범프 앱에서 Google 포토로, 그리고 암과의 싸움까지: 데이비드 리브의 뒷이야기

### Bump에서 Google 포토로: 회복탄력성과 재창조의 여정
* 🚀 David Lieb은 수십억 명의 사용자를 목표로 하는 제품을 만들 때 헌신과 인내의 중요성을 강조하며, **초기 실패에서 Google 포토의 최종 성공**에 이르기까지 자신의 여정을 공유합니다.
* 🎓 댈러스에서 공학과 컴퓨터 과학을 전공하며 성장한 Lieb은 경쟁심이 강한 성격 덕분에 학업에 두각을 나타내 **프린스턴과 스탠포드에서 인공 지능 박사 학위**를 취득했습니다.
* 📱 박사 과정을 중퇴한 후에는 휴대폰을 부딪쳐 연락처 정보를 공유할 수 있는 앱인 **Bump를 공동 창업**하여 빠르게 인기를 얻어 **앱스토어 상위권**에 올랐습니다.
* 💸 초기 성공에도 불구하고 Bump는 사용자 유지와 수익 창출에 어려움을 겪었고, 이에 따라 Lieb은 사용자들과 직접 소통하여 그들의 니즈를 파악하고 결국 **사진 공유로 방향을 전환**하여 Flock을 만들게 되었습니다.
* 📉 Flock과 줄어드는 자금으로 어려움을 겪던 Lieb은 **Y Combinator의 도움**을 받아 아이폰의 사진 앱을 대체할 수 있는 아이디어를 얻었고, **Bump를 Google에 매각**한 후 **Google 포토를 개발**하게 되었습니다.
* 🎉 2015년에 성공적으로 출시된 Google 포토는 **4년도 채 되지 않아 10억 명 이상의 사용자**로 성장했으며, 생명을 위협하는 백혈병 진단을 받기 전까지 리브의 경력에서 최고의 정점을 찍었습니다.
* 💪 치료와 회복을 통해 자신의 경력을 재평가한 Lieb은 사용자를 위한 제품 개발에 대한 자신의 열정이 바뀌었음을 깨닫고 **Google을 떠나 Y Combinator에 합류**하여 미래 창업자들을 멘토링하기로 결심했습니다.
* 🌟 이제 리브는 선수가 아닌 코치로서 자신의 경험과 인사이트를 공유하여 **차세대 기업가들이 미래를 바꿀 영향력 있는 제품**을 만들 수 있도록 돕는 것을 목표로 하고 있습니다.

Bump의 창립자인 David Lieb은 직업적 좌절과 암을 극복한 후 Google 포토를 만들었습니다.

[Music] If you want to create something that billions of people will use, a brand new product, Google Photos, you have to be totally committed. And you have to realize that the path to success is very rarely a straight line, and you're almost

certainly going to fail a few times or be thrown a curveball that you weren't expecting. Just talk to the ER nurse here, it doesn't look good. And you just have to keep moving forward no matter what. I'm David Lieb, and this is my backstory.

I grew up in a suburb of Dallas, pretty normal childhood. I was, you know, into math and science, computers. My dad was an engineer, and my mom was a school teacher. So very much a focus on, like, engineering, math, and science growing up. I was one of

the top students in school, and, you know, I wanted to be first in the class. And so I got extremely competitive about that. I really don't like losing. I went to Princeton, majored in electrical engineering there and computer science, and kind of just continued the

traditional path of, like, get good grades, get good internships. After Princeton, um, you know, I didn't really feel the urge to get a job, so I went to Stanford and joined the PhD program in artificial intelligence. So I did that, met a bunch of cool people, ended up working on what

would be the beginning of the DARPA Grand Challenge, which would turn into the self-driving cars that we have today. But I was never a PhD researcher, like I never felt at home amongst those people, and that led me to drop out of the PhD program and go get a job at Texas.

Instruments back home in Texas. I remember sitting in my cubicle at TI, and I read these two 25-year-old kids sold YouTube for a billion dollars. And that was the first moment that it became tangible to me that, like, "Oh, those guys don't look much different than I do. They

don't seem that much different than I do. Could I do that sometime? Huh, maybe. If you were a, you know, smart engineer that aspired to do more than engineering, at least in my era, the next step was to go to business school. So you would go

and get your MBA and then graduate and become a manager at some tech company. So I pursued that path. I went to University of Chicago. I started my MBA, and that was like what I thought I was going to do. But then the first week of

business school, I showed up, you know, we're in a big room, you're meeting all your classmates, and the iPhone had just come out. And we were all trying to get each other's phone numbers so we could text each other to, like, meet up. And one

day I typed in, like, 10 people's phone numbers and asked them to spell their last name, and then I called them, and they dismissed the call, and they added my contact to their phone. And I just thought, like, "Well, this is ridiculous. Why are we doing this? We have

these supercomputers that can run apps now in our pockets. Why hasn't somebody solved this?" You know, the idea that you could share contact information by taking two phones and bumping them together popped into my head in an accounting class one day. If you want to

Share contact info with a bump. There's an app for that. That became Bump. I emailed my buddy Andy to see if we could build it, and we started working on it. We worked on it for maybe three or four weeks, just kind of

nights and weekends as a side project. Submitted it to the App Store for approval. The app went live at the end of March 2009, and we did no promotion. It just went on the App Store, and some people found it. Um, I think the first day

like tens of people found it, and the second day hundreds of people found it, and the third day thousands of people found it. And so pretty quickly it just started to take off. Um, and we did a bunch of work then afterward to try to get the word out. We talked to press. I

would go hit up any blogger that I could find, but it really was driven by word of mouth. I think I learned a few things from the beginning of Bump. Um, one is anybody can build anything. Like, we had no expertise in doing this; we just figured it out. And I think the other

thing that really resonated in hindsight is that when you're building a product for yourself, you can really trust your own intuition about what it should be and how it should work. We weren't mobile app developers. We didn't know anything about building consumer products. I just

wanted to build a product that I enjoyed, and I wanted to make it really good. And so all of the design decisions that we made just kind of fell out from my intuition. So, step one is find a problem that bugs you about the world, and step

too is go build it. In the early days of building a product, like, you have to do everything. There's no team that's going to support you. There's no marketing team, there's no engineering team. It's, it's just you. All three of the founders were

former engineers, um, and so we just divided things up. Obviously, Andy was the best coder, so Andy wrote all the code. I worked on kind of the algorithm and the design, and Jake helped with design and the early promotion of the product. And so we kind of needed an excuse for

school and for our parents to work on Bump, but have it be like more legitimate, I guess, than just messing around with a side project. So we decided to apply to YC on a whim. So our goal is to turn Bump into a verb, just like Google has become

a verb today. And we're looking forward to doing that this summer. Thanks. We got into YC, and the program was to come out to California for the summer for three months and, and build your startup. We got $16,667 of funding, which, in hindsight, is

pretty small, uh, but it was totally sufficient to come out to the Bay Area, live on a friend's floor, and, and build Bump some more. Turns out I never went back to business school, never finished that degree. I had been on the traditional path of going to business

school, becoming a manager at a tech company, and then this small, little, random moment of, of having an idea for an app took me on a completely different career journey. And YC went really well throughout. The, the product kept growing, and by the time Demo Day came

Around in August, we were actually the number two app on the entire App Store, so we were like the most popular app in the world other than iGlowStick, which always will bother me. Our demo day pitch was pretty simple: I showed a map of bumps happening live around the world,

and the map was just lighting up every second. And so everybody realized Bump was like the hottest thing around. MC Hammer invested. People were dressing up as Bump as their Halloween costume that fall. Steve Jobs put our icon on a slide in one of his pitch decks. We

were the hot app of the time. The problem is, um, people didn't keep using the app, and I think this is something that took us many years to figure out. The frequency of use of Bump was too low for the value that it provided people. If

you think about kind of a 2x2 grid where there's high frequency and low frequency, and then high value per interaction and low value per interaction, obviously you want to be in the high frequency, high value box. That's the best place to be. And it's okay if

you're in the low frequency, high value or high frequency, low value, but there's one box you don't want to be in, which is the low frequency, low value box, and that's where we found ourselves with Bump. And in hindsight, you know, I realized we made a ton of mistakes. We

didn't ever have a credible idea for how we would make Bump a business. We hired a bunch of people just to keep up with demand, and, you know, in hindsight, we probably should have hired a lot slower. We spent time going to conferences. All the VCs wanted to talk to us, so we took

All the meetings, we raised too much money too quickly because we could, um, and it prevented us from realizing the real problems that we had in our business. All the classic mistakes that, you know, we at YC now try to teach founders to avoid, uh, we made them all.

Ultimately, we finally kind of came to terms that, like, "Oh, this might not work. Like, what are we going to do?" And so we went back to the very basic YC startup advice, which is: talk to your users. If you don't know what to do, go talk to

your users. We were many years into the Bump journey. We'd burned $10 million or more, probably, probably more, probably $15 million. And I asked our team, "Give me the email addresses of the top 100 users of Bump around the world." And that day, I just emailed them all

personally. And I said, "Hey, I'm the founder of Bump. You're one of our best users. Would you mind talking to me on the phone today?" And that day, uh, I ended up talking to maybe, like, 20 or 30 of those people, and I learned some

interesting things. We knew from our data that they were all primarily using Bump to share photos and not share contact information, but I didn't understand, like, why. Like, what was the context? And by talking to those people, I heard over and over and over again that day that they

were using it to share photos of their family with their family members. And that was something that was a big surprise to us. We had no idea. And when we thought about it, we realized, "Well, the Bump product is actually, like, not the best product in the world if you were"

going to solve that problem. Um, to solve that problem, you don't want to, like, physically have to touch your hands together in order to give somebody some photos. So we realized, well, if we're going to solve the photo sharing problem, like, we should build a really great app

for that. Uh, and that's where we kicked off building our second app, which was called Flock. So with Flock, you would just install the app, you'd go live your life, you'd take photos as you normally do, and it would figure out which photos you took in the presence of your actual

friends. And we did this with geolocation, with social graph, a bunch of other inputs, and help you share those photos with the people that you took them with. And so we would go talk to people and ask them, "Hey, what do you think of Flock? Like, isn't it great?" And they would say,

"Oh, yeah, yeah, I love it. It's so great." And then it turns out they weren't using it. I think it's really hard to get people to tell you hard things. Um, and so the best way to do it is to actually look at quantitative data, like, look at the logs,

see if people are actually using it, look at your retention curves. Um, these things are really simple, especially when you have very few users. You know, this was a pretty tough period, right? We had all these expectations on us. We had 150 million users of Bump. It was the most

popular app in the world, still, but we knew the secret, which is it's going to fail. Our second attempt, Flock, also didn't work. Um, we're running out of money, and so I felt a lot of pressure. This was, you know, probably one of the

most challenging periods of my life, and I just wanted to figure out a way to, like, keep this airplane from crashing. And so we went to YC, we talked to Paul Graham, and we told him what's going on. Here's, here's our status. He made us kind

of think a little bit bigger than we were thinking. So we, we showed him Flock, and we said we've got this really awesome photo sharing app, but nobody's using it. And he pushed us. He said, "You know what you should do? You should just replace the entire photos app on the phone. Then

people will probably use your sharing products." And at the time, I thought that was preposterous. Like, how could we ever do that? Um, that would, that would be impossible. But as we got thinking about it, we realized, you know, the, the photos app on the iPhone isn't that good. Um, and

if we were designing it, we would make it way better. So we decided to go build that product with, you know, four or five months of runway left. We called it Photo Roll. We never launched it. It ran only on my iPhone, uh, because we never scaled it

to work on anybody else's. But it was the product that we wanted as users of photos and iPhones at the time. So I went around and tried to talk to a bunch of companies to see, you know, who might want to buy Bump, who might value this photo

roll idea that we had. And it really was hard for me to accept, but like, no one wanted Bump. It was not valuable. But this idea of Photo Roll and the demo that we had built was something that several companies indicated, you know, "You might be right, like maybe that should be the"

photo app of the future. Ultimately, we sold the company to Google, and the plan was to turn Photo Roll, rebuild it with Google technology, and make it Google Photos. I was actually pretty optimistic about what we could do. We had an aligned plan, like it was very clear

we were going to go build this product. And I was just certain in my bones that it was going to be a winner. Then we showed up to Google on the first day, and there had been a re-org. Um, and all of the plans that we had agreed upon with our

sponsor were out the window. And we were tasked to go work on Google+, the social network. And I basically just believed so strongly, based on all of the time that we had spent working on Bump, that I was certain Google Photos would be a billion

user product if we built it. And I kind of just didn't do what my boss had asked me to do. Um, and it created a ton of conflict. I was definitely not the model employee. I just kind of did it on the, on the back burner. I would go every day and

do my day job, and then in the afternoon I'd go spend some time with our lead designer and design Google Photos. And we did that over several weeks, and we got to a point where we had a plan for like what we would go build. I started to get

some support from the engineers on the team. They all looked at what we were working on, and they said, "Oh, I want that product too! Like, why don't we build that instead of this social network that we don't necessarily want?" And we just kind of like slowly got some groundswell.

support, despite the fact that our bosses were explicitly telling us not to do that. I think a big part of this, for me personally, was we had this enormous opportunity with Bump, and then, by many measures, we'd blown it. We ruined it. And I didn't want

to be a loser. I didn't want to have spent the last five years of my life building this thing that ultimately wouldn't have any legacy in the world. And I saw the opportunity with Google Photos to build something that would be very long-lasting, that would

make all the work that we did on Bump, the 30 people that worked at Bump over those years, make all of their contributions actually matter in the world. And I just couldn't let it go. I couldn't say no to that opportunity. I didn't want Bump to be a failure, and so

I just didn't take no for an answer when the bosses told me, "We're not doing Google Photos." I said, "Okay, boss," and then I went and worked on Google Photos. So, ultimately, they told me to leave the team. In fact, twice I was

fired from the team and told to go find a new role at Google. I called in a bunch of favors. We had a bunch of friends throughout the Valley that knew various people at Google, and I just used every single pathway I could to get

support to build Google Photos. And eventually, we won the battle, and we were given the green light to go build it. So, I think this is a lesson that took me a while to learn, but you can take way more risk than you think.

and if you do, there's big upside available. So once we got the green light, um, you know, it was a team of like 20 of us from Bump latched onto maybe a team of, like, 100 core people from Google with access to all of this

incredible technology, and we were able to build all of Google Photos basically from scratch in about nine months, and we launched it at Google I/O in 2015. I'm thrilled to introduce a brand new product: Google Photos. The core idea of Google Photos

was a home for all of your life's memories. It was a place you could keep your photos and videos. We did very early pioneering work on AI to make them searchable, uh, organize your photos by face, create things, do editing for you. It

was this idea of building a photo assistant for every human on the planet. Google Photos was a hit from day one, and it grew like crazy after that. You know, things were great. We were like an autonomous team inside of Google; we could build what we wanted. I was the

product lead, probably the best period of my career in terms of just building and iterating really quickly. The next few years, things were great. Google Photos grew to more than a billion users in less than four years, which I think is the fastest-growing product of all time, at

least at the time. So things were good. We were popping champagne in the office; everything was rosy. And then I got cancer. Well, we know, no, it's leukemia. Surprise! I was feeling just kind of a little tired. This was in the middle of COVID. We had just had our

My first kid, a five-month-old, meant I wasn't sleeping very much. I just kind of felt a little rundown, a little tired, which made sense. I'd been working non-stop for the last 15 years. But I decided, on a whim, to go to One Medical on

Valencia Street in San Francisco and get checked out. The next day, they did the cursory blood test, just to be sure, and I got an emergency phone call from the Atlanta Dispatch Center. The person on the line said, "You need to go to the

ER as soon as possible. There's something very wrong with your blood." I went to the ER in San Francisco with my wife. We were double-masked; this was the height of COVID. They took me back and poked and prodded,

and the doctors' faces were all very serious. I realized, "Oh, this might be a big deal." For 24 hours, they really didn't have anything to tell me. They ruled out a few things, but it was clear they

didn't know what was wrong with me yet. I talked to the ER nurse. "It doesn't look good." I remember that night was probably the hardest single night of my life. I thought I might die. I tried to calculate the probability in my head, given the

information I had been given. What was the chance I didn't wake up in the morning? In my head that night, I had pegged it at 50%. I thought, "This is it. There's a chance, like a coin flip, maybe I don't wake up." So, what did I do?

Like, when you, you know, you think about being faced with the end of your life, and you can imagine it sometimes and think, like, what would I do if I knew I was going to die? Well, I did. And what I did was look at photos and videos on Google Photos of

my family. I decided I don't want to die in my sleep, so I'm going to stay awake as long as possible tonight and just enjoy the memories that I've had. And then I fell asleep, and I woke up the next morning and I was alive, and it was, um, pretty

amazing to wake up and be alive. You take that for granted every day, don't you? But then that day they came in, and they said, "Hey, we're going to do one more test." Um, and they did a bone marrow biopsy, and they pretty quickly concluded I had

leukemia, which was not good news. But the good news was there were paths to treat it, and the doctor said, "We're going to get started tomorrow." Um, and so at that point I was kind of like, "All right, I got dealt a tough hand. That sucks, but, uh, I

know what I need to do, and I've done hard things before, so let's get it done." So the treatment plan was basically one year of what I would call hard chemo, followed by three years of easier chemo. It was a challenging year. I was in the

hospital for 38 days straight. "Harper, it's day 26 of Papa's chemo. We're almost done. We're just waiting for the cells to come back, right?" I remember when I got out, my wife picked me up, and we rolled the window down of the car, and I

smelled the smells of San Francisco, and it was like the most amazing thing that I had ever experienced. It really changed my mindset of how I wanted to spend the rest of my life. I realized one more thing, which was the job that I had been doing

at Google over the years, it had evolved, and it wasn't anymore the job that I loved, which was building products for users. I just got this bonus life period granted to me. Like, I thought I was going to die, and now I didn't, and

I have this extra piece of life. How do I want to spend it? And the answer was not to be a bureaucrat at a big company. I wanted to work with people who were building the future. I left Google in September 2022 and joined YC and started

working with founders immediately. Working at YC is great. You know, you get to be in the trenches working with the people who are at the frontier of the future, and you get to tell them all the mistakes you made and support them along the way and maybe be that honest

voice that, you know, I wish I had had in hindsight in building my startup. Having gone through what I've gone through, both in the personal realm and also professionally, I've realized now my role is to be the coach rather than the player on the field. Like, be the person

who can help the next generation of founders build the products that we will all use in the future. [Music]

How David Lieb Turned A Failed Startup Into Google Photos | Backstory

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Video Team:
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Y Combinator

전통적인 엔지니어의 길에서 Bump를 만들기까지 David Lieb의 뒷이야기를 들어보세요.

수학, 과학, 컴퓨터에 관심이 많았던 Lieb은 프린스턴과 스탠포드에서 공학과 컴퓨터 과학을 전공했습니다.

초기 자율 주행 자동차 기술을 연구했지만 박사 과정을 그만두고 텍사스 인스트루먼트에서 일했습니다.

YouTube 인수에 영감을 받은 그는 다음 단계로 경영대학원 진학을 고려했습니다.

iPhone의 번거로운 연락처 공유 프로세스는 Bump에 대한 아이디어를 촉발시켰습니다.

사이드 프로젝트로 Bump를 개발했고, 입소문을 통해 빠르게 인기를 얻었습니다.

Bump의 초기 성공과 도전, 그리고 Flock으로의 전환.

누구나 무엇이든 만들 수 있으며 직관을 신뢰하는 것이 중요하다는 것을 배웠습니다.

범프 팀은 각자의 강점에 따라 책임을 분담하고 Y 컴비네이터에 합류했습니다.

폭넓은 인기를 얻었지만 사용자 유지가 큰 문제가 되었습니다.

Bump의 낮은 빈도, 낮은 값 문제와 전형적인 시작 실수를 확인했습니다.

사용자 조사를 통해 Bump가 주로 가족 사진 공유에 사용된다는 사실을 알게 되었고, 이를 바탕으로 Flock을 개발하게 되었습니다.

Flock의 실패, 포토롤의 개발, 그리고 Google의 인수.

Flock은 긍정적인 피드백에도 불구하고 관심을 끌지 못했습니다.

폴 그레이엄의 조언을 바탕으로 새로운 사진 앱인 포토 롤이 개발되었습니다.

Bump는 가치 있는 서비스로 평가받았지만, 포토롤은 관심을 끌었고 결국 구글의 인수로 이어졌습니다.

포토 롤을 Google 포토에 통합하려는 초기 계획은 조직 개편으로 인해 무산되었습니다.

Google 포토를 구축하고, 성공을 거두고, 인생을 바꿀 수 있는 진단을 받습니다.

Lieb은 Google+로 발령받았음에도 불구하고 Google 포토 개발을 계속했습니다.

그는 지속적인 유산을 남기고자 하는 열망에 이끌려 내부의 저항을 극복하고 승인을 받았습니다.

Google 포토는 2015년에 출시되어 10억 명이 넘는 사용자를 확보하며 빠르게 큰 성공을 거두었습니다.

이러한 성공의 와중에 리브는 백혈병 진단을 받았습니다.

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죽음의 가능성에 직면한 리브는 Google 포토의 추억에서 위안을 얻었습니다.

1년간의 격렬한 항암 치료를 견뎌냈고, 이로 인해 그의 인생관이 크게 바뀌었습니다.

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