의식의 신경과학:  내면 성찰과 과학적 실험의 연결고리

### 베르나르도 카스트럽, 의식 있는 컴퓨터의 불가능성에 대하여
* 🧠 카스트럽은 의식을 시뮬레이션한다는 아이디어를 컴퓨터 신장 시뮬레이션을 실제 신장이 소변을 생성하는 것으로 착각하는 것과 비교하며 시뮬레이션은 시뮬레이션이 아니라고 반박합니다.
* 🤔 그는 의식을 뇌 활동으로 환원하려는 실험의 타당성에 의문을 제기하며, 신경과학에서 보고 가능한 경험에만 의존하는 것의 한계를 강조합니다.
* 🔬 신경과학에서는 신경 상관관계와 주관적 보고를 통해 의식을 연구하지만, 이러한 접근 방식은 원시 의식과 메타 의식(의식에 대한 인식)을 구분하지 못합니다.
* ⚠ ️ 카스트럽은 의식을 신경생물학으로 환원하는 것을 경계하며, 이러한 시도는 환원 가능성에 대한 형이상학적 가정과 뇌 활동과 의식 사이의 인과적 상관관계를 전제로 한다고 주장합니다.
* 🧘 그는 신경과학적 조사와 성찰을 결합해야 한다고 주장하며, 연구자에게 주관적 경험에 대한 깊은 이해가 중요하다고 강조합니다.
* 🤯 그는 현상적 의식을 오해하여 "의식은 일어나지 않는다"고 주장하며 개인의 주관과 혼동하는 일부 신경과학자들의 순진함을 비판합니다.
* 🌌 카스트럽은 현상적 의식은 물리적 현상과 달리 양으로 정의할 수 없으며, 생각의 길이나 감정의 무게를 측정할 수 없다고 주장합니다.
* 🤖 그는 의식의 물리적 발현은 본질적으로 생물학적이며 실리콘으로 복제할 수 없기 때문에 의식 있는 컴퓨터를 만드는 것은 비생산적인 환상이라고 결론지었습니다.

신경과학은 실험과 주관적인 보고를 통해 의식을 생산적으로 연구하지만, 의식을 뇌 활동으로 환원하는 것은 비생산적입니다.

The mistake made here is mistaking a simulation for the thing simulated. We don't make that mistake for anything

else. I mean, nobody would mistake a kidney function simulation on a computer for a kidney producing urine. It seems

almost impossible to think, though, that we could ever reproduce or have a control group with consciousness, um, and

that I think leads many people to think about, uh, maybe philosophically entertaining, but ultimately, you know,

impractical sorts of experiments. I mean, are you aware of any, you know, true experiments that could shed light, uh,

no pun intended, on consciousness as a, uh, other than, you know, kind of metaphorically, the dashboard, the

instrument panel of yours, etc.? Are there only Gedanken experiments, or can we actually do real, honest-to-goodness

experiments in the physical sciences? I think we can. I think neuroscience has been showing that experimentation around awareness, phenomenality, consciousness

itself is possible and it's productive to a large degree. Um, the entire field of the neuroscience of consciousness, the

notion of the neural correlates of consciousness is based on measurement and subjective reports. Individuals who report what they are experiencing now,

are there problems with that? Are there limitations? Surely there are. Um, for instance, uh, when you are basing your

study on reportability, you do not distinguish between raw consciousness or phenomenal consciousness, as we say, state

on the one hand, and on the other hand, meta-consciousness or conscious metacognition, which sits on top of

awareness. It's meta-conscious consciousness. It's what you have when, in addition to experiencing, you know that

you experience. Now, to report an experience, you have to be meta-conscious of it; otherwise, you will not say

Well, I'm not having that experience; well, in fact, it may be an experience in itself, so there is that limitation, the

Neuroscience, neuroscientists today try to get around that with the so-called 'no-report' paradigms, but then you get

limited in all kinds of other ways. But I think it is productive to have some science around, uh, phenomenality, around

consciousness. What we will not succeed in—and unfortunately, that seems to be the goal for most sciences, uh, around

consciousness—is to reduce consciousness to physiological brain activity, to, to, to neurometabolism. The very

attempt to do that presupposes a certain metaphysical assumption, which is that, well, consciousness is reducible, and that

the correlation between brain activity and consciousness is a causal one, and, uh, that I think is hopeless. Um, and to

complement the neuroscience of consciousness, I think the way to go is to, um, to have introspective

investigation, which is not science. We should not add introspection to science because it will break the back of

science as a horse, and we will lose a very, very useful horse that we should keep and protect and maintain healthy. Um, but

in addition to science, I think it would be very productive, even for the scientists who practice the science of

consciousness, to develop a little more sophisticated, uh, introspective awareness; to know a little bit more firsthand what

it is that they are actually studying. Because the level of introspective naiveté amongst philosophers of mind and

and neuroscientists of consciousness is sometimes scary. It's, it's, it's, um, because why, why, why do you say

that? Well, because you, one is dedicating one's life to studying consciousness, which can only be actually known from

Introspection, a first-person perspective, uh, but one is extremely naive about what that word means. So how can one study it?

From the outside, if one doesn't actually know what one is studying. I mean, there are attempts, uh, made by famous

neuroscientists who say that, and I quote, "Consciousness doesn't happen. Consciousness doesn't exist." Um, and when

you read their material, what you realize is that what they call consciousness is a kind of ethereal sense

of individual subjectivity, a kind of individual eye within a kind of soul or spirit. And and that's what they explain away. Well, very

good. It's it's not like anybody was waiting for for that kind of proof of the obvious, but um, they confuse that

with what philosophers call phenomenal consciousness, which has nothing to do with individual identity or some kind of

individual soul. It's about experience itself, phenomenality. It's it's a type of existence that is defined in terms of

qualities as opposed to quantities. You cannot specify or fully describe, uh, uh, uh, experiences on on the basis of

physical quantities. What is the length in centimeters of a thought? What is the weight in kilograms of an emotion? What

is the color of of a memory? I mean, um, that's where things go wrong when a, know, otherwise famous

neuroscientist makes proclamations about the ability to reduce consciousness to nothing, while in fact what he's

referring to as consciousness is not it's not consciousness at all. I think that is that is unfortunate and a little

more introspective insight would would improve and help everybody to engage in a more productive dialogue. So, uh, I think it is uh it is

useful to kind of, maybe for the audience, to kind of state some of your positions, which I'll summarize at least as I

understand them, but please correct me if I'm wrong—in the likely scenario that I am wrong—but as far as I understand it,

you are not—although you are materialistic in some sense—you don't believe that computers will ever be able

to approach the, uh, conscious experience or even the thought process that humans can engage in. Is that

correct? Am I summarizing your position, or...

all. I don't think that the foundational level of nature is material or physical or describable in terms of

quantities at all. I don't think that is true. Um, I am very skeptical of the notion that one can build a silicon

computer and expect it to have private conscious experience the way you and I have. Because when you talk about

conscious computers, what we mean is more than just the fact that there is consciousness associated with it; what we

mean is that a computer would be conscious in the same way as you and I are. In other words, a computer would have

private conscious states that are accessible from the inside but not from the outside. Yes, that I think is a very

unproductive fantasy. It arises from some silly psychology because nature is telling us that what private conscious

experience looks like when observed from the outside is warm, moist neurochemistry. That's what it looks like.

So why would a silicon computer that, you know, doesn't metabolize, doesn't burn ATP, doesn't release neurotransmitter

molecules, uh, doesn't have action potentials—well, we can imitate action potentials, so that's not a good

example—but doesn't have any of the rest, why would that be what private conscious experience looks like? It's completely

Arbitrarily, the mistake made here is to mistake a simulation for the thing simulated. We don't make that mistake for

anything else. I mean, nobody would mistake a kidney function simulation on a computer for a kidney producing urine.

Nobody would expect a computer to pee on one's desk because one knows that a kidney simulation, even if accurate down

to the molecular level, is not the thing simulated. But when it comes to the patterns of mental activity in a

human being, we think the simulation is the thing simulated, and that's extraordinarily naive. No, I don't think any silicon computer will ever

Bernardo Kastrup: Proof of Consciousness

Dr Brian Keating

시뮬레이션(예: 신장 기능)을 실제와 착각하는 것은 흔히 발생하는 오류입니다.

신장을 컴퓨터로 시뮬레이션한다고 해서 소변이 나오지 않는 것처럼, 의식을 시뮬레이션한다고 해서 실제 의식이 생기는 것은 아닙니다.

의식 연구를 위한 대조군 생성의 어려움은 실험 진행을 방해합니다.

연사는 은유적 접근을 넘어 의식에 대한 진정한 실험의 존재에 의문을 제기합니다.

신경과학은 인식과 의식을 연구하기 위한 실험적 접근 방식을 제공합니다.

이 분야는 의식의 신경학적 상관관계에 초점을 맞춘 측정과 주관적인 보고에 의존합니다.

원시 의식과 메타 의식을 구분하지 않기 때문에 보고 기능에 의존하는 데는 한계가 있습니다.

경험을 보고하려면 메타 의식이 필요하므로 연구에 한계가 있습니다.

'무보고' 패러다임은 이러한 제한을 피하려고 하지만 다른 제약이 따릅니다.

의식 연구에서의 환원주의의 한계

의식을 두뇌 활동으로 축소하는 것은 결함이 있는 접근 방식입니다.

이러한 환원주의적 시도는 의식이 환원 가능하며 뇌와 의식의 상관관계가 인과관계가 있다는 것을 전제로 합니다.

내성적 조사는 가치가 있지만 과학적 방법론에 통합되어서는 안 됩니다.

의식을 연구하는 과학자들은 보다 정교한 성찰적 인식을 키워야 합니다.

의식을 연구하는 철학자와 신경과학자 사이에는 내성적 이해가 부족하다는 우려가 존재합니다.

의식은 성찰을 통해서만 진정으로 알 수 있지만, 연구자들은 종종 이러한 이해가 부족합니다.

일부 신경과학자들은 의식을 미묘한 주관적 감각으로 치부하는 경우가 있습니다.

이러한 오해는 개인의 정체성과 현상적 의식(경험 자체의 본질)을 혼동합니다.

물질주의와 의식적 컴퓨터의 불가능성

연사는 유물론과 의식적 컴퓨터의 가능성에 대한 자신의 입장을 명확히 밝힙니다.

그는 유물론자가 아니며, 자연의 근본적인 수준은 물질이나 물리적이지 않다고 믿습니다.

그는 실리콘 컴퓨터가 인간처럼 사적인 의식 경험을 할 수 있을지에 대해서는 회의적입니다.

그는 의식 있는 컴퓨터에 대한 생각을 비생산적인 환상으로 여깁니다.

그는 신장을 예로 들며 시뮬레이션과 실제 상황을 혼동하는 실수를 다시 한 번 반복합니다.