Um, I, I don't know if I, I don't know, I made myself clear what I was trying to get at. Uh, are you, maybe I, I should ask a question first. Are you proposing that you can do physics a priori? Uh, because that doesn't seem to be the

case. Um, we tried to do physics a priori in that stateheart's project, and it collapses. You can't do physics a priori. You see, as you said, and then you said we can observe regularities, which I think is what physics does, but that means you're

saying that regularities are really there. Um, and then I guess the problem becomes, uh, what privileges those experiences of, I mean, I can have to use your analogy, I can have regularities in my dream, and I don't take them to have given me

an account of how the world really is. But if I do say that regularities work, what is it about them that gets me outside of the simulation? I'm worried about, I'm worried about a problem of skepticism here. I'm worried about a problem of

right. Am I, this is what, you know, this is what Hume does. He says, well, you know, uh, you've got all these regularities, but those regularities are themselves only projected by the mind. Their causation is just association between ideas and experiences, and therefore I

really can't know the world. And Kant, et cetera. And so, I, I guess I'm wondering if there seems to be a, I mean, to say things are a projection is to say that other things are real because it's a contrast term to say that everything

is an illusion for example doesn't make any sense. It's like saying everything's tall, right? Um, so I'm trying to get out what is like what surely we must have experiences that count as access to the real or else we are just locked inside

an attorney, an internal self-referential system. That's what I'm, that's what I'm asking. That make sense? Um, yes, but let's start out with um one of these aspects. There are several um points that we I think would need to address and some of them

are veritable rabbit holes. So let's start out with the problem of skepticism. Personally, I don't see skepticism as a problem because I think that uh when I am observing um the trajectories that my mind can take, there is not usually many points where I

open a door and go through and I cannot go back, right? It's not that I uh in the course of intellectual exploration uh go through one-way doors that I can see before and I say um, I cannot come back. This might exist in some religions. So uh here is a wonderful

delicious brain worm uh you take it on and you can give it back in three weeks from now. And ideologies uh usually work in such a way that they warp your mind in such a way that you get cut off from the rest of human thought space and you

cannot come back. And I, I think that in the rational world this cannot happen. So when you think rationally, everything that you think is conditional on something else, and so everything that is not impossible is possible, and the confidence among the possible things has to be disputed uh distributed.

according to the evidence that is available, so the possibility that nothing exists in the way in which I perceive it, and I don't exist and other people don't exist, or only I exist and all the other people exist is always a possibility, and there is nothing scary

about it, and they don't need to be worried about it. There are no assumptions that they need to make to avoid this, so I never fall into this trap and never come back. Oh my god, no, it's not not a problem. The possibility

that there are no other people should be considered, and I should see, uh, what observations suggest that this is the case and which observations speak against it, and uh, if I ever find out that there never been other people, why should I be surprised, right? It's I should consider this. I

should see how deep the rabbit hole goes. There's nothing scary about it. It's not infinitely deep. They're not infinitely many conclusions that I will draw from this. This will not lock me in an inhospitable place of the intellectual universe if I consider this path. So I

would suggest basically consider the entire space of possibilities and the idea that there are other minds in the world that are constituted in a quite similar way to mine, but have a larger diversity than some people might be willing to acknowledge at first glance

and so on, right? This seems to be a good theory. There seem to be other objects that look a lot like me in this mind, and they seem to be like me. The side effect of the regulation needs of the hairless monkey in the present universe, and uh

This, so it's a good theory. It gives good predictions. It's a useful encoding of the patterns that are thrown at my systemic boundary. And this, there's another aspect to solipsism which is more an experiential one. This is if you cannot perceive other minds as

minds based on the priors that you have. Most people don't learn a lot of wisdom in their life, and that their wisdom they have is largely a structure that is innate to them. They are lucky to be born biased, and they just converge in the

observation of the world to more details in this structure. And so only people that are born unwise have difficulty to ever get to wisdom. So we do learn new structure, but largely the architecture that we use to interpret the world seems to be something that is to a large degree innate. That is mapped

to the circumstances that our ancestors found themselves in in the world. And what we noticed, for instance, many Europeans that live in the US have all these weird quirks in which they relate to the world that are the remnant of non-existent European societies that they're brought

within their own minds, and the structure that is built into their soul over many generations. And now they try this in this very brutish and weird pioneer society that is the US. And many of these patterns don't make sense. And this is not just the case for

Europeans, it's just for Europeans. I can notice and interpret these patterns better than for other cultures that are part of this hodgepodge of the US. And so it's very interesting to see that uh solipsism might be a property of

Some people, I I sometimes think that our previous president has been a solipsist, not in the sense that he is an evil person. I think it's psychologically interesting that when he talks to other people, his important criterion was always, "He can't say whatever he wants as long

as he gets away with it." And communication is a tool to get what he wants. And it seems to be somewhat invariant in politics, but he beelines for it right. He is able to think outside of a box because he never acknowledged the existence of this box.

There is a certain prior that there are other minds that he needs to share truth with, that is absent. He can just say whatever he wants. He's free to do this because there are no other people. There's only something like an almost faceless audience that relates to him in

a particular way, and that he relates to in a particular way that makes him fit for this particular role. Was probably unwise to to make this tangent because they don't want to make a normative statement one way or the other about Trump. They just think that he happens to

be somebody that we all know and who's psychologically interesting because I think he might be a solipsist in an experiential, functional, not necessarily a philosophical sense. So don't worry, Josh, I'm not going to draw you into any kind of political

debate around uh uh Trump. Um so that uh that would be uh unfair to you and unfair to the spirit in which you offered the example. Um now uh I'm trying to think of what how to reply because you said about seven thousand really interesting things in

that last thing uh but one thing I I I seemed to pick up on uh was that you know reality seems to be determined by rational processes of making sense um which I mean and that's a classical kind of idealism that's sort of like Hegelian

idealism that ultimately the real is dependent on on the on the capacity for rationality and so rationality has to be as real as anything else because of that dependency relationship now the thing about that is rationality seems to be a quintessential mental property too

um and does that mean that we don't have I mean you know you know you know this too I know you know what again I've seen your talks you know the problems of deep time that idealism faces right the problem with deep time you know

there seems to be a significant difference between Darwin discovering the theory of evolution in 1859 process of rational reflection gathering the evidence and the process of evolution that actually led to Darwin's existence right they have different they have different temporal uh spatial extensions

etc and so the the problem I guess I'm trying to get at is when I'm talking about it that way doesn't that mean that I have to take it that that rationality really exists since my ability to determine what is real is dependent on

my rational processes like you said better theories worth series making better sense etc etc and then that seems to indicate a very high level of organization at which things can be real rather than just what is typically taken to be the physical I take it that at least

traditionally at least currently rationality is not part of the ontology of physics. It's presupposed in the practice of physics but it's not part of the ontology. Um and so that that means it sounds to me either like you have a kind of strong

idealism or because you brought this up as another possibility you see rationality as emerging uh perhaps out of intelligence and intelligence emerging out of the behavior of the brain. But it wouldn't be an epiphenomenon. It could not be given this argument at the

phenomenal emergence. Rationality would have to be a real thing that really exists and really uh directs people's behavior in some fashion. How does that land with you or have I misinterpreted you?

The problem of skepticism and solipsism - Joscha Bach and John Vervaeke

The problem of skepticism and solipsism - Joscha Bach and John Vervaeke

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