미식가 윤리: 근본적인 동기 부여로서의 쾌락과 고통

### 키케로의 미식가 논증: 최고의 선으로서의 쾌락
* 🧠 키케로의 캐릭터 루시우스 토르쿠아투스는 **쾌락은 단순한 선이 아니라 최고의 선**이며 **고통은 최악의 악**이라는 에피쿠로스의 신념을 보여줍니다.
* 🐾 모든 동물은 태어날 때부터 **쾌락을 욕망**하고 즐기며 **고통을 피합니다.**
* 🌟 "모든 동물은 태어날 때부터 **쾌락을 최고의 선**으로 여깁니다."
* 👃 쾌락과 고통은 감각을 통해 파악할 수 있으며, **윤리의 기본이자 즉각적인 요소**입니다.
* 💪 **쾌락과 고통**은 우리의 동기, 욕구, 행동을 결정합니다.
* 📏 "쾌락과 고통은 우리가 하고, 생각하고, 느끼고, 가치 있게 여기는 모든 것의 근간"이 됩니다.
* 🔄 미덕, 악덕, 우정, 예외는 **쾌락과 고통의 관점**에서 설명할 수 있습니다.

에피쿠로스는 동물의 행동, 감각 지각, 미덕과 악덕을 설명하면서 쾌락을 최고의 선으로 주장합니다.

hi, this is Dr. Gregory Sadler. I'm a professor of philosophy and the president and founder of an educational consulting company called Reason IO, where we put philosophy into practice. I've studied and taught philosophy for over 20 years, and I find that many people run into difficulties reading classic philosophical texts. Sometimes it's the way things are said or how the text is structured, but the concepts themselves are not always that complicated. And that's where I come in to help students and lifelong learners. I've been producing longer lecture videos and posting them to YouTube. Many viewers say they find them useful. What you're currently watching is part of a new series of shorter videos, each of them focused on one core concept from an important philosophical text. I hope you find it useful as well. In Cicero's work on moral ends, he has one character, Lucius Torquatus, who represents the Epicurean position and who presents it in an extended argument, trying to make the case for what it is that Epicurus actually thinks.

it's quite rational and should be taken as the correct philosophical position in ethics. The Epicureans are hedonists, that means that they believe that pleasure is not just something that's good. They believe it is the good, or to put it in Cicero's terms, the Summum bonum, the greatest, the highest good, the good that in some respect encompasses the other ones and makes them good. Likewise, it's called on the ends, not on the end, because pain is also an end, a so mama, but it's the Summum Mahlum, the worst evil, and so pain is not just something bad for the Epicureans, it is love bad. It is what is worst and what makes other things bad. So good and bad are understood primarily in terms of pain and pleasure. What about everything else in the universe that we're interested in, that might motivate us, that we might take into account in our moral reasoning, or even in our just sentimental responses? Well, everything else for the Epicureans is simply a

means to an end, and we have two different ends here: the end of good and the end of evil or badness. So, everything that can bring us to some sort of pleasure is conducing to that final end of ours, which is to have pleasure, to enjoy pleasure, or to avoid pain. Likewise, there are many things that are bad, not intrinsically bad, but because they lead to pain. So, the Epicureans might take some things that we would often say are just good or just bad and say, well, no, it really depends on whether they're leading to pain or pleasure, or are likely to lead to pain and pleasure, and that's a typical hedonist position. Now, Cicero is going to have Torquatus provide several arguments explaining the Epicurean position, trying to make it seem reasonable and plausible. Let's take a look at the first argument. It's fairly straightforward. This is one that comes directly, if the ancients are correct, from Epicurus himself, which is that every single animal, when we observe them as soon as they are babies, they desire.

they seek out and they enjoy pleasures. Their pleasures may vary considerably from species to species, so we share some things in common. For example, with otters, we both enjoy swimming and playing in the water, but otters eat a lot of things that I think we would find fairly disgusting, and perhaps vice versa. There's probably a lot of things that we eat that otters would turn their nose up at. And if we go through other animals, we'll find all sorts of other things that we don't enjoy that they enjoy, and vice versa. And there's some things that babies do enjoy that perhaps we as adults don't get so much out of, and vice versa. You know, you're not gonna have a baby enjoying reading Cicero, for example, but every animal does in fact desire and seek out pleasure from its very inception, from its very birth. Likewise, Cicero has Torquatus say they do the converse with pain. They register pain and it sucks for them. They don't like it. They do the opposite of desiring.

which is being averse to they do the opposite of seeking which is to avoid. Now, Cicero says this. This assumes you've got an animal whose nature has not been corrupted. If it has been corrupted, then you might say all bets are off, but you don't take those as the norm. So looking at healthy animals from their very inception, they begin to value pleasure as the highest good. Does this actually prove that pleasure is the highest good? If you want to be strict about it, not really. It does prove that pleasure is a desirable good and that animals are motivated by it. And likewise, they're also motivated to avoid pain. But it doesn't prove that it's the highest good. A stronger argument is going to be provided for this a little bit later. Let's look at the second argument, also not that strong but an interesting one nonetheless. So it's saying essentially there is an immediacy about pleasure and pain that doesn't require any sort of complex philosophical argument on their behalf as fundamentally basic for ethics. What's the argument here? Well, we grasp

pleasures desirability through our senses. How do you know something is pleasant? Well, you know, I'll be kind of silly here. Give it a lick, give it a touch, give it a tickle, smell it, rub your face in it. You know, that works for certain kinds of things. You might imagine a bar of chocolate, right? Give it a lick. You know, that's very pleasant. Rub it on your face, maybe not so much. Maybe it's not that kind of pleasure, right? And likewise, how do you know something is painful? Well, it hurts you or it sucks and it makes you feel bad. Some pains could be maybe not like the poking, like, you know, something poking you in the eye or catching your toe on the stool or something like that, but there's other things like the gross feeling of oozy things, right? You recoil from that. You don't have to sit there and think, hmm, is this something that is actually painful to me? I don't know, let me go through a syllogism. Epicure says

you don't have to do anything remotely like that. You know right away that something is pleasurable and painful, and we know right away that we are motivated by these things. A much stronger argument is provided in claiming that pleasure and pain are generating or determining the motivations that we have, our fundamental attitudes, and behavior and relations to all other things. So he's going to say this in two places. In the first place, he is going to say that we seek out pleasure and we avoid pain, and that leads us to other things as well. He says, What is nature perceive, or what does she judge of perceive through the senses, judge of through the intellect besides pleasure and pain to guide her actions of desire and avoidance? Desire and avoidance are in some respect dictated or determined by the pleasures and pains that we've experienced or that we anticipate coming from whatever it is that we're reasoning about or even just reacting to. A little bit later he'll say, Pleasure and pain supply the motives of desire and avoidance and the springs of.

conduct generally. So, the idea here is that if we're looking at human experience, if we're generalizing about the kind of creatures that we are, and we're being honest with ourselves, we will understand that pleasure and pain lie at the basis. Not only of everything we do, but everything we think, everything we feel. Even more so, everything we value and how we value things in relation to each other seems to be a somewhat stronger way of making the case. The fourth argument that he's going to provide, and you see him doing this in many different ways, talking, for example, about friendship or about virtue or about other things that we choose and pursue, is that any sort of exception, what seems like an exception to the rule of pleasure and pain, are really the fundamental motivators can actually be explained in terms of pleasure and pain. So, take the virtues, for example, are the virtues genuinely good? Do we really value courage, justice, temperance, wisdom for their own sake, or do we value these because they lead us to pleasure and he

help us to avoid pain, or at least to minimize the pain that we encounter. What about the vices? Are they bad in and of themselves: folly, cowardice, injustice, intemperance, or are they bad because they ultimately lead to pains and deprive us of pleasures? We can talk about friendship, but Epicurus also goes to ordinary experiences that we have. Think about when you forgo some sort of pleasure that you normally would pursue because you engage in some reasoning and you realize that if you do engage in this pleasure, you're going to have a more painful situation later on. Think, for example, about when you'd like to say something cutting, too witty, but kind of biting to somebody else, and you think, Oh, no, no, I better not say that now. Why do you forego that immediate pleasure? It's because you actually do value pleasure more, and you want to have more pleasure later on than right now. Likewise, why do we do the things that we do that don't bring us pleasure in many

cases to avoid pain, to avoid further pains down the line, and so any sort of exception, according to the Epicureans, can really be explained in terms of good practical reasoning that leads us to enjoy pleasure. Is the good and avoid pain as the evil. This, according to Torquatus and Epicurus, provides the fundamental basis for not just Epicurean ethics, but for all other ethics. It's just the Epicureans are being honest about it and everybody else is sort of hiding this from themselves.

Cicero, on the Ends bk 1 | Epicureans on Pleasure as the Basis | Philosophy Core Concepts

I bring philosophy into practice, making complex classic philosophical ideas accessible for a wide audience of professionals, students, and life-long learners.  After a decade in traditional academic positions, I started my own business and began doing philosophical work in more practical contexts.  I am an APPA-certified philosophical counselor, a public speaker, an author, an ethics trainer, and an executive coach (among other things!).

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Gregory B. Sadler

식탐주의에 대한 에피쿠로스 철학의 이해

철학 교수인 그레고리 새들러 박사는 키케로의 도덕적 목적에 관한 저작에서 쾌락을 최고의 선으로, 고통을 최악의 악으로 보는 에피쿠로스적 관점에 대해 설명합니다.

에피쿠로스는 도덕적 추론에서 우주의 다른 모든 것은 고통과 쾌락에 부차적이라고 믿습니다.

새들러의 짧은 동영상은 학생과 평생 학습자를 돕기 위해 중요한 철학 텍스트의 핵심 개념에 초점을 맞춥니다.

쾌락과 고통에 대한 에피쿠로스적 관점

에피쿠로스는 모든 것이 쾌락이나 고통 회피라는 목적을 위한 수단이라고 믿습니다.

이러한 쾌락주의적 입장은 아기부터 성인에 이르기까지 모든 동물이 고통을 피하면서 쾌락을 추구하고 즐긴다는 관찰에 의해 뒷받침됩니다.

쾌락 추구가 모든 생물의 삶의 근본적인 측면임을 설명함으로써 에피쿠로스의 입장이 합리적이고 그럴듯하게 보이도록 하는 것이 목적입니다.

윤리학에서 쾌락과 고통의 본질

키케로는 자연 상태에서 동물은 쾌락을 최고의 선으로 우선시하고 고통을 피하려고 노력한다고 주장합니다.

그러나 이것이 쾌락이 궁극적인 선이라는 것을 결정적으로 증명하는 것은 아닙니다.

또 다른 주장은 감각을 통해 지각되는 쾌락과 고통의 즉각성이 윤리의 기본이 된다는 것이지만, 이 관점에도 한계가 있습니다.

동기 부여와 행동에서 쾌락과 고통의 역할

쾌락과 고통은 인간의 동기와 행동의 주요 동인으로, 다른 모든 것에 대한 우리의 행동과 태도에 영향을 미칩니다.

우리의 욕망, 회피, 심지어 가치관까지도 쾌락과 고통에 대한 기대에 의해 결정됩니다.

미덕과 같은 이 규칙의 예외도 궁극적으로 쾌락으로 이어진다는 점에서 쾌락과 고통과의 관계로 설명할 수 있습니다.

에피쿠로스는 악덕은 궁극적으로 고통을 초래하고 쾌락을 박탈하기 때문에 나쁘다고 믿었습니다.

이 철학은 당장의 욕망을 희생하더라도 쾌락을 추구하고 고통을 피하는 데 있어 올바른 실용적 추론의 중요성을 강조합니다.

이러한 관점은 에피쿠로스 윤리뿐만 아니라 다른 모든 윤리 체계의 근본적인 기초를 형성합니다.