; and if a person should bid his host to set before him fish or cakes, he would be regarded as eccentric. Yet in the world at large we ask the gods for things which they do not give us, and that too when there are many things which they actually have given us. From the same. Those are amusing persons, he said, who take great pride in the things which are not under our control. A man says, I am better than you; for I have many estates, and you are half-dead with hunger. Another says, I am a consular. Another, I am a procurator.

Another, I have thick curly hair. But one horse does not say to another horse,
I am better than you, for I have quantities of fodder, and a great deal of barley, and
my bridles are of gold, and my saddle-cloths are embroidered, but I can run faster than
you can. And every creature is better or worse because
of its own particular virtue or vice. Can it be, then, that man is the only creature
without a special virtue, but he must have recourse to his hair, and his clothes, and
his grandsires? 19
The same. When men are sick and their physician gives
them no advice, they are annoyed, and think that he has given them up. And why should not a man feel that way toward
the philosopher, and so conclude that he has given up hope of one's ever coming to a sound
state of mind, if he no longer tells one anything that is of any use?

20
The same. Those whose bodies are in good condition can
endure heat and cold; so also those whose souls are in an excellent condition can endure
anger, and grief, and great joy, and every other emotion. 21
From Epictetus. For this reason, it is right to praise Agrippinus,
because, although he was a man of the very highest worth, he never praised himself, but
used to blush even if someone else praised him. His character was such, said Epictetus, that
when any hardship befell him, he would compose a eulogy upon it; on fever, if he had a fever;
on disrepute, if he suffered from disrepute; on exile, if he went into exile. And once, he said, when Agrippinus was preparing
to take lunch, a man brought him word that Nero ordered him into exile; Very well,
said he, we shall take our lunch in Aricia.

22
From Agrippinus: When Agrippinus was governor, he used to try to persuade the persons whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced. For, he would say, it is not as an enemy or as a brigand that I record my vote against them, but as a curator and guardian; just as also the physician encourages the man upon whom he is operating, and persuades him to submit to the operation. 

23
From Epictetus: Nature is wonderful, and, as Xenophon says, fond of her creatures. At all events we love and tend our body, the most unpleasant and dirtiest thing that there is; why, if we had had to tend our neighbour's body for no more than five days, we could not have endured it. Just consider what a nuisance it is to get up in the morning and brush some other person's teeth, and then after attending to a call of nature to wash those parts.

Truly, it is wonderful to love a thing for which we perform so many services every day. I stuff this bag here; and then I empty it; what is more tiresome? But I must serve God. For that reason, I remain and endure to wash this miserable paltry body, and to feed and shelter it; and when I was younger, there was still another behest which it laid upon me, yet nevertheless I endured it. Why then, when Nature, which gave us our body, takes it away, do you not bear it?—I love it, says somebody.—Well, but as I was just now saying, is it not Nature that has given you this very affection? But the same Nature also says, Let it go now, and have no more trouble with it. The same. If a man dies young, he blames the gods because he is carried off before his time. But if a man fails to die when he is old, he too blames the gods, because, when it

was long since time for him to rest. He has trouble; yet nonetheless, when death draws nigh, he wishes to live and sends for the doctor, and implores him to spare no zeal and pains. People are very strange, he used to say, wishing neither to live nor to die.

From Epictetus: When you attack someone with vehemence and threatening, remember to tell yourself beforehand that you are a tame animal; and then you will never do anything fierce, and so will come to the end of your life without having to repent or to be called to account.

You are a little soul, carrying around a corpse, as Epictetus used to say.

We must discover, said he, an art that deals with assent, and in the sphere of the choices we must be careful to maintain close attention, that they be made with due reservations, that they be social, and that they be according.

to merit; and from desire, we must refrain altogether, and must exercise aversion towards none of the things that are not under our control. 28 It is no ordinary matter that is at stake, said he, but it is a question of either madness or sanity. 28a Socrates used to say, What do you want? To have souls of rational or irrational animals? Of rational animals. Of what kind of rational animals? Sound or vicious? Sound. Why, then, do you not try to get them? Because we have them. Why, then, do you strive and quarrel? 28b[33] Miserable me, that this has befallen me! Say not so, but rather, Fortunate that I am because, although this has befallen me, I continue to live untroubled, being neither crushed by the present nor afraid of the future. For something of this kind might have befallen anyone, but not everyone would have continued

to live untroubled by it. Why, then, count the former aspect of the
matter a misfortune, rather than this latter good fortune? And in general, do you call a man's misfortune
that which is not an aberration from man's nature? And does that seem to you to be an aberration
from the nature of man which does not contravene the will of his nature? What then? This will of man's nature you have already
learned; this, then, which has befallen you does not prevent you, does it, from being
just, high-minded, self-controlled, self-possessed, deliberate, free from deceit, self-respecting,
free, and everything else, the possession of which enables the nature of man to come
into its own? Remember for the future, whenever anything
begins to trouble you, to make use of the following judgement: This thing is not a misfortune,
but to bear it in a noble spirit is good fortune.

(referenced by Marcus Aurelius)
  DOUBTFUL AND SPURIOUS FRAGMENTS
29. From the Encheiridion of Epictetus:
Under all circumstances, take thought of nothing so much as safety; for it is safer to keep
silence than to speak, and refrain from saying what will be devoid of sense and full of censure.
30. From Epictetus:
We ought neither to fasten our ship to one small anchor nor our life to a single hope.
31. From the same:
We ought to measure both the length of our stride and the extent of our hope by what is possible.
32. From Epictetus:
It is much more necessary to cure the soul than the body; for death is better than a bad life.
33. From the same:
Those of our pleasures which come most rarely give the greatest delight.
34. From the same:
If a man should overpass the mean, the most delightful things would become least delightful.

35
No man is free who is not master of himself.
36
The truth is something immortal and eternal, and does not present us with a beauty that
withers from the passage of time, nor a freedom of speech which can be taken away by justice,
but it presents us with what is just and lawful, distinguishing the unlawful therefrom, and
refuting it.

The Discourses of Epictetus - Fragments - (My Narration & Notes)

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The Discourses of Epictetus - Fragments - (My Narration & Notes)

The Discourses of Epictetus - Fragments - (My Narration & Notes)

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