프라이빗 크레딧: 캐니언 파트너스의 부상과 투자 인사이트

### 조쉬 프리드먼: 하버드 물리학 전공자에서 캐니언 파트너스 공동 CEO가 되기까지
* 📈 조쉬 프리드먼은 1990년 절친한 친구이자 하버드 로스쿨 룸메이트인 미치 줄리어스와 함께 **개인 신용 투자에 주력하는 캐니언 파트너스**를 공동 설립했습니다.
* 💰 **2028년까지 2조 8,000억 달러에 이를 것**으로 예상되는 민간 신용 시장은 상업 은행에 비해 더 빠르고 효율적인 자금 조달을 제공하면서 크게 성장했습니다.
* 🏦 프리드먼은 규제받지 않는 민간 신용 회사가 초래하는 위험에 대한 우려에도 불구하고 **시장의 다양한 형태와 낮은 레버리지**로 인해 시스템적 문제가 발생할 가능성이 적다고 생각합니다.
* 🏠 은행이 대출을 축소하면서 **부동산 신용에 기회**가 생겨났고, 부동산이 **재융자나 공실에 직면**할 때 종종 문제가 드러나기도 합니다.
* 📉 프리드먼은 금리와 경제에 대해 상반된 견해를 가지고 있으며, 경기 침체를 피할 수 있었던 것은 **강력한 펀더멘털과 재정 부양책** 덕분이라고 주장합니다.
* 🧠 프리드먼이 찰리 멍거로부터 받은 최고의 투자 조언은 **놓칠까 봐 두려워하거나 시기심에서 비롯되는 일반적인 실수**를 피하면서 **인내심을 갖고 절제**하라는 것이었습니다.
* 🎓 프리드먼은 **교육, 좋아하는 일을 추구하는 것, 비즈니스에서 좋은 파트너를 선택하는 것**의 중요성을 강조합니다.
* 🌟 "금전적 보상이 있다고 해서 금전적 보상을 기대하며 무언가를 할 수는 없습니다. 일반적으로 **금전적 보상은 자신이 좋아하고 잘하는 일을 할 때** 얻을 수 있습니다."

캐니언 파트너스의 공동 설립자인 조쉬 프리먼은 투자 결정에 있어 독립성과 반대의 사고를 강조하며 260억 달러 규모의 사모 신용 회사를 설립했습니다.

If you take a step back, the private markets in general have exploded at the expense of the public markets. I think people overreacted to the Fed raising short-term rates and just anticipated a much worse outcome than what we've actually seen. You've got to think independently. You've got to be a contrarian. And you can't be motivated by fear of missing out or by envy. Canyon Partners co-founder and co-CEO Josh Freeman always knew he would run his own business one day. From the time I was very young, my dad would say to me, You have to go to Harvard. And when you're done, you have to have your own business. He just never thought that business would be an investment firm. What I really wanted to do was I wanted to run a tech company. I got a little bit waylaid in that trajectory because Goldman Sachs was particularly good at recruiting top students at law school and business

school, and he never left finance.
Freeman started KENYON in 1990 with his best friend and roommate from Harvard
Law School. The firm focus was largely on private
credit investing, a market that has soared in popularity in recent years and
could reach $2.8 trillion by 2028, according to Morgan Stanley estimates.
I think people figured out quite correctly that there was an opportunity
to move quicker and more with more alacrity to help finance private equity
firms that were growing quickly and move quicker and more efficiently than
commercial banks. Today, Carney manages more than $26
billion with 200 employees across seven global offices.
Not bad for a kid whose first degree was a bachelor's in physics.
So for those who aren't investment aficionados, what does Canyon Partners
do? What kind of firm is it?
Canyon is basically a credit firm. We focus on things that are
intellectually challenging and complex.

as opposed to middle of the plate types
of things. So we started our careers as Canyon,
focusing on distressed debt. We've widened that viewpoint quite,
quite a bit to encompass structured credit, real estate credit, things that
are transitioning from complex to simple arbitrage, things of that sort, things
where there's a very high payoff to doing thorough and complex research.
So credit is very popular these days. Private credit has been seen as one of
the great growth areas in the investment world.
Why is it that private credit is so popular these days as opposed to ten
years ago or 20 years ago? I think if you take a step back, the
private markets in general have exploded at the expense of the public markets.
Part of that's regulatory. Part of that is just structural in the
market. I think private credit particularly
exploded when the banks took a step back.
I think people figured out quite correctly that there was an opportunity
to move quicker and more with more

alacrity to help finance private equity
firms that were growing quickly, moved quicker and more efficiently than
commercial banks. And the banks would say, well, the
private credit firms that are now dominating this business, large private
equity firms, firms like yours, they are not regulated.
So the banks, when they lend money, they're lending money typically off
their balance sheet or money from the FDIC, guaranteed.
And therefore they have some constraints on what they can do, and they're often
regulated by the Federal Reserve. The private equity firms that have
private credit businesses or private credit firms that just do private credit
or credit kinds of investments. They are not regulated.
So therefore, the argument that the banks make is that maybe these firms are
not going to be really doing good deals and ultimately there'll be a problem
when they when the economy slows down. How do you respond to that?
I think it certainly could be correct.

I think private credit has a lot of different forms and varieties that straight down the middle of the plate. UniTranche lending, which is basically first lien plus second lien combined into one. That layer of the capital structure has gotten to be very crowded with the with the explosion of private credit firms who have grown based on that product. And at this point, you could argue that's probably too much credit availability, chasing too few deals. So there's probably a half a trillion sitting on the sidelines. And as a result, spreads have come down, rates have come down, that the depth of lending has gone up and the covenants have weakened. Generally speaking, the private credit world is operating with with sophisticated investors who take a certain amount of risk and with much, much less leverage applied to those loans. The leverage in commercial banks is generally much higher than the leverage you see in private credit.

So the problems, while they might arise
here and there, are much less likely to be systematic or existential for the
financial system in the way that we saw in 2008 when banks were way
overleveraged with a lot of not very good credit products.
Mostly in that case, real estate based. Somebody gives you money to invest in
private credit, one of your private credit funds.
What kind of rate of return should they reasonably expect?
I think it depends on what they're doing, what those entities are
on things like distressed. I think we expect that to be mid-teens
to 20% on things like close average returns have been, you know, north of 15
and less than 20. They've been in that range very
consistently for many, many years. Let's talk about real estate for a
moment. It is generally the view that large
cities like Los Angeles, San Francisco

New York, Chicago have office buildings
that are not being occupied that much because people work at home.
And also the rents have come down a bit because they can't fill these empty
spaces there, and because interest rates are so high, the overall cap value of or
capitalization rate for these buildings is lower than it used to be.
So there is a view that the banks have on their balance sheets senior debt and
mezzanine debt that is not worth 100 cents on the dollar, maybe not even
worth $0.50 on the dollar, but they're not selling it in the enormous
amounts that people would have expected. Why is all this bank debt for real
estate not on the market and being sold by the banks now?
Well, some of it is. And what what happens in real estate
with banks is typically the problems don't happen until maturity happens or
you need a refinancing and it's not available, or rents turn over and or
tenants turn over and now you have

vacancies.
Some of these buildings are literally obsolete.
David, I mean, there are buildings that were built in 1960 on
Third Avenue here in New York that have been recapped so many times with money
coming out and more and more debt and with pop.
Migrating to different areas with brand new buildings that look completely
different from older buildings that might have lower ceilings and not the
right kind of infrastructure. Some buildings are just completely
obsolete, and there's a lot of that. I've heard estimates as much as 20% of
the office building stock in the United States.
So it takes a while before those problems hit, and sometimes they're not
really fixable through the capital structure.
Sometimes those properties are actually worth whatever the dirt is, minus the
cost of carting away the structure. Opportunities in real estate tend to
start at the top of the capitalization, and they work their way down.
So the first opportunities are good

properties that just weren't
anticipating 6% interest rates. They were anticipating 3% interest
rates. And when debt becomes, do they have to
figure out a solution to that problem? Eventually you work your way down to the
problems of buildings that have substantially
large vacancy rates and are almost not re tenants, both because they're so
obsolete. And we'll see those and we have seen
some of those already, but they tend to be when there's a moment of default or
crisis. Now, with interest rates as high as they
have been for the last two years or so, the general view was for a while that
we're going to have a so-called hard landing, which is a euphemism for a
recession. We haven't really had that.
How did we avoid a recession, given how high interest rates were?
You know, I've been a little bit of a contrarian in the last couple of
years, and I think now I'm probably a

little more consensus-driven in the sense that I kind of agree with the concept that rates are not likely to come down until after the election and that the economy is starting to see a little more signs of shakiness with consumers and where they're spending their money and so forth. But I think if you go back, if the economy is strong and I think people were so concerned about higher rates and yet there were some there was so much fiscal stimulus built up in the economy, unemployment was extremely low. Consumer balance sheets were extremely strong, Bank balance sheets weren't particularly leveraged. I think people overreacted to the Fed raising short-term rates and just anticipated a much worse outcome than what we've actually seen. I really wanted to do something on my own. I wanted to have a shot at having my own business. Let's talk about your background. So where were you born? So I grew up outside of Boston, in a suburb.

Now you got into Harvard, so you must
have done reasonably well in high school, where you were like first in your class
or something like that. I was I had the benefit of parents who
thought that education was the path to having the kinds of alternatives and
flexibility in what you did in your life.
And so that was a major focus of my parents.
So when I became a good student, they were constantly leaning on me to be a
better student. So you went to Harvard and you graduated
summa cum laude? I did.
Now, Summers, that is the highest you can get.
But you also won a martial scholarship. Martial scholarships are given by the
British government to the best academic students in U.S.
colleges, as I understand it. So you must have been one of the top two
or three people at Harvard academically to get a martial scholarship.
Is that right? I was ranked in that very top of my
class.

I was a physics major.
I think there are plenty of people in my class at Harvard who are an order of magnitude more naturally blessed than I was with.
Why did you want to be a physics major? That's not the easiest major.
It. Well, it isn't.
It isn't. If you're really good at math and science, it's a lot more predictable than trying to rely on someone to grade your essay in history. And I loved math and I love science.
And I thought I was really good at it. And then I got to Harvard and I encountered people who just didn't study and just knew everything, and they were brilliant. So you became a martial scholar and you studied at Oxford? Yes.
And did you get a degree there? I did.
I got a degree in politics and economics.
So I wanted to do something that was completely different, something unlikely to be exposed to in the future, in my at

least in my education.
Now, a number of times when people go to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, martial
scholar, they come back and they get a degree back in the United States that
might help their career like a law degree or medical degree or business
degree. But you've got a law and a business
degree. Did your parents say, you know, enough
studying already, get your career going? It was almost the opposite.
My dad didn't know a lot about career paths, per se, but from the time I was
very young, my dad would say to me, You have to go to Harvard.
That's because he was from Boston, and that was the school he knew that was the
best school for someone brought up in his neighborhood and in Roxbury
back then. And he said, You have to go to law
school and you have to go to business school at Harvard.
And when you're done, you have to have

your own business.
Don't work for people, and don't be a lawyer, or at least don't do it for
long. Right.
So you graduate, and you get all these degrees.
What did you want to do with that? Well, what I did was different from what
I wanted to do, David. What I really wanted to do was I wanted to run a tech
company. And tech back then meant electronics.
I mean, signal processing at MIT, all those companies that were located
outside of Boston on Route 128. Eventually, I wanted to own one of those
companies and run it and so forth. I got a little bit waylaid in that trajectory because Goldman Sachs was particularly good at recruiting top
students at law school and business school.
So I thought, well, I'll go to Goldman Sachs for a few years.
All right. So you were at Goldman for a few years,
and presumably you're a pretty smart guy.

You'll rise up.
Why did you decide to leave Goldman? And why did you decide to go where you went?
My roommate from law school and business school, Mitch Julius, who became my partner at Canyon when we started the firm in 1990.
Mitch was a bankruptcy lawyer who decided he didn't want to be a lawyer.
He was writing articles on investing in the 1983 recession, and one of the investment strategies he was writing about was buying junk bonds.
And he came out to L.A. to interview Drexel and Mike Milken, and he ended up joining as a bankruptcy analyst.
He overheard Mike saying he really needed someone to call on private equity firms and try to get them to use high yield bonds as a financing tool.
And he said, hey, you should call my friend Josh.
And so I. I got a call from Mike and three weeks later, I, I left. Right.
So you have these degrees from Harvard.

degrees from Oxford, top of your class,
practically everywhere you go. Goldman is the pinnacle of the
investment banking world. Drexel, while Mike is brilliant, was not
considered in the league of Goldman in terms of prestige.
Did your parents tell you, you know, you're going from the top to a place
that's kind of, you know, new boy on the block?
I knew exactly what he was doing. One of my friends at Goldman and I had a
little file box of all these entrepreneurs doing transformative
things in the capital markets, people who were doing bootstrap transactions,
which is what they called leveraged buyouts back then.
There were maybe two handfuls, three handfuls of leveraged buyout firms at
all. And Drexel's mission was to try to do or
Mike's mission, at least for me, was to try to get these private equity
firms not to deal with Equitable and

Prudential and CNR and Northwest Mutual to try to finance their deals, but rather to use high-yield bonds, because we could be quick. Her more efficient and and really facilitate a much higher velocity of transactions and much more certainty. Right. So you get the Drexel. What year was that? Yeah, it was 1984. All right. So Drexel is doing really very well. But eventually Mike gets into trouble legally and eventually go Drexel goes bankrupt. So were you at Drexel when it went bankrupt? Yes, I was. What was that like? That they had filed for bankruptcy. Were you shocked? No, I wasn't shocked. I think you could see the cracks in the foundation as much as two years before. So I was already planning an exit whether or not Drexel vanished. Right. So Drexel filed for bankruptcy. You're employed there. Do your parents call you and say, hey, your firm just filed for bankruptcy.

What are you going to do?
You know, I don't remember, David. I think I. I do know that I didn't want
to take a job. Once Drexel was gone, many of my
colleagues went to other firms and started high-yield groups.
That became huge profit engines for all of those
firms on the street. Every one of those firms.
I really wanted to do something on my own.
I wanted to have a shot at having my own business.
So I don't think I ever would have left if things continued on the trajectory
that they were on, and things were great. It was so much fun and so
innovative and so exciting. But here was an opportunity that landed
in my lap to do something on my own. So you started KENYON Partners in what
year? 1990 with my partner, Mitch.
And are you other what's the likelihood of starting your business with your
roommate from school?

That rarely happens, right?
It does. It was a great opportunity.
I think we both wanted to take a shot. We have different strengths and
weaknesses. We thought we could do something.
We really didn't have a very well thought out or intel.
How did you capitalize the. Well, initially we each put in some of
our own money, and we had a couple of other partners did the same thing that
at least let us hire some people and get started.
We were doing advisory work initially because that could put bread on the
table every day just through advisory fees that you receive every every month.
And we had some very high profile, significant restructuring advisory work.
We didn't really want to do that. We wanted to be investors.
So we talked a few institutions into giving us some managed accounts, and we
started investing as well. So today the business has taken off.
How large is Kenya Partners now in terms of assets under management?
We're about $26 billion, 26 billion.

And how many employees do you have?
About 235. And you are still running it with your
partner? Yes.
And you think I might you might step back from some point because I've been
running for a while. Are you just going to keep running it
for another dozen years or so now? Well, we did just sign on for another
five years. So as you know, we took on an outside
investor for the first time in our history, which really helped capitalize
the first. And then outside investor you took on is
a large Japanese insurance company. Yes.
The largest insurance company in in Japan.
And what did they do for you? We want to create a firm that has
permanence and has stability, bringing in an outside investor help do
that because first of all, we capitalize the balance sheet with hundreds of
millions of dollars of capital that doesn't go in our pockets, but goes on
our balance sheet so that we can face

the world in a more forward-leaning way, as opposed to a more defensive way where it gets capitalized every year. Now, as we mentioned earlier, you were born in Massachusetts. You're educated there largely, though, sometime in England. You've lived largely in New York and Los Angeles, and now you've moved your headquarters to Dallas and you're living in Dallas. So I Dallas, a wonderful city. I saw a TV show called Dallas. But is that what attracted you to Dallas or why are you in Dallas? Dallas is a great place to do business. California is an amazing place. New York's an amazing place. They're both difficult places to do business for a variety of reasons. From a regulatory point of view, from a cost of living standpoint, it's not so easy to hire people, particularly middle and back-office people where they're facing an enormous cost of living and enormous tax rates and gas prices.

and everything else. So we thought we should offer an alternative. I think many firms in New York have been creating outposts or headquarters, and in Florida, Dallas seemed like a great place to raise a family. There's there are great schools. There are a lot of places to live that are very close to the the sort of uptown and downtown neighborhoods where most offices are located. So we thought it was time to offer an alternative, and we did that. Most of the big mistakes people make is because they see others doing it, and they feel like, Oh my God, how did I miss that? I better get into that. So is it a good time to invest today for the average investor who says, Well, interest rates are pretty high, inflation is still reasonably high, I should wait for a while, or is it time to invest now? I think it depends on the area. I think, for example, distressed investing is very good right now. It doesn't have the same tone and flavor

as prior distress cycles because in
prior distress cycles, there were a lot of bankruptcies, and the economy was
weak. What we have instead is a very strong
economy, and businesses that are doing quite well, but simply have too much debt,
and they can't really refinance it. So there's a lot of balance sheet
restructuring, and there's a very, very long list of situations like that.
But they're not for the faint-hearted because the behavior, both by the
borrowers and by the creditors vis-a-vis each other, it can be pretty rough.
But I think that's an area of immediate opportunity.
Real estate credit is an area of immediate opportunity because the banks
have just been forced by both regulatory initiatives and by their own balance
sheets to take a step back, and an enormous step back.
And a lot of the balance sheets there are unstable as well.
So certain areas, I think, are extremely opportune, and certain areas are more
evergreen areas.

I think that hedge funds try to be an evergreen strategy. And I think we're in a bit of a sweet spot now because credit is yielding so much versus where it was. So what is the best investment advice you've ever been given? Charlie Munger used to have a saying that things fall into three categories: So yes, no, and too complicated to figure out. We kind of ignore that a little bit because we tend to gravitate toward complexity. But I think there's a basic message in there that's a terrific one, which is that you have to be patient and you have to be aggressive when the opportunities are abundant and you have to be quite disciplined at a time when they're not. And if you look at that period that we lived through where rates were ridiculously low, it was easy to put money to work in things that were silly in retrospect. That was true in venture capital.

It was true in equity markets.
It was true in credit markets, particularly.
And I think having the kind of patience and discipline
that Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett have had, is a great
lesson for everyone in the investment world.
What's the most common mistake that investors make in your view?
I think that people are motivated. Another lesson from the great
Charlie Munger, who, if you have the benefit of living in Los Angeles for a
while, you know, he, you get the benefit of
interacting with him periodically. An extraordinary person.
He had a way of looking at both sides of the balance sheet, and he really taught
Warren Buffett, I think, to buy quality businesses as opposed to buying low
quality businesses and being desperate to do it.
When you look at what other people do, they tend to be motivated by fear of
missing out. As he used to say, it's not greed, it's
envy that motivates people.

And I think that most of the big
mistakes people make is because they see others doing it, and they feel like, Oh,
my God, how did I miss that? I better get into that.
I want to look like so-and-so, who's doing a lot of growth equity, and they
transform their hedge fund into that. Or I have to be involved in this
situation because everyone's doing it. You've got to think independently.
You've got to be a contrarian, and you can't be motivated by fear of missing
out or by envy. It's a very, very bad characteristic of
human beings that makes them make bad investment decisions.
So suppose somebody is watching this, and they say, I want to grow up to be Josh
Friedman, a very successful financial entrepreneur, businessperson,
philanthropist. What is the best advice you can give to
young people who might be interested in being like you?
I think that people should, first of all,

they should make sure they get the most
they can out of their education. That's a good thing.
And I think it's important to do something that you love doing.
You can't do something because it's financially rewarding and expect it to
be financially rewarding. That's just unlikely.
That's not usually what happens. Usually, the financial rewards come from
you doing something that you like and that you're good at, and then you have a
certain measure of luck because you happen to be in the right industry at
the right time. I do think it's really important to pick
good partners and good people to do business with.
I was very, very fortunate to have met Mitch back in law school, in business
school in our first year business school section, and then to stay closely in
touch and remain best friends for a long period of time and then start a business
together. I do by far my best thinking when I'm
talking to someone else.

There are others. I'm not sure that's a model that I would necessarily encourage others to pursue, but at least for me, the experience of being able to have somebody to interact with, to disagree with someone who has a different viewpoint, but enough of the same viewpoints has been just a source of great rewards throughout my life.

Bloomberg Wealth: Josh Friedman

David Rubenstein

급증하는 개인 신용 투자의 인기

캐니언 파트너스의 공동 설립자인 조쉬 프리먼은 처음에는 기술 회사를 운영하려 했지만 결국 금융업에 종사하게 되었습니다.

1990년에 설립된 이 회사는 2028년까지 2조 8,000억 달러 규모의 시장이 될 사모 신용 투자에 주력하고 있습니다.

사모 신용은 특히 은행이 철수하면서 시중 은행보다 더 효율적으로 사모 펀드에 자금을 조달할 수 있는 기회로 인해 급성장했습니다.

현재 민간 신용 시장은 과포화 상태이며, 이로 인해 스프레드 하락, 금리 하락, 약정 약화로 이어지고 있습니다.

상업 은행과 달리 민간 신용 회사는 레버리지가 적기 때문에 잠재적인 문제가 발생하더라도 광범위한 영향을 미칠 가능성이 적습니다.

부동산 부문에서는 오피스 빌딩의 낮은 입주율, 임대료 하락, 노후화된 부동산으로 인해 시장이 어려움에 직면하고 있으며, 이는 향후 잠재적인 문제로 이어질 수 있습니다.

이러한 어려움에도 불구하고 부동산 부문에서는 자본화 구조의 최상위에서 시작하여 아래로 내려갈수록 기회가 나타날 것으로 예상됩니다.

높은 금리로 인해 경기 침체에 대한 우려가 있었지만, 경기 호조와 재정 부양책이 경기 침체를 막는 데 도움이 되었습니다.

하버드에서 물리학을 전공하고 마샬 장학금을 받은 이 학생의 배경에는 학업적 성공이 포함되어 있습니다.

옥스퍼드에서 정치학과 경제학을 공부하기로 결정한 것은 남들과는 다른 독특한 길을 가고자 하는 열망을 반영한 것입니다.

성공적인 비즈니스맨의 학업 및 경력에 미치는 영향

인터뷰 대상자의 아버지는 성장하면서 하버드에 진학하여 법학 및 경영학 학위를 취득하고 자신의 사업을 시작하는 것이 중요하다고 강조했습니다.

처음에는 기술 회사를 운영하는 것이 목표였지만, 골드만삭스에 채용되어 몇 년 동안 근무하다가 하버드 동창과 함께 회사를 공동 설립하기 위해 회사를 떠났습니다.

인터뷰 대상자는 골드만삭스와 드렉셀의 명성 차이를 알고 있었지만, 자본 시장에서 혁신적인 일을 할 수 있는 기회에 끌렸습니다.

케니언 파트너스 설립 및 성공적인 비즈니스 구축

마이클은 드렉셀이 파산한 후 다른 회사의 고수익 그룹에 합류하는 대신 자신만의 사업을 목표로 케니언 파트너스를 설립했습니다.

그는 룸메이트였던 미치와 함께 자신의 돈과 일부 파트너의 투자금으로 회사를 공동 설립했습니다.

현재 약 260억 달러의 자산을 관리하고 있는 케니언 파트너스는 처음에는 투자자로 전환하기 전에 자문 업무에 집중했습니다.

댈러스로의 비즈니스 확장 및 이전

이 회사는 일본의 대형 보험회사를 외부 투자자로 영입하여 수억 달러의 자본을 유치하여 재무제표를 자본화했습니다.

CEO와 그의 파트너는 댈러스의 유리한 비즈니스 환경과 삶의 질을 이유로 회사 본사를 댈러스로 이전했습니다.

달라스 이전은 고용과 생활에 있어 뉴욕과 캘리포니아의 높은 비용과 규제에 대한 대안을 제시하기 위한 것입니다.

현재 경기 호조로 인해 구조조정이 필요한 기업 부채가 증가하면서 투자 기회가 창출되고 있습니다.

부동산 신용 및 헤지 펀드는 특히 투자하기에 적합한 분야로 여겨지고 있습니다.

투자자들이 저지르는 가장 흔한 실수는 인내심과 절제된 투자 접근법을 따르기보다는 놓칠지도 모른다는 두려움에 동기를 부여받는 것입니다.

성공적인 금융 기업가 정신의 열쇠

독립적으로 사고하고 투자 결정을 내릴 때 놓칠까 봐 두려워하거나 시기심에 사로잡히지 마세요.

금전적인 보상만을 쫓기보다는 교육을 최대한 활용하고 자신이 좋아하는 일을 추구하는 데 집중하세요.

다른 관점을 가진 사람과 함께 사업을 하면 큰 보람과 창업 성공으로 이어질 수 있으므로 좋은 파트너를 선택하세요.