Taiwan's Indigenous Fighter Jet Development Journey

Taiwan's struggle for fighter jet independence highlights the importance of self-reliant defense capabilities.

### The Evolution of Taiwan's Fighter Jet Development: From Dependence to Independence
* ✈ On May 28, 1989, Taiwan marked a significant milestone with the **first flight of its indigenous supersonic fighter jet**, the Ching-kuo, showcasing a moment of **pride in its aviation history**.
* 🇺🇸 Despite its early efforts, Taiwan's aviation sector lagged behind due to its **reliance on foreign technology**, particularly after the U.S. shifted its focus towards **China following the 1971 Table Tennis Championship**.
* 🛩 The aging fleet of F-14s and F-5s highlighted Taiwan's **urgent need for modern fighter jets**, with initial plans for F-16 and Northrop F-20 acquisitions thwarted by **U.S. policy changes**.
* 🔧 Consequently, Taiwan initiated the IDF development project in May 1982, leading to the establishment of the **Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC)** and the production of its first trainer aircraft, the **Tzu Chung**, in 1972.
* 💡 Despite American assistance, Taiwan faced limitations, such as **restrictions on military engines and operational range**, which led to the development of **domestically produced missiles** and modifications to existing technology.
* 📉 By 1990, as the Jinguo was nearing completion, the U.S. allowed F-16 exports to Taiwan, resulting in a **significant reduction in the planned production of the Jinguo from 260 to 130 units**.
* 🛠 This reduction in production, coupled with a localization rate of **less than 10%**, raised concerns about the **effectiveness and self-sufficiency** of Taiwan's fighter jet capabilities.
* 🔍 Ultimately, the contrasting paths of Taiwan and South Korea in fighter jet development highlight the **importance of in-house development capabilities** and the **efficient sourcing of technology** for achieving **true self-reliance in defense**.

On May 28, 1989, in Tainan, Taiwan, a sleek-looking fighter jet took to the skies for the first time. This was a historic moment as Taiwan successfully completed the first flight of the indigenous supersonic fighter jet, the Ching-kuo. It was a moment filled with emotion. Considering that our first domestically produced fighter jet, the T-38, was essentially just an assembly of the Northrop F-5, Taiwan was quite far behind in the aviation sector at that time. So, why does Taiwan now look at Korea with envy? What happened in the meantime? 

Originally, Taiwan had a strong alliance with the United States. However, the issue arose with that little ping pong ball. The relationship between the U.S. and China improved rapidly following the 1971 Table Tennis Championship held in Japan, leading to the deployment of J-7 fighter jets with enhanced engine performance in the region, which put Taiwan in a precarious position.

They were threatened, but the state of the Taiwanese Air Force was such that it was almost despairing. More than 70 aging F-14s, which had long surpassed their recommended service life, along with outdated F-5s, were a significant concern. In particular, the aging F-5s that were operational in Taiwan made it urgent to replace them with new fighter jets. Initially, the F-16 and Northrop F-20 were strong candidates for Taiwan's new fighter jet. The F-20 was especially significant as it was an upgraded version of the F-5 that Northrop was keen to push for Taiwan. However, due to changes in U.S.-China relations, the U.S. government did not permit this, rendering all these plans futile. At this time, Northrop turned its attention to South Korea instead of the blocked Taiwanese market, but the crash of the F-20 during a flight in Suwon meant that the promising prospect of introducing the F-20 in South Korea also fell through. In any case, as it became clear that acquiring new fighter jets would be difficult in the future, Taiwan decided to pursue independent development of a fighter jet.

In May 1982, the IDF development project was launched, marking the beginning of serious research and development. Taiwan's independent aircraft development efforts surprisingly began quite early, with attempts to develop aircraft dating back to the time of President Chiang Ching-kuo's Kuomintang administration. The result of these efforts was the establishment of Taiwan's aircraft development agency, AIDC, or the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation. After several reorganizations, AIDC became active in the 1970s and successfully launched its first product in 1972, which was Taiwan's first domestically produced trainer aircraft, the Tzu Chung. Although it was developed based on American trainer aircraft, it served as an important stepping stone for independent aircraft development. To put it in perspective, we can compare it to the KT-1, which had its first flight in 1991, indicating how advanced Taiwan was at that time. Under the support of President Chiang Ching-kuo's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, AIDC made various attempts at independent aircraft development. Among these efforts,

One of the developments was the evidence of the fourth-generation fighter jet. The name was also derived from the name of the leader, which was part of the development process. So, did Taiwan have the capability to independently develop fighter jets at that time? Of course, it did not. It was thanks to various American defense companies that entered Taiwan's fighter jet development project behind the scenes. The Reagan administration, due to its relationship with China, officially prohibited major arms sales to Taiwan, but it was not about to abandon Taiwan, which was crucial in preventing China's expansion into the Pacific. The support for this fighter jet system technology came from General Dynamics, BA Systems, Northrop Grumman, and others. However, as development progressed with American assistance, some issues arose. First, the United States did not allow Taiwan to use the latest military engines. As a result, Taiwan had to modify the F124 engine, which was not specialized in military aircraft engines, from the American company Honeywell.

I created an F125 engine with an afterburner, which has made it quite a usable engine. However, due to its weak thrust when used as a single-engine, it had to be a twin-engine even for a lightweight fighter. This significantly affects the weight. Moreover, the United States has limited the operational range of Taiwan's fighter jets to just enough to defend Taiwan without provoking China. In fact, initially, there were attempts to limit the engine output through software. Since the U.S. did not allow the export of AMRAAM missiles to Taiwan, Taiwan had to develop its own missiles. Due to technological support factors, the appearance of the F-16 and FA-18 can be seen simultaneously. The basic armament includes a cannon, with short-range air-to-air missiles being the domestically produced Tien Kung 1, medium-range air-to-air missiles being Tien Kung 2, and a 200 km range air-to-ground missile, the Wan Gong. Although it has not been tested in actual combat, it has been significantly enhanced by being equipped with domestically developed systems.

The head of the power was made possible. The radar was equipped with the latest model, the F20, boasting a detection range of 150 to 160 km, which was excellent. Although it was difficult to say it was completely self-developed and there were many performance limitations, Taiwan was painting a hopeful picture. However, in 1990, when the development of the Jinguo was completed and it was being deployed for practical use, the U.S. government allowed the export of F-16 fighter jets. Although it was the initial version, Taiwan prioritized the introduction of the F-16. Around the same time, France proposed the Mirage 2000 to Taiwan, and Taiwan, thirsty for high-performance fighters, quickly accepted the Mirage as well. As a result, the number of Jinguo units introduced fell to half of the original plan, at 130 units. It was truly like pouring cold water on a fire that was being stoked. In fact, although it was a self-developed project, the limited timeframe led to an urgent process, resulting in a very low domestic production rate of components.

The domestic production rate was less than 10%. A low localization rate is not only a problem for military support but also puts us at a disadvantage in production costs. Especially since we reduced the required number of units by half, the impact was significant. While we expected limited performance, the overall effectiveness of the airframe, such as fuel efficiency and operational availability, did not meet the standards of the Taiwanese Air Force. Some criticize the low localization of parts, questioning how it can be called a domestic fighter jet, but this perspective ignores the advantages of developing our own platform and system capabilities. In fact, Taiwan developed the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) with the consideration of it being a nuclear delivery system. Thus, even with a low localization rate and reliance on foreign technology, there are sufficient reasons for needing an independently developed fighter jet. The introduction of the F-16, which Taiwan desperately wanted, was also allowed after the development of the IDF, indicating that there is indeed a causal relationship.

It seems that for this reason, during the development of TOC in our country, we received advice on various technological experiences from Taiwanese aircraft developers, separate from Lockheed Martin's technology. On the other hand, after the production quantity of evidence halved, we only made performance improvements around 2009 and did not consider additional production. However, recently, evidence has resurfaced. In 2019, we introduced the AT5 Yongying, a high-level trainer. Although a new model was presented, its foundation is clearly based on the FA-50, which was developed for conversion to combat use. There are also reports that Taiwan's next-generation fighter development project is based on this. If we look at the fighter development history of Taiwan and our country together, we can see clues as to why we have different outcomes today. First, the independently developed fighter, or more precisely, the core components of the independently developed platform...

If there is no capability for in-house development or sourcing, even a reader platform cannot fully function. The localization of parts does not necessarily mean that all components must be developed in-house. Unlike Taiwan, we have relatively free sourcing of technology and components, so it is more efficient in terms of time and cost to source from abroad. However, experts believe that we need to steadily secure the development capability for key aircraft components under government leadership. This is likely the last piece of the puzzle for true self-reliant defense. The case of Taiwan's Jingguo illustrates this point. What are your thoughts?

앞서가다 존재감 사라진 대만 전투기 근황 : F-CK-1 징궈(경국호) 이야기

All about enjoying 'flying'!
‘아는 만큼 보인다!’ 비행을 즐기기 위한 모든 것!  

비행기로 여행할 때  / TV나 영화를 볼 때  / 항공 전문지를 읽을 때  / 항공 레저를 즐길 때 / 항공 분야에 종사하면서 
항공기, 하늘 그리고 엔지니어링에 대해 갖게 되는 궁금증들을 취재하여 소개합니다.



더스카이맥 theSKYmag

Taiwan's Journey to Indigenous Fighter Jets

Taiwan's first indigenous supersonic fighter jet, the Ching-kuo, had its inaugural flight on May 28, 1989, marking a significant milestone for the country's aviation sector.

-China relations in the 1970s, particularly after the Table Tennis Championship, led to Taiwan's precarious position and a desperate need to replace its aging fighter jets.

Despite initial plans to acquire new jets like the F-16 and F-20, U.

government restrictions and a subsequent crash in South Korea derailed those efforts, prompting Taiwan to pursue independent development of its own fighter jet.

Taiwan's Independent Aircraft Development

Taiwan's aircraft development efforts began early, during President Chiang Ching-kuo's administration, leading to the establishment of AIDC in the 1970s.

AIDC's first product, Taiwan's domestically produced trainer aircraft, the Tzu Chung, was launched in 1972, marking a significant step in independent aircraft development.

Despite Taiwan's ambitions, the country's fighter jet development was heavily supported by American defense companies, facing challenges such as the prohibition of using the latest military engines.

Taiwan's F125 Engine and Fighter Jet Development

The F125 engine with an afterburner has weak thrust, necessitating a twin-engine setup for lightweight fighters.

has limited the operational range of Taiwan's fighter jets, leading to the development of domestically produced missiles.

The introduction of the F-16 and Mirage 2000 coincided with Taiwan's fighter jet program, causing a significant reduction in the planned number of Jinguo units.

The Challenges of Domestic Fighter Jet Production

The domestic production rate for fighter jets was below 10%, leading to disadvantages in military support and production costs.

Despite a low localization rate, Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) was developed with the intention of being a nuclear delivery system.

The introduction of the F-16 in Taiwan was allowed after the IDF's development, indicating a causal relationship between the two.

The Importance of Development Capability in Defense

In-house development or sourcing is crucial for the full functionality of a reader platform.

While localization of parts is important, sourcing technology and components from abroad can be more efficient.

Securing the development capability for key aircraft components under government leadership is essential for achieving true self-reliant defense.